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Abstract
This thesis identifies and resolves an issue caused by Braess’s paradox in Finan-
cial Transmission Right (FTR) auctions. Braess’s paradox in power systems is the
situation where adding a new transmission line can reduce the transmission system
capacity, and vice-versa. FTRs are auctioned by Regional Transmission Organiza-
tions (RTOs) to market parties who wish to hedge uncertain transmission costs. The
issue can cause the RTO to over-allocate FTRs and become revenue inadequate which
leaves the RTO the dilemma of how to recover the deficit.
An auction process called the simultaneous feasibility test (SFT) limits the FTR
awarded to ensure that sufficient congestion rents are collected by the RTO to pay
the FTR holders. The problem stems from an SFT approximation coined in this the-
sis the Simultaneous Imposition of Non-coincidental Transmission Outages (SINTO)
that models planned transmission outages concurrently rather than as scheduled.
When Braess’s paradox applies to FTR auctions, the SFT approximation defies the
intuitive assumption that removing transmission lines will reduce transmission system
capacity. Thus, two methods are proposed to mitigate the effects of Braess’s paradox
ii
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in FTR auctions. The first is the Chronological Imposition of Planned Transmission
Outages (CHIMPO), which ideally models the transmission outages as scheduled but
also considerably increases the auction’s computational cost. The second method,
called the Normally-Operated SINTO (NO-SINTO), is a robust and computation-
ally inexpensive approximation that adds a single set of transmission constraints to
the SINTO model.
The five contributions of this thesis are described through simple examples and
case study simulation using actual historical FTR auction data. The first establishes,
using the SINTO SFT approximation, that the existence of Braess’s paradox can
lead to revenue inadequacy in FTR auctions. The second demonstrates that mod-
eling SINTO in FTR auctions may aggravate the impact of the paradox. The third
offers two alternative FTR auction models (CHIMPO, NO-SINTO) to reduce the
risk of revenue inadequacy from Braess’s paradox. The fourth demonstrates that the
ideal CHIMPO allocation of FTRs is better approximated by the NO-SINTO model
than the SINTO model. The fifth indicates that RTOs may practically implement
the NO-SINTO approximation on a realistically sized power networks.
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Note on mathematical notation:
• Sets are shown in the Mathcal font, and indices are in lower-case italic fonts.
For example, k ∈ K denotes the kth element in the set K. Common sets, such
as the set of natural numbers N, or the set of real numbers R, are denoted by
the mathbb font.
• Arrays are written in bold, italic, font, whereas elements of an array are written
in italics with indices to denote its position. For example, X denotes an array,
whereas Xk denotes the k
th element in X.
• Subscript on variables or sets are indices. If the subscript is in italics, then it is
an arbitrary (variable) element, whereas a roman subscript indicates a specific
element within a set or variable. For example Xk indicates the k
th element of
X, whereas Xk indicates the variable associated with a specific element with
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the name “k”. Superscript roman text are labels to distinguish variables and
sets. For example, XOne and XTwo are two different variables. Conversely, XOne
and XTwo are two different elements from the same variable X.
• Uppercase variables are considered parameters in optimization problems, whereas
lowercase letters are considered decision variables in optimization problems. For
example, X is a parameter, whereas x is a decision variable.
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v Index of the set of interfaces V (Section 6.3.7)
y Index of settlement points ∈ Y (Section 6.3.2)
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“Transmission rights stand at the center of market design in a restructured
electricity industry” [1].
The main goals of electric power restructuring are to provide industry partici-
pants with better incentives to reduce their costs and to introduce innovations that
increase the social welfare, or more precisely, to lower the cost of electricity provision
by opening power generation to competition [2]. The literature that analyzes and
quantifies the benefits of electricity market designs is extensive [1, 3–18]. While in
theory, each market design may be economically efficient, its benefits may not be
fully realized in practice due to its complexity or difficulty to implement in a manner
that is publicly acceptable and robust against gaming. The translation of broad pol-
icy design concepts to practicable and enforceable regulation often lead to inefficient
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implementation, whose impact vary widely. One common issue concerning the design
of electricity markets is the fair access to the transmission system.
Due to physical laws governing power transmission and congestion on power trans-
fer, the value of electricity can vary based on location. In a deregulated electricity
market, it is considered economically efficient to price electricity to reflect the value of
electricity at each bus1, such that each bus will have a locational marginal price (LMP)
for electricity. Locational marginal pricing is used in most American bulk power mar-
kets to ensure that consumers fairly pay generators for electricity provision, both in
real-time markets and in day-ahead markets. When there is a difference in LMP
between two nodes, an incentive exists for transmitting power from the cheaper bus
to the more expensive bus until the prices converge. However, when this is impossible
(e.g., congestion or Kirchkoff’s laws), financial transmission rights (FTRs) have been
suggested as a financial instrument to capture the cost difference.
A congested power system may purchase power from a generator at a cheap node
and resell power at an expensive node at a net positive revenue, called congestion
rent. While this practice is profitable for merchant transmission lines, independent
system operators (ISOs)2 are expected to be impartial and to return congestion rents
to market participants as fairly as possible. An FTR is a financial instrument designed
to address this issue by hedging FTR holders from congestion, by compensating them
1A power system bus, also known as a node or busbar, is a piece of electrically conductive metal
that allows a common point for connection of power system equipment, such as power lines.
2A regional transmission organization (RTO) or independent system operator (ISO)3 is an entity
that administrates and operates centralized power markets.
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(based on nodal price differences) an amount equal to the congestion rent, thereby
putting the system operator back in an impartial position.4 FTR recipients pay or are
compensated the congestion rent. The objective of the FTR auction is to maximize
the economic value of allocating FTRs, subject to network constraints, where each
bid contains information such as quantity and price of power.
However, the FTR system is not without flaws. Even today, we face pricing diffi-
culties in electricity markets, as described Joskow et al. in 1997 [20]:
“We must get transmission pricing right to decentralize competitive gen-
eration supply decisions efficiently over time and space on an AC net-
work” [20].
When the FTR auctioneer over-allocates the amount of FTRs, the market oper-
ator may owe more money to FTR holders than they make from congestion rents,
which causes the FTR auctioneer to be revenue inadequate. One of the biggest is-
sues facing the centralized power markets is that of maintaining revenue adequacy of
FTR systems. Revenue adequacy is desirable so that the FTR holders can be paid
without the ISO losing money. This issue is described in detail in Section 2.2, with
simple numerical examples in Chapter 4. Hogan [1] demonstrates that, under certain
4Congestion rent can be calculated as the product of the power flow and price differences be-
tween two points [19]. Some markets minimize the as-bid cost of generation, accounting for both
congestion and transmission resistance losses; thus, congestion is not the sole factor that can cause
price divergence between busses. In this case, the LMP is equal to the sum of the marginal energy
component (MEC), the marginal loss component (MLC), and the marginal congestion component
(MCC): LMP = MEC + MLC + MCC. For these markets, the congestion rents are collected from
the MCC instead of the LMP differences. For simplicity, the dispatch examples and formulations




conditions, revenue adequacy can be achieved by ensuring FTRs pass a simultaneous
feasibility test (SFT): if the market operator limits FTR allocations to the capacity
of the transmission system, the convex set of constraints accurately represents the
network during operations, then the FTR market system would be revenue adequate.
While it is known that revenue adequacy is desirable, the methods of recovering from
revenue inadequacy in FTR auctions is still debated. This issue is presently of great
concern to RTOs, stakeholders, and regulators [21].5
The most common method of acquiring FTRs is through monthly FTR auctions
run by the market operator (i.e., FTR auctioneer) for the entire following month, un-
like power transactions that may have 15-minute or hourly resolution. This practice is
called calendar-strip sales.6 Auction participants need to account for network topolo-
gies occurring during the auction period when submitting their bids. The current
industry practice is to model all transmission outages concurrently in the SFT and
throughout the entire FTR auction period, known as the simultaneous imposition of
non-coincident transmission outages (SINTO). However, this can be problematic be-
cause auction participants must submit bids with a monthly resolution, while knowing
that the transmission network topology may change several times during that period
(e.g., due to repairs for transmission line, transformer, breaker, etc.), which may
fail the SFT. Ideally, FTR auctions could be held at a higher time resolution (e.g.,
5Discussed in Section 2.2
6A calendar strip is a product where the quantity is typically based on a sequence of hours that
are bundled together for sale. FTRs are sold by calendar strips. Calendar strip sales are also called
life term [22] or validity period [23].
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each settlement period)7 based on the transmission capacity available in each period,
rather than to treat all maintenance outages as if they occur concurrently for the
entire month. However, current market rules in all formal U.S. markets only allow
future FTRs to be auctioned off in monthly calendar strips. For example, if a auc-
tion participant’s 1-MW bid clears for a 30-day month, they purchased 1 MW × 24
hours/day × 30 days/month, or 720 MWh/month. Alternatively, non-coincidental
outage models would allow each network topology, resulting from planned outage
schedules that do not perfectly overlap, to be considered in FTR auctions. The latter
better represents the actual availability of transmission and in general, would result
in different FTR distributions. The operation of the SFT is illustrated with numerical
examples in Chapter 4.
The origin of using the single-topology model is not known; however, it is ubiqui-
tously practiced in the industry in FTR auction modeling [24–27].8 As explained in
Section 2.1, there are two reasons for this practice: computational simplicity and a
naive (and, as this thesis shows, mistaken) expectation that considering all outages
together would result in a conservative (smaller) allocation of rights, thereby ensur-
ing that the market operator remains revenue adequate. The criteria for transmission
outage inclusion that RTOs use for the single-topology SINTO SFT approximation
are shown in Table 3.1. As described in Section 3.4, one possible reason that the
7Many day-ahead power markets settle hourly.
8Prior to centralized LMP markets with FTR auctions, the simultaneous outage assumption was
widely used to model outages when defining the feasible amount of physical transmission service or
rights that could be provided. [28–35]
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practice was adopted was to reduce the number of constraints. For example, consid-
ering two distinct network configurations on different days would double the number
of constraints because the flows from a given set of rights would have to be calculated
for the two distinct configurations. Reducing the size of the problem was desirable,
or even necessary, due to limitations in computer software and hardware capabilities
at the time.9
In many instances, the SINTO practice may yield conservative solutions that avoid
FTR overallocation [35, 36] by awarding FTRs based on a system with a smaller ca-
pacity. However, as noted in [37, 38], removing a transmission element may in fact
increase the capacity of the system. This phenomenon is known as Braess’s para-
dox, which was first described for transportation systems [39]. If Braess’s paradox
results in an increase in FTR allocations using the SINTO model, it would be incon-
sistent with the assumption that SINTO conservatively reduces FTR allocations for
the market operator to remain revenue adequate. The presence of Braess’s paradox
in SINTO-based FTR auctions would affect FTR prices, availability, and distribu-
tion with attendant impacts on market efficiency (net economic benefit-maximizing
solution), revenue adequacy, and the financial position of partipants in wholesale mar-
kets. Note that Braess’s paradox is a system-level phenomenon: removing one line
may increase or decrease system capacity under different circumstances. However, it
is possible, in some circumstances, to localize Braess’s Paradox to a specific line or
9This is considering the large number of contingencies that would have to be analyzed.
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set of lines in the system, where the effect is more commonly observed.
Consider, for example, a case where there are two sets of scheduled outages at
different times of month. The market operator, who is in a conservative position
to avoid revenue inadequacy, allocates FTRs with the assumption that both outages
occur simultaneously. If the modeled topology does not exhibit Braess’s paradox,
SINTO limits FTR availability such that more FTRs could have been sold. This
may be a sub-optimal solution, but would guarantee revenue adequacy. However,
the assumption of revenue adequacy does not hold when we consider a system that
exhibits Braess’s paradox. It is possible that, by modeling both sets of outages simul-
taneously, that the system capacity increases, thereby leading the market operator’s
“conservative” model to over-allocate FTRs and become revenue inadequate.
To make the situation more complex, the effects of Braess’s paradox are locational:
it is possible for SINTO modeling increases capacity in one region while decreasing in
another. As a result, it is possible, due to Braess’s paradox and the fact that FTRs
are locational, that the market operator over-allocates FTRs in one region and under-
allocates them in another. Thus, due to Braess’s paradox, it is difficult to predict
whether the market operator will be revenue adequate.
This research investigates the impacts of Braess’s paradox and SINTO in calendar
strip sales on the revenue adequacy of market operators. The combination of how
FTRs are auctioned (calendar strips), Braess’s paradox, and SINTO may reduce the
efficiency of the market by not providing the set of FTRs that maximizes benefits to
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users while still satisfying the revenue adequacy condition. This thesis investigates
how the combination of Braess’s paradox, SINTO, and FTR calendar strip sales im-
pacts revenue adequacy and develops new FTR auction formulations that will reduce
their impact on revenue inadequacy while maintaining computational efficiency. More
precisely, the objectives of the research are as follows:
1. Investigate the impact of SINTO and Braess’s paradox upon FTR auction re-
sults, showing that together with FTR calendar strip sales they can lead directly
to revenue inadequacy in realistic situations.
2. Provide two reformulations and/or practices in FTR auctions that can elimi-
nate or greatly mitigate the potential impacts of hypothesized over-conservative
awards of FTRs by SINTO and/or the over-generous award of rights if Braess’s
paradox is important in real systems.
3. Conduct a case study to find evidence for which of Braess’s paradox or over-
conservatism is a greater problem with the widely used SINTO auction and
concurrently test whether two practical reformulations yield rights allocations
that are closer to the allocation that would result if the actual daily distribution
of network outages were to be considered when making monthly allocations.
4. Determine whether the two practical reformulations can be implemented by an
RTO.
This research is relevant because it addresses a correctable issue that impacts
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the distribution of transmission rights and pricing in all current centralized power
markets. Addressing this issue would reduce revenue inadequacy and distortion10 in
FTR award distributions and FTR clearing prices – both of which impact market
efficiency.
1.2 Dissertation scope
The structure of the thesis is as follows. In the present chapter, the scope of this
dissertation is formally introduced, namely, how Braess’s paradox and the SINTO
practice used in FTR auctions as FTR products are awarded (calendar strip sales)
leads to revenue inadequacy. Moreover, it describes the research objectives. In addi-
tion, this section describes the arrangement of this dissertation.
Chapter 2 provides a synopsis on the evolution of power markets, from bilateral
markets with physical transmission rights to LMP markets and FTRs, and develops a
hypothesis on how and why the SINTO practice is part of the FTR auction modeling
practice. In addition, this chapter reviews known causes of FTR underfunding and
revenue inadequacy and how these are currently managed in current markets. Finally,
the chapter reviews the literature relevant to the proposed research, which includes
LMP market design, FTR development, and FTR revenue adequacy.
Chapter 3 is a broad chapter covering necessary concepts. It contains detailed
10Distortion in this context is defined as the path-specific change in FTR awards due to additional
transmission capacity caused by Braess’s paradox and SINTO.
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background information and a baseline model for understanding the subsequent work.
Section 3.2 provides a simple example to illustrate how LMP arises when the transmis-
sion network is congested. In Section 3.3, Braess’s paradox is presented from its dis-
covery in transportation system to its application in power systems. Braess’s paradox
explains situations where removing a transmission element increases the transmission
capacity of the system. Section 3.3 concludes by examining two simple circuits that
exhibit Braess’s paradox: the first is a Wheatstone bridge circuit and the second has
parallel circuits with one circuit having higher admittance and lower capacity than
the other circuit (parallel high admittance low capacity, PHALC). Admittance is a
measure of how easily a circuit or device will allow a current to flow. After explaining
these circuits, the two circuits are combined in Chapter 4 to create an example that
numerically illustrates the problem pertaining to revenue inadequacy. Section 3.4,
explains SINTO in power systems and the possible origin of the practice. Chapter 3
concludes in Section 3.5 by reviewing two formulations: an LMP energy dispatch for-
mulation and a general FTR auction formulation. The dispatch formulation is used
in later examples to provide LMPs resulting from energy dispatch, and the LMP
differences are used to simulate the payouts (settlements) from the allocated FTRs.
Likewise, the FTR formulation is used in an example FTR auction to simulate derived
FTR clearing prices. In addition, the FTR auction formulation is modified to mitigate
FTR over-awarding due to the combined impact of Braess’s paradox, SINTO, and
FTR calendar strip sales. This proposal is an important contribution of this thesis
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and is elaborated upon in later chapters.
Chapter 4 derives how revenue inadequacy occurs due to Braess’s paradox, SINTO,
and FTR calendar strip sales. This is accomplished by modeling and comparing two
cases – the first using the SINTO practice and the second by modifying the FTR
auction to include constraints that represent each transmission configuration that
occurs during the period. The contribution of this chapter is the identification of the
correctable issue that causes revenue inadequacy.
In Chapter 5, two FTR auction formulations are developed that remedy the ef-
fects of Braess’s paradox in FTR auctions – the two models are practical and readily
implementable in actual FTR auctions. The first improves the SFT approximation
by modeling all unique outage configurations as a result of the planned transmission
outage schedule and is named the chronological imposition of planned transmission
outages (CHIMPO). The second formulation is called the normal operation – simul-
taneous imposition of non-coincidental transmission outages (NO-SINTO), which is
a practical modification to SINTO that mitigates Braess’s paradox and improves the
model run-time performance.
Chapters 6 and 7 constitute a case study that contributes evidence that Braess’s
paradox and SINTO do impact real FTR auction results. By applying ERCOT FTR
auction data to the iHedge® FTR market simulator (a commercial FTR auction
software package also used by ERCOT for CRR,11 it was possible to elucidate the
11In ERCOT, FTRs are called congestion revenue rights or CRRs.
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role of Braess’s paradox in real FTR auctions. iHedge is reconfigured to the two
practical formulations in Chapter 5, namely the CHIMPO and NO-SINTO formula-
tions. The objective function values of these two formulations are compared to the
SINTO FTR auction and to another case that is similar to a SINTO FTR auction
without transmission outages included. Chapter 6 provides the rationale for selecting
ERCOT for the case study, describes ERCOT’s CRR auction process and iHedge
(and configuration for practical formulations), describes the model data preparation,
and provides case study research questions and model run methodology. Chapter 7
answers the case study questions posed in Chapter 6 and provides the case study
results, analysis, and findings. In addition, an assessment is offered on the feasibility
of ERCOT adopting the practical formulations by comparing computational run-time
performance and analyzing the difficulty of preparing the model runs.
Chapter 8 concludes the dissertation by summarizing the contributions made in




This chapter has four objectives. The first objective is to provide background on
how the practice of simultaneously modeling non-coincidental transmission outages
(SINTO) became widespread in Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs) auction pro-
cesses. The second objective is to provide a historical overview of FTR funding to
give an indication of RTO performance in managing FTR revenue adequacy. The
third objective is to explain the known causes of FTR underfunding and the methods
RTOs adopted to manage the shortfalls. Finally, the chapter concludes with a review
of the academic literature relevant to financial transmission rights and theoretical
causes of revenue inadequacy.
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2.1 Background
In 1996, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Orders 888 [40] and
889 [41] mandated the deregulation of the power industry – unbundling vertically
integrated utilities into unregulated generation, regulated transmission, and distri-
bution companies. Central to the order was non-discriminatory access to the trans-
mission system. To provide non-discriminatory access to the transmission system,
the orders called for the creation of the Open Access Same Time Information System
known as OASIS. OASIS provided a centralized portal so that all customers were
treated equally and had the same access to transmission information and capacity
available for sale. Transmission service is the leasing of transmission capacity from
the transmission owners through entities called transmission service providers.
Before implementation of Locational Marginal Price (LMP) markets with FTRs,
transmission service was a physical capacity right where a portion of transmission
system’s line capacities was reserved. The physical transmission service was sold
based on the “firmness” of the service whereas the firmer the transmission service,
the lower the possibility of curtailment. Of course, transmission customers would pay
more for firmer service. Transmission service was also sold by term: annual, monthly,
weekly, daily, and hourly. The firmness of the transmission service increased with the
length of the term so that the system operator would curtail a shorter term service
before a longer term one. Lastly, transmission service was sold as either point-to-
point or network service. Point-to-point transmission service was sold for transactions
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between control areas.1 Sometimes these transactions involved “wheeling” power [42]
through a control area that neither had the generator (source) or the designated
load (sink). In addition to point-to-point service, a trader would have to purchase
transmission service within a control area to move the power from either the generator
to the control area boundary or from the boundary to the load. This transmission
service is known as Network Transmission Service. Most of the network transmission
service is sold to the legacy electric utility customers for transmission service inside
their control area from their legacy utility generators known as Designated Network
Resources [43, 44].
OASIS sites were required to post the amount of transmission capacity available for
sale, Available Transfer Capability (ATC), to other control areas (legacy transmission
service territories of electric utilities) - for power traders and marketers to determine
available transmission capacity. Engineers used power flow analysis to determine
available transfer capability and developed methodologies based on how transmission
service was sold. A capacity accounting system emerged based on power flow studies.
For example, annual transmission service was studied using twelve base cases (power
flow models) – one representing each month. This resulted in the problem of how to
model non-coincidental transmission outages, each of which tends to last days rather
than a full month. It is not known why the practice was adopted, but ultimately
transmission engineers chose to simultaneously model non-coincidental transmission
1Today, Control Areas are called Balancing Authority Areas.
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outages using SINTO-type models. Although this practice was not collectively de-
cided upon, it has become the de facto good utility practice by utilities [24–35,45–47].
One possible reason may be due to lack of awareness of Braess’s paradox, or per-
haps the low-frequency of Braess’s paradox caused it to be ignored in models. It is
reasonable, however, to conclude that SINTO was a conservative measure to avoid
overselling transmission service by reducing the available capacity.
In 1994, Hogan proposed a nodal market design based on LMPs and financial
transmission rights, which was adopted by FERC’s Order 2000 [48]. LMP-based
markets were first proposed by Schweppe et al. [4, 5]. A more thorough explanation
of these academic works is provided in Section 2.5. Order 2000 attempted to imple-
ment a Standard Market Design (SMD) that included a day-ahead LMP market, a
real-time LMP market, and financial transmission rights. Additionally, SMD initiated
a centralized unit commitment process, known as Security Constrained Unit Com-
mitment (SCUC) and a dispatch process known as Security Constrained Economic
Dispatch (SCED). A key challenge for FERC included the compensation of transmis-
sion service customers with equivalent transmission rights in an LMP market. In LMP
markets, the economics of the generators determine which generating units operate
to use the transmission capacity. In other words, in LMP markets, generators that
cause congestion are disincentivized from running, as it would decrease the clearing
price. By contrast, in physical rights markets, the “firmness” of service determines
the transactions cut to relieve the constraint. Note the inefficiency: if a line becomes
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congested, a lower cost generator can be curtailed if the higher cost generator has
firmer transmission service than a lower cost generator. This inefficiency is remedied
in an LMP market; thus the concept of “firmness” of the transmission service is no
longer relevant.
The solution was to replace physical transmission service reservations with FTRs
through an FTR allocation process. FTRs credit the market participant the con-
gestion charges incurred if there was congestion between the generator and the load
(point-to-point) it is serving, thereby financially hedging the transaction. The excess
transmission capacity after the FTR allocation process would be made available to the
market through FTR auctions. FTR auctions require a simultaneous feasibility test
to maintain revenue adequacy that limits the number of FTRs to the available trans-
mission capacity. Current practices in all RTO/ISO markets model non-coincidental
transmission outages simultaneously (SINTO) in assessing system feasibility.
Revenue adequacy is a term used in the power industry to indicate when the RTO
can collect enough congestion rents to pay all of its FTR holders. More specifically,
Hogan defines it as follows: “the system is revenue adequate if the revenues collected
from the economic dispatch in the form of congestion payments are sufficient to fully
fund payments for the FTRs” [49]. Although Hogan provides theoretical proof that
the FTR model is revenue adequate under certain assumptions, in actuality, most
ISO/RTOs are not [50], [51] or have adopted administrative mechanisms to manage
the discrepancy. To address this issue, Hogan provides insight into the drivers of
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the inadequacies [49]. Many of these drivers are caused by uncertainties that are
not controllable. For example, a forced (unplanned) transmission line outage due
to equipment failure can cause congestion. In this case, the capacity limitation is
not modeled in the FTR auction, and thus, FTRs are over-awarded. This causes
a discrepancy between the total congestion rents collected to pay the FTR holders.
Other causes of revenue inadequacy are discussed in Section 2.2. This research will
not address these uncontrollable events that lead to revenue inadequacy but instead
will focus on how simplified (simultaneous) modeling of maintenance outages together
with Braess’s paradox can also result in revenue inadequacy.
2.2 Revenue inadequacy problems in
today’s FTR markets
This section presents the initial motivation for this research by presenting an
overview of RTO FTR funding performance in the United States centralized power
markets prior to 2015. See Figure 2.1 to reference the geographical boundaries of
the seven U.S. centralized power markets discussed below. The terminology used
to describe the measurement of revenue adequacy, limits and assumptions used in
the simultaneous feasibility test and settlement mechanisms used for funding FTR
payments differ among the markets; therefore, there are differences in how revenue
adequacy metrics are reported by each RTO. The objective of this section is to show
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that revenue adequacy performance is a concern that is actively monitored by all U.S.
RTOs and historically is, in almost all RTOs, an underfunding issue that RTOs must
address.
According to [52], “The purpose of the SFT is to preserve the economic value
of FTRs to the FTR holders by ensuring that all FTRs awarded can be honored.”
Thus addressing revenue inadequacy issues begin by improving the SFT (which is the
objective of this thesis). When the economic value of the FTRs are not preserved
(by under collecting sufficient congestion rents), they weaken FTR values and create
uncertainty affecting the efficiency of the market [52,53]. Conversely, the RTO would
receive a surplus (by over collecting congestion rents) and also maintain the value of
the FTRs if the RTO does not allocate sufficient FTR quantities. However, this too
is problematic because it creates a lost opportunity cost by not making available the
full capability of the transmission system. RTOs bear the responsibility for managing
these two situations.
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Figure 2.1: Map of RTOs-ISOs in the United States [54]
2.2.1 Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland
Interconnection
The PJM2 interconnection is the largest power market in the United States. It
has a highest peak demand of 165,492 MW [56].3 In 1997, it was the first centrally
dispatched U.S. power market to implement LMP [57, 58] and in 1998 implemented
their FTR auction market [59]. This being the case, PJM is closely scrutinized by the
power industry as a prototypical model for other power markets to learn from and
2PJM started in 1927 when three utilities from New Jersey and Pennsylvania formed an integrated
power pool. After Baltimore Gas and Electric Company and General Public Utilities joined in 1956,
the pool was renamed the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland Interconnection or PJM. PJM became
an ISO in 1997 and an RTO 2001, and since then the RTO has grown to include other utilities
from Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia [55]
3Occurred in July 2011
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being the oldest U.S. LMP market and first to implement FTRs it has the longest
history managing revenue adequacy.
PJM manages revenue inadequacy by pro rata reduction of the FTR payments
to the FTR holders. Figure 2.2 displays the FTR annual percent payout since FTRs
were first implemented by PJM. The FTR annual payout percentage is equal to the
total congestion rents collected divided target FTR payments over a year whereas
the target payment is the fully funded FTR payment equal to the total number of
FTR times the corresponding price difference between the sink LMP minus the source
LMP.





Target FTR Payments =
∑
s∈SFixed
qFTRs × (πLMP,Sinks − πLMP,Sources )
where s ∈ SFixed denote the set of previously awarded FTRs, qFTRs is the quantity of
transmission rights awarded for bid s [MW], and πLMP,Sources and π
LMP,Sink
s denote the
locational marginal prices at the source and sink settlement points for bid s [$/MW].
Despite using a simultaneous feasibility test to release FTRs, the FTR payments
have been reduced in ten of the sixteen years with several recent years (2011 to
2014) experiencing very large percent reductions of 19%, 31.7%, and 27.2% respec-
tively. During these years the revenue inadequacy amounted to $192, $288 and $679
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Figure 2.2: Historical PJM FTR payout percentage [60]
million dollars respectively. Figure 2.3 shows the historical amount of the revenue
adequacy surpluses and deficits in U.S. dollars. The accumulated revenue adequacy
from 2007/08 to 2015/16 planning years is a deficit of 1.237 billion dollars with the
highest cumulative deficit of 1.412 billion dollars occurring in planning year 2013/14.
To investigate the causes for the FTR revenue inadequacy issues, PJM has held
three separate stakeholder processes to address FTR revenue adequacy since March
2011 as of October 15, 2015 [61].
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Figure 2.3: Historical PJM revenue adequacy [60]
2.2.2 Midcontinent Independent System Operator
Unlike PJM, the Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO) guarantees
full payment for released FTRs; therefore the chart presented in Figure 2.4 reflects
the FTR funding performance instead of the FTR payout percentage reported by
PJM. Any shortfalls are collected from other market settlement sources to make up
the difference. Notice that in each year since 2008 the funding performance has been
less than one-hundred percent except for 2011 which had a surplus of 2.8%. Like
PJM, MISO has a stakeholder process4 to investigate and improve revenue adequacy.
4Financial Transmission Rights Working Group (FTRWG)
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Figure 2.4: Historical MISO FTR funding performance percentage [62–66]
2.2.3 California Independent System Operator
The California Independent System Operator (CAISO), like MISO, guarantees
full funding for their FTRs [67] which are called Congestion Revenue Rights (CRR).
Figure 2.5 displays the annual shortfall in dollar amounts. In each of the seven years
during the period from 2009 to 2015 since CRRs were first implemented the day-
ahead congestion rents were not enough to fully fund the CRRs and the cumulative
amount of inadequacy during this period amounts to 466 million dollars.
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Figure 2.5: Historical CAISO CRR revenue inadequacy [68–70]
2.2.4 New York Independent System Operator
The New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) is another RTO that fully
funds their FTR instruments called Transmission Congestion Contracts (TCC). They
report revenue inadequacy as a TCC funding shortfall percentage. In this case, any
surpluses and deficits are absorbed by the transmission companies in the NYISO
region. The graph in Figure 2.6 indicates shortfalls in each year from 2009 to 2015
with an average shortfall, in percentage, of 13.1%. In 2012, NYISO implemented
changes to their TCC action modeling assumptions that reduced the shortfalls in the
subsequent years.
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Figure 2.6: Historical NYISO TCC funding shortfall percentage [71–76]
2.2.5 New England Independent System Operator
Figure 2.7 shows the historical FTR funding performance in percentage for New
England Independent System Operator (NEISO). From the period beginning 2006,
the New England Independent System Operator (NEISO or ISONE) experienced
few years of FTR underfunding. In fact, in several years during this period, they
have experienced surpluses even though NEISO makes available up to 95% of the
transmission capacity in their monthly auctions. Other markets make much less
available, for example, in ERCOT it is a 10% reduction of all transmission system
equipment capacities and in CAISO which varies every month typically is 15% or
more (see Figure 2.11). However, there are a couple of reasons. The first reason is
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that New England ISO substantially reduces the ratings of their interfaces5 between
regions because the power transfer capability of the interfaces is difficult to calculate
with certainty; therefore, they are very conservative in setting the interface limit.
When any of these interfaces become congested, the amount of the congestion rents
will be greater than the amount of FTRs allocated that creates a surplus which is used
to pay any other constraints that are revenue inadequate. The second reason is due
to the effect of recent transmission upgrades on their system that has substantially
decreased congestion.
Figure 2.7: Historical NEISO FTR funding performance percentage [77–82]
5An interface is a grouping of transmission lines that limit the flow to or from a region for
reliability concerns. e.g., stability ratings
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2.2.6 Electric Reliability Council of Texas
In the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), like in CAISO, FTRs are
called Congestion Revenue Rights (CRR). ERCOT uses two methods to manage infea-
sible CRRs that incur revenue inadequacy. In the first method, ERCOT investigates
which constraints are revenue inadequate and then discounts the CRRs that impact
the revenue inadequate constraint in a prorated fashion [83]. In this case, only, the
CRR holders that have CRRs that flow over the constraint are derated. ERCOT calls
this process CRR deration. If the CRRs are still underfunded, ERCOT will make
up the difference through a shortfall payment by all the CRR participants who have
positive value CRRs. The stacked bars in Figure 2.8 displays the amount of monthly
CRR deration and shortfall charges, and the line shows the CRR percentage payout
during the period from December 2010 to July 2013. These values are displayed be-
fore applying the balancing account system. The monthly balancing account system
is a financial repository that accumulates surplus congestion rents during each set-
tlement period to subsidize revenue inadequate periods. The purpose of this account
is to preserve the value of the CRRs. At the end of the month, any balance account
surplus is credited to the load serving entities by load ratio share or deficit is charged
accordingly using deration and shortfall charges. In 2014 after applying the monthly
balancing account, the CRR funding percentage was 94% with $19 million in deration
charges and $11 million in shortfall charges.6
6Note: ERCOT makes available 90% of the transmission capacity. The shortfall and deration
charges would be greater if ERCOT released 100% of their system capacity.
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Figure 2.8: Historical ERCOT CRR deration and shortfalls [84]
2.2.7 Southwest Power Pool
The Southwest Power Pool (SPP) began their Integrated Marketplace in March
2014 offering FTR instruments called Transmission Congestion Rights (TCR). Figure
2.9 shows the TCR funding performance for the first two years of operations. In 2014,
the funding performance was 85%, and in 2015 it was 86%. These percentages equate
to 56 and 33 million dollars of shortfalls respectively. Like PJM, SPP manages the
underfunding by prorating the TCR payments to the TCR holders.
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Figure 2.9: Historical SPP TCR funding performance percentage [85,86]
2.2.8 Independent market monitors
As can be seen from the FTR funding charts in this section, historically, most
RTOs experienced underfunding due to revenue inadequacy. In some RTOs, the
underfunding was substantial. All RTOs monitor and report on the management
of revenue adequacy, which is also one of the metrics used by independent market
monitors to gauge the effectiveness of the market. Independent market monitors
(IMM) are retained by RTOs to analyze the design and the functioning of the power
market. IMMs typically provide periodic state of the market reports that contain
analysis and information about FTR markets and revenue adequacy.
30
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE SURVEY
2.3 Causes of FTR underfunding and
revenue inadequacy
Revenue inadequacy causes underfunding, however underfunding is not revenue in-
adequacy. This section begins by describing the difference between the two commonly
used terms by RTOs to report the status of their revenue adequacy periodically. Once
that is explained, the known causes of FTR revenue inadequacy and underfunding
are presented.
2.3.1 Difference between revenue inadequacy and
underfunding
Some RTOs describe FTR underfunding in association with revenue inadequacy,
but the two terms have different meanings. In general, underfunding is a term RTOs
use when revenue inadequacy occurs, but may also include insufficient funds from
other sources. For example, this includes FTR auction revenues or congestion rents
collected from the real-time market.7 In a simple one-market system (as will be used
in the examples in this dissertation) the term revenue inadequacy is the circumstance
where insufficient congestion rents are collected to pay the FTR holders from the
LMPs that are calculated during the real-time operation of the system. However, all
7Congestion associated with the real-time market is called balancing congestion as opposed to
day-ahead congestion.
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U.S. RTOs have adopted a two-market system in addition to the FTR market. One
is called the real-time market, and the other is the day-ahead market.
The real-time market is the same as the one-market system where the LMPs are
calculated to operate the system and reflect actual system conditions. The day-ahead
market8 is a financial market where no actual power is being produced or consumed
and is not susceptible to random events that can cause price volatility during the
actual operation of the power system. Market participants such as generators, op-
erators, and load serving entities participate (either offer to sell power or bid to
purchase power) in the day-ahead market to prevent financial exposure to real-time
price volatility. As long as the transactions that cleared in the day-ahead market
are physically delivered or consumed in the operating period (real-time), the market
participants have no financial exposure to the potentially volatile real-time prices.
However, if the market participants deviate from their physical obligations, then they
must pay (or be paid) based on the real-time prices.
In some markets, (e.g., PJM) FTRs are paid by congestion rents from both the
day-ahead and real-time markets, and in other markets (e.g., ERCOT), only from
the day-ahead market. Day-ahead transactions can be thought of as shorter term
FTRs with a period of one day. Like the FTR allocation process, the day-ahead
market also uses an SFT to constrain the market transactions. This is an important
point since the day-ahead market may be revenue adequate and have a surplus of
8As the name implies the day-ahead market occurs the day preceding the operating (real-time)
day
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congestion rents but be called underfunded because the real-time market may not
produce enough congestion rents to pay day-ahead transactions. In other words, the
real-time market may be revenue inadequate such that the total congestion rents
collected in both the day-ahead and real-time markets cannot cover the payments to
both the FTR holders and the day-ahead transactions.
Combining the day-ahead with the real-time settlements creates a situation of
cross-subsidization where surpluses in one market settlement are used to fund short-
falls in other market settlements. Like the FTR market process, there are other
related market financial instruments in RTOs that depend on transmission capacity
for both their allocation and settlements based on the realization of congestion rents.
Figure 2.10 displays a diagram depicting the energy market process.
Holders of physical transmission rights convert their rights to an instrument called
Auction Revenue Right (ARR), which entitles the holder of the ARR to the FTR auc-
tion revenues. The ARR allocation process determines the feasibility of the submitted
candidate physical transmission rights using an SFT process that limits the ARR al-
location to the estimated future transmission system capacity using a simultaneous
feasibility test similar to the FTR auction process. The holder of the ARRs can
convert their ARRs into FTRs by a process called self-scheduling – the effect of this
action is to trade the value from the FTR auction revenues for the day-ahead rev-
enues for the path selected. However, if the ARR holder decides to keep their ARRs,
the merchandising surplus (congestion rents) derived from the transmission system
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Figure 2.10: RTO market process
constraints used in the FTR auction will be used to pay the ARR holders. If there is
less capacity in the FTR auction transmission model on the transmission constraints
then there will not be enough merchandising surplus collected to pay the ARR holders
fully. The same situation can occur between the day-ahead market and the real-time
markets since the day-ahead market transmission configuration may not align with
the real-time transmission configuration. This is displayed in Figure 2.10 where the
ovals depict different transmission system SFT topologies for their respective market
process and the circles represent the revenue adequacy condition that is managed by
the RTO. The flat cylinder at the top of the diagram shows a settlement construct
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called a balancing account. The dashed lines indicate that the RTO may elect to
cross-subsidize these market settlements.
Another method to manage FTR funding is temporal cross-subsidisation where
surpluses that occur during one time period created by FTR under-allocation is put
into the balance account to fund periods where FTRs are over-allocated. Lastly,
constraint cross-subsidisation is where one constraint that is revenue inadequate is
funded by another constraint in the same period that is more than revenue adequate.
Cross-subsidisation is an administrative method to deal with the underfunding
caused by revenue inadequacy and as such does not address the cause of underfunding.
Resolving the underfunding problem is not the primary focus of this research; however,
it is necessary to distinguish it from revenue inadequacy. This distinction is important
because some RTOs, for example, have combined different settlement systems, or as
discussed, fund FTR revenue inadequacy from other sources. In all U.S. RTOs, FTRs
are settled using the day-ahead LMPs, therefore according to Hogan [49], only day-
ahead congestion rents should be used to determine FTR revenue adequacy.
2.3.2 Known causes of revenue inadequacy
Revenue inadequacy is an intricate issue with many causes, all of which are ulti-
mately derived from over-allocating FTRs [21, 49]. The FTR allocation is bounded
by a Simultaneous Feasibility Test (SFT) where the bids are modeled as power injec-
tions (source) into a bus or group of buses that flow through the transmission system
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model and withdrawn from a bus or group of buses (sink). Bids modeled in this
fashion obey Kirchhoff’s laws thus the flows on each transmission line can then be
determined. All bids are considered simultaneously feasible when the flows on the
lines are at or within the rating of the lines (and other transmission equipment). In
theory, based on Hogan’s revenue adequacy theorem [1,49], if the bids are simultane-
ously feasible, the system is revenue adequate. However, as Hogan points out in [49],
this is not the case in practice due to real conditions. The causes that drive revenue
inadequacy are separated below into three categories. The first category concerns
FTR modeling, the second category pertains to transmission capacity uncertainty,
and the third category is FTR release policy and market design.
2.3.2.1 Category 1: FTR modeling
FTR modeling concerns itself with the method, assumptions and software config-
urations by which FTRs are released. Most RTOs release FTRs through an allocation
and auction process that solves an optimization problem with simultaneous feasibility
test constraints. The modeling assumptions that may over-release FTRs are listed
below.
• Input assumptions
– Parallel flows: Parallel flows occur due to the physical characteristics of
the transmission system where the flows from a neighboring interconnected
system flow over the system of interest. It is standard practice to assume a
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set of fixed flows from a neighboring system in the SFT and then if the es-
timated flows modeled are less than the ones during the settlement period,
too many FTR are released thus potentially causing revenue inadequacy.
– Phase Angle Regulator (PAR) settings: A PAR is a specialized trans-
former designed for controlling the real power flow in a network. Like
parallel flows, PAR adjustments change line flows in the SFT which, if
misestimated, can lead to revenue inadequacy [87].
– Dynamic line ratings: Transmission line ratings are set based on static
and very conservative engineering assumptions (e.g., pertaining to ambient
temperature or wind speed) for determining conductor heat dissipation.
Dynamic line ratings, on the other hand, increase line ratings by using
short-term forecast or actual measurements of localized ambient weather
conditions around the conductor instead of the conservative engineering
values. Revenue inadequacy can occur if the dynamic ratings used in the
Day-ahead market are less than the estimated dynamic line ratings used
for the FTR allocation.
• Missing constraints: The definition of a transmission line constraint consists of a
monitored element and may include one or more contingency elements (see Sec-
tion 6.3.8 for further explanation of monitored and contingency elements). An
FTR over-allocation may occur if either the monitored element or the contin-
gency element is not defined in the FTR allocation model. For example, many
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RTOs use an abridged set of line constraints (called flowgates) instead of the
set of all possible combinations of monitored lines and contingencies (m num-
ber of monitored elements multiplied by n number of contingencies) to reduce
computational time in solving the FTR allocation model, DA and RT markets.
This creates a situation where the flowgates used in the DA market may not
have been modeled in the FTR allocation SFT thus releasing too many FTRs.
• Software or system error: FTR system data management or software flaws may
cause incorrect allocation results.
• Human error: FTR modeling engineer can make errors like entering incorrect
configuration values into the FTR model that can provide the wrong allocation.
• Modeling approach or method: The modeling approach constitutes the engi-
neering modeling decisions that the FTR engineer develops to form the method
used to run the allocation process. Below are two examples that may lead to
FTR over-allocation.
– SINTO: Modeling one topology in the FTR model to represent the trans-
mission configurations during the auction period. The FTR over-allocation
caused by SINTO is explained in Chapter 4.
– Outage duration imposition rules: RTO practice of modeling transmission
outages that have a duration greater than or equal to minimum duration
period (see Table 3.1). In this case, outages with scheduled durations less
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than the minimum duration period are not modeled in the FTR allocation
process. The excluded outages may lead to an over allocation of FTRs.
2.3.2.2 Category 2: Transmission capacity uncertainty
The second category encompasses situations where revenue inadequacy is caused
by transmission capacity uncertainty. As previously mentioned in Section 2.1, trans-
mission capacity differences between the FTR release process and the topology during
the period the congestion rents are generated directly impact revenue adequacy. For
example, if a transmission outage that reduces transmission capacity is not modeled
in the FTR released process, it can cause an over-allocation of FTRs.9 The situa-
tions listed below are circumstances that create differences in between the topology
used to allocate FTR and the topologies used to collect the congestion rents that pay
the FTR holders. The last item of this list is also the subject of this thesis – the
over-allocation of FTRs due to the impact of Braess’s paradox and SINTO.
• Forced outages and deratings that occur after the FTR are released that reduce
capacity of the transmission system.
• Planned outages that are not included in the FTR auction because they are
submitted to the RTO by the transmission company after the FTRs are released.
• The imposition of additional constraints on the grid to ensure electricity quality
9Historically, this situation is a major contributor to revenue inadequacy in most RTOs.
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[88] or reliability, e.g., voltage stability limit constraint implemented due to a
forced generator outage after the FTRs are allocated.
• Optimal Transmission switching [89,90] changes the configuration of the trans-
mission system to minimize the generation dispatch cost, and may cause a
misalignment between the topology in the FTR model and the DA and RT
models.
• Impact of Braess’s paradox and SINTO in the FTR release process when the
scheduled transmission outages have a duration that is less than the auction
period. This phenomenon is explained in Chapter 4.
2.3.2.3 Category 3: Allocation policy and market design
The third and final category is FTR allocation policy and market design. This
category contains three examples where the policy and rules of the market design
create the risk of revenue inadequacy.
• Policy awarding infeasible ARRs: PJM has a Tariff and Operating Agreement
provision [61] that requires PJM to allocate a minimum amount of ARRs (Stage
1A in the Annual ARR allocation) for a 10-year period even if the ARRs are
infeasible. The limits on the constraints caused by the infeasible ARRs in the
ARR allocation SFT are increased in subsequent rounds of the ARR allocation
and future FTR auctions for that period. As explained in Section 2.3.1, an ARR
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is a financial instrument that entitles the holder a share of the FTR auction
revenues or day-ahead congestion rents if the ARRs are converted to FTRs
through a process called self-scheduling.
• Policy adopting Long-term FTRs: In 2005, FERC sent out an invitation [91] to
any interested party soliciting comments on establishing long-term transmission
rights in LMP markets. Prior to this time, the longest FTR term in any RTO
was one year. Market participants that desired longer-term ability to hedge
their transactions initiated the inquiry. FERC, in the inquiry, directly noted the
risk to revenue adequacy involved in adopting the policy by stating, “providing
such long-term rights presents challenges. One such challenge is that to the
extent that the RTO hands out transmission rights over multiple years but
actual grid conditions are different than those anticipated, the RTO could collect
insufficient congestion revenues to pay the FTR holders. Decisions must then be
made regarding who will bear the revenue shortfall. As might be expected, the
longer the instrument’s term, the greater the probability that grid conditions
will be different than forecast.”
• Combining different market settlement accounting streams: Some markets com-
bine different dispatch settlements together to determine FTR payments, e.g.,
in PJM, combining day-ahead and real-time market accounting to determine
FTR funding. As Hogan explains in [49], the FTRs may be revenue adequate
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if the accounting streams are separated so that only the congestion revenue
from the day-ahead market is used to fund the FTRs. As was explained in
Section 2.3.1, by doing so, revenue inadequacy due to circumstances when the
congestion rents collected from the real-time market are insufficient to pay the
day-ahead transactions is removed from the FTR settlements.
2.4 Applied approaches to manage the
funding issues
This section presents the practical methods that RTO use or has considered man-
aging underfunding. As explained in Section 2.3.1, underfunding and revenue inad-
equacy are different terms since underfunding may include shortfalls due to revenue
inadequacy from other market settlements. FTR revenue inadequacy specifically per-
tains to an over-allocation of FTRs when the transmission capacity in the FTR model
is greater than the transmission capacity during the day-ahead market dispatch. Man-
aging FTR revenue adequacy is more of a practice than a science given that many
of the applied methods to reduce capacity in the FTR release process are based on
historical experience, engineering judgment or is broadly applied.
The methods listed below are used to manage revenue adequacy by regulating the
FTR model transmission capacity.
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• Global derate factors: Practice of uniformly reducing the capacity of all lines
by some percentage. For example, the CAISO varies the percent derating on
a monthly basis for their monthly CRR auction, see Figure 2.11 and ERCOT
uses a fixed global derating of ten percent for their monthly CRR auction
• Derate selected lines: This is a more targeted method to reduce individual line
ratings in the FTR allocation model based on line’s historical revenue adequacy.
• Add unscheduled outages: Add unscheduled outages to the FTR model that
the RTO FTR engineers believe would create significant revenue inadequacy if
forced out.
• Reduce the limits of the line by prorating the limits by the duration of the
outage over the outage period in cases where a scheduled transmission outage
is not modeled in the FTR allocation model because the outage duration is less
than the minimum duration rule.10
The methods listed below are approaches that RTOs use to manage underfunding
that can be classified either: cross-subsidization, uplift payments or reducing FTR
payments.
• Spatial cross-subsidization: Within the same period constraint that creates sur-
pluses are used to fund constraints that are revenue inadequate.
10Note: that reducing limits may be overly conservative in cases where the outage exhibits Braess’s
paradox.
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Figure 2.11: CAISO historical global derate factors [92]
• Temporal cross-subsidization: The use of a balance account nets surpluses from
one settlement period to fund revenue inadequacy shortfalls in other periods,
e.g., monthly, rolling month, or annual [93].
• Market settlement cross-subsidization: Practice of combining different market
settlements, e.g., ARR auction revenues, RT market, marginal losses (not cur-
rently done in any market).
• Uplift payments: Recover revenue inadequacy shortfalls from either from the
load (pro rata) or transmission companies [93].
• Derate FTR payments: RTO does not pay the FTR holders the full value of
the FTR targeted payments and only distributes the congestion rents collected.
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This derating is implemented in two ways. The first is accomplished by propor-
tionally socializing the shortfall to the FTR holders so that FTRs are equally
reduced by a percentage equal to the deficit divided by the total FTR target
payments. The second way is to directly derate payments to the FTR holders
whose FTR flow over constraints that are revenue inadequate, for example, this
method is used in ERCOT see Figure 2.12.
Lastly, the two methods below provide examples of managing revenue inadequacy
caused by market rules.
• Modify the market outage scheduling policy for transmission companies to have
the transmission company submit planned transmission outages to the RTO so
that the FTR model SFT can properly account for the outages.
• Modify market rule to prevent an RTO from mixing different market settlements
(multi-settlement) that cause underfunding for the FTR holders so that the
FTR holders do not subsidize deficits from other markets.
A goal of this research is to provide the RTO a new method that reduces FTR
over-allocation due to Braess’s paradox and SINTO by improving the FTR model
SFT to reduce the degree of which the above ex-post facto or socialized techniques
are applied. This research identifies a potential revenue inadequacy problem not
previously considered by RTOs, and proposes new methods to manage that risk.
45
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE SURVEY
Figure 2.12: ERCOT historical CRR deratings [94]
2.5 Literature review: Theory of FTRs
and revenue adequacy
This section complements the preceding sections of this chapter that provide an
explanation of the causes diagnosed and practical solutions implemented by RTOs
based on their actual experiences managing FTR markets. The theoretical work
involving financial transmission rights encompasses a broad spectrum of topics in-
cluding issues of market power, the incentive for transmission investments, FTR val-
uation, game theory simulations, FTR implementation experience, FTR formulation
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functional enhancements, and algorithmic optimization improvements. A summary
compilation of references covering these FTR topics is given in [95,96]. However, the
central subject of this thesis is in identifying, investigating and solving a particular
FTR issue that induces revenue inadequacy; therefore, this section primarily covers
the relevant literature underpinning the development of financial transmission rights
and the subject of revenue adequacy. In Section 2.5.1, the first objective is to review
the relevant academic research on the development of FTRs and other congestion
management products, emphasize the need for revenue adequacy in order to have
successful FTR implementation, and the important role of the SFT in attaining rev-
enue adequacy. The second objective is to present the research about the theoretical
causes of and solutions to revenue inadequacy and is presented in Sections 2.5.2 and
2.5.3 respectively.
2.5.1 Literature pertaining to FTR design and de-
velopment
In their 1982 seminal paper [4], Caramanis et al. laid the conceptual framework
for electricity prices that accounts for the varying time and space nature of electricity
operating costs – known today as locational marginal price (LMP). This concept was
expanded comprehensively into the notional framework of an “energy marketplace” by
Schweppe et al. in their 1988 book [97]. Leveraging this pricing mechanism, Hogan,
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in [98] proposed an alternative (called a “contract network”) to the then current
physical firm transmission rights, which were specified in terms of “contract path” or
“interface transfer capabilities.”
Physical transmission rights, specified in terms of contract paths, disregards im-
portant physical characteristics of power systems [99]. For example, it assumes that
power transfers (due to power sales) follow the shortest path from generator to the
delivery area where the load is located without impacting other transmission neigh-
boring systems. However, in an actual system, power flows (for the desired power
transfer) take parallel paths with flows on each path being inversely proportional to
their impedances. As a result, parallel flows can cause overload issues in neighboring
systems during the operating period. In path-based systems, such congestion is man-
aged inefficiently through a process called Transmission Loading Relief (TLR) [11],
where transactions are curtailed based on the firmness of transmission service as
previously discussed in Section 2.1.
Physical transmission rights, are usually specified in terms of interface transfer
capabilities. Their problem is that the transmission service providers use rough es-
timates of transfer capability between control areas to manage power transactions.
Figure 2.13 displays a portion of the 2004 NERC control area map used by power
traders and marketers to trade power between the control area regions. The circles
represent control areas and the lines connecting the circles are paths representing all
the transmission tie lines between control areas. For each path, the transmission ser-
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vice provider estimates the transfer capacity limit to cap power transactions (trades).
In addition, physical transmission rights require an alignment between the generation
Figure 2.13: 2004 partial Control Area map [100]
dispatch and use of the transmission system (through a process called “tagging”).
For example, a trader has to coordinate the power trade, acquire transmission service
and schedule the transmission service by tagging it. This method to facilitate power
trading requires a significant amount of work and requires the transmission service
provider to recalculate the available transmission capacity of the transmission system
continually.
In contrast, the transmission rights associated with a Hogan’s “contract network,”
called Transmission Congestion Contracts (TCC), adhere to Kirchhoff’s laws. TCCs
preserve the value of the physical transmission rights,11 and exploits the prior work of
11This assumes the long-term capacity right holder is indifferent between delivering the power at
a distant node or receiving the compensation from congestion rents that reflect the opportunity cost
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Schweppe et al. on efficient short-term spot pricing (LMP), which incentivize efficient
dispatch of the generation. Contract network associated rights that use “congestion
payments as a rental fee for the utilization of the capacity rights [98]” later became
known as financial transmission rights. Hogan deduced a centralized market design
structure where the transmission grid operator administers and manages the FTR
process.
Hogan concluded that it is in the grid operator’s best interest (since the grid
operator would control the FTR process) to determine if the congestion revenue is
sufficient to cover the payments to the FTR (capacity right) holders. For a contract
network to be successful, it is vital that revenue adequacy is achieved, so Hogan
in [1] mathematically provides proof that FTRs are revenue adequacy under various
conditions. To this end, Hogan explains that for the DC load flow approximation
there is exact revenue adequacy for congestion payments if the flows induced by the
set of rights would be feasible. Hogan’s FTR is preceded with the term “point-to-
point” because it is calculated from the difference in LMP prices between any two
settlement points that define its path.12
In [11], Chao et al., proposed a different type of transmission right called a flow-
based transmission right or flowgate right. A flowgate right (FGR) is a financial
right that is defined by a network link13 (line, transformer, set of lines) instead of
in the network [98].
12In this thesis, the “point-to-point” designation may be dropped thus any reference to FTR
means point-to-point FTR.
13Oren, in [101], referred to FGRs as Link Based Rights (LBR)
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bus-to-bus (point-to-point) and is settled using the shadow price of the link if the
link becomes congested instead of the LMP difference between two points (buses).
The relationship between FTRs and FGRs is analogous to the relationship between
the LMP difference between two buses and the shadow prices on constrained lines in
a transmission system. However, before continuing further with the analogy, power
transfer distribution factors14 (PTDF) are defined.
In a linearized DC power-flow model, the sensitivity for a power transfer (from one
bus to another bus) on the flow on a transmission line in the system can be expressed
by a constant number called a power transfer distribution factor, which has a value





` is the line index
i, j are the bus indexes where power is injected and taken out, respectively
∆f` change in MW power flow on line ` when a power transfer of ∆Pij is made
between buses i and j
∆Pij is the power transfer from bus i to bus j.
14The derivation for a Power Transfer Distribution Factor can be found in [102] Appendix 7B on
page 336.
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For example, a one megawatt injection at bus i that is withdrawn at bus j with a
PTDF value of APTDFij` = 0.12 on line ` would increase the flow on the line ` by 0.12
megawatts.
Now with an understanding of the PTDF, the analogy between FTRs and FGRs
to LMP and shadow prices is presented below. If resistance losses are disregarded in
the dispatch optimization (e.g., like it is presently in the ERCOT market), the LMP
difference between two buses can be expressed in terms of transmission constraints
as shown below, which shows the relationship between FTRs and FGRs.
πMCCij = π
LMP





` is the line index in the set of lines L
i, j are the bus indexes where power is injected and taken out, respectively
πMCCij is the marginal congestion component from buses i to j [$/MWh]
πLMPi is the locational marginal cost at bus i [$/MWh]
πShadowi is the shadow price on the line ` [$/MWh]
APTDFij` is the power transfer distribution factor on line ` due to changes in power
transfer from bus i to j.
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From the relationship, the difference in LMPs between buses is equal to the sum of
the shadow price πShadow multiplied by its corresponding sensitivity factor (APTDF) on
all lines. Correspondingly, the equation below describes the relationship between the
value of an FTR to FGRs15 where qFTRij is the financial transmission rights quantity
[MWh] from bus i to bus j and qFGR` is the financial flowgate rights [MWh] on the





In [11], Chao et al. describes an FTR as a “portfolio of flowgate rights” since
an FTR has a unique correspondence with flowgates. Conversely, in the reverse
arrangement, the unique correspondence between FTRs and FGRs is not maintained
when decomposing an FGR into a set of FTRs. There may be a multitude of point-
to-point FTR combinations that are equivalent to the same FGR quantity.16
Although there is a direct relationship between FTRs and FGRs, according to
[11,103], one of the main advantages of the flowgate right is that the FGR allocation
does not require a simultaneous feasibility test since the feasible quantity of FGRs on
each link (e.g., a line) is not sensitive to network topology changes or is independent of
power flow patterns. However, in [104], Hogan argues that the transmission system is
operated under n-1 contingencies,17 thus the quantity of FGRs that could be allocated
15The FGR is defined as a single line in this case.
16The exception is in the case of a radial system that has a 1:1 correspondence.
17An n-1 contingency is an NERC reliability criterion where the power system must be operated
such that the flows on each line in the transmission system must stay within the operating limit for
the loss of any system component (e.g., transmission line). The implication of this criterion is that
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changes for every contingency [103, 105] because the flows would be different under
each contingency. Therefore, the FGR (like the FTR) is dependent on topology
changes and power flow patterns.
Another claimed advantage posited by advocates for FGRs is that their implemen-
tation would be simpler than point-to-point FTRs and as such would better facilitate
the power market. The assertion is that there are many more possible point-to-point
FTRs combinations than there are FGRs since the number of possible FGRs would
be limited by the number of connected links (transmission lines) on the network.
However, due to the NERC contingency criteria discussed above, each FGR would
be a combination of a monitored line and a contingency pair, and since there are n-1
contingencies, there would also be a great number of possible FGR combinations [105].
After FGRs had been first proposed by Chao et al., a large debate ensued as to
which financial instrument was better for the market, for examples, see [11,103–108].
Others proposed market designs that accommodate both types. In [109], Tabors
proposed a hybrid model that synthesizes both FTRs and FGRs to facilitate the
creation of a forward market and a stable delivery system. O’Neill et al., in [18,
110], proposes a flexible hybrid energy and transmission market design structure
that incorporates both FTRs and FGRs as well as energy trades through a series of
jointly optimized energy and transmission right auctions. Several RTOs have designed
each line (or system component) must allow for the redistribution of flow due to the contingency
of another system component thus the line cannot be fully loaded to its limit. The n-1 designation
refers to the number of system components (n) except the one removed from service for analysis
(n-1).
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auction and allocation systems that offer both FTRs and FGRs. However, FTRs are
the most popular financial transmission right among market participants.
While FTRs and FGRs emerged as the most prominent, other types of rights were
also proposed, including the Contingent Transmission Right and the Loss hedging fi-
nancial transmission right. O’Neill et al. proposed the Contingency Transmission
Right [8]. A Contingency Transmission Right is a financial right that contains mul-
tiple path designations (multiple sources and sinks). The concept is analogous to
network transmission service associated with physical transmission rights markets.
With network transmission service, the holder of the right has the option to sched-
ule transmission service from generators (sources) they designated as a designated
network resource to one or more loads (sinks) within the control area. Network
transmission service, unlike point-to-point transmission service, gives the holder of
that right, the right to select which generators they prefer to run. For example, in
the case when a generation outage happens. Likewise, a Contingent Revenue Right
provides similar flexibility in that the holder of the financial right would have the
option to hedge any source and sink combinations pertaining to the right thus al-
lowing “for generation portfolio choice and also providing a hedge against generation
outages.” Although [8] claims that Contingent Revenue Rights are revenue adequate
via examples, no formal mathematical proof is provided. Currently, no RTO offers
Contingent Revenue Rights.
In addition to optimizing the value of demand bids minus the cost of resource offers
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to minimize electricity cost, almost all RTOs18 also reduce the cost due to transmission
losses – where generators that decrease losses are rewarded by formulaically adjusting
their bids and penalizes generators that increase losses likewise. The implementation
of minimizing losses is referred to as marginal loss pricing. In marginal loss pricing,
the LMP is decomposed to a marginal energy component (MEC), marginal congestion
component (MCC) and a marginal loss (MLC) component. The energy component
is the same for all pricing nodes in the system. The congestion component is as the
name implies dependent on congestion in the system thus may be different for different
pricing nodes. The marginal loss component also varies by location, therefore, may
create a price difference between a generator bus and load bus even if there is no
congestion. The FTR auction (as opposed to the Day-ahead and real-time markets
[111]) uses a linear power flow model thus does not solve for power losses which is a
quadratic equation (PLoss = I
2×R) therefore FTRs are allocated without accounting
for losses. In RTOs that implement marginal loss pricing, FTRs provide a hedge
for congestion price differences (πMCCij = π
LMP
j − πLMPi ) but not for marginal loss
component price differences. In [112], Harvey and Hogan extend the FTR concept
to provide hedges for both losses and congestion between two buses. In this paper,
Harvey and Hogan summarize the advantages and disadvantages of five different
market designs that account for transmission losses and FTRs - two of which are
prevalent today: marginal loss pricing and average loss pricing.
18Except for ERCOT
56
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE SURVEY
Although most discussions in the literature center on FTRs and FGRs, RTOs have
designed systems that accommodate both types. However, market participants prefer
FTRs. According to [93], FGRs are not adopted because “energy traders prefer FTRs
that are more suitable for hedging point to point congestion risk.” For example, to
provide a simple hedge between two points using FGRs, an energy trader would have
to determine what lines (links) would be constrained and under what contingencies
(if the FGR are defined uniquely as a monitored element and contingency pair) and
the quantity of the capacity to bid (since only a portion of the flows from the hedging
transaction would flow on the constraint) to assemble the hedge. Whereas it is much
easier with an FTR – the trader only has to designate the source and sink points, the
bid price and the quantity desired.
Despite their differences, both FTRs and FGRs have the advantage (as opposed
to physical transmission rights schemes), of being unbundled into transmission rights
that enable the efficient dispatch gained from Schweppe’s spot market to be realized.
However, the successful implementation of both depend on collecting enough con-
gestion rents to pay the rights holders. Therefore, the simultaneous feasibility test
is critical to preventing revenue inadequacy due to the over-allocation of FTRs and
FGRs.
In the next section, power flow problem characteristics are examined in the con-
text of the dispatch optimization problems to understand how they impact revenue
adequacy.
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2.5.2 Literature on revenue adequacy
“A central issue in the provision of FTRs by an ISO is revenue adequacy
[44].”
Section 2.3.2 details many of the possible causes of revenue inadequacy that RTOs
have experienced, which are categorized as either modeling assumptions, transmis-
sion outage uncertainty, and policy and design. Also, Section 2.3.2 describes the
practical methods that RTO use to manage underfunding and revenue inadequacy.
The simultaneous feasibility test accompanying the FTR allocation ensures revenue
adequacy when the transmission configurations used by the FTR allocation model
and the day-ahead market model are consistent. This concept is also known as the
Revenue Adequacy Theorem. Various versions of the Revenue Adequacy Theorem
are provided in the literature but have the same meaning. For example, in [113],
the theorem is stated as: “the TCC19 revenue from a consolidated set of feasible
contracts under the optimal dispatch is no greater than the merchandising surplus.”
And in [114] the definition of Revenue Adequacy Theorem is given as: “when the
extant FTR contracts are simultaneously feasible, the rentals earned by the ISO are
sufficient to fund the coupon payments to the FTR holders.” Theoretically, however,
other conditions are necessary for achieving revenue adequacy. Presented here is the
research that proves the Revenue Adequacy Theorem and under what conditions.
In his seminal work on a Contract Network, Hogan in [48], offers the first math-
ematical proof where an FTR allocation based on an auction using a simultaneous
19TCC stands for Transmission Congestion Contract.
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feasibility test with a linear DC load flow approximation achieves revenue adequacy.
In this case, assumptions are made to simplify the nonlinear aspects of an AC sys-
tem, for example, ignoring power system characteristics such as transmission losses,
voltage constraints, and reactive power flows. Following this initial work, Hogan and
others, in subsequent work, extend the revenue adequacy theorem by proving it holds
under other conditions, for other products types (e.g., flowgate rights, options) or
modeling methods (e.g., convexification).
In [113], Bushnell and Stoft prove that the using a Feasible Lossy Dispatch with
a relaxed energy balance constraint (inequality rather than equality) is convex when
using the DC load flow with quadratic losses approximation. In [115], Hogan and Pope
prove that FTR20 Options for a DC approximation under contingencies are revenue
adequate. There are two types of FTRs – Obligations and options.21 FTRs are
directionally defined by a path from one point to another. For both FTR Obligations
and Options, if the direction of congestion flow is in the same direction as the FTR,
then the holder receives a payment equal to the price difference between the two
points. However, if congestion flow is in the opposite direction, the FTR Obligation
holder is charged the difference between the two points whereas there will be no
charge to the FTR Option holder. In [46], a practical test is conducted using auction
software to determine the effect of introducing FTR Options to the New England ISO
20In this memorandum, Hogan and Pope refer to Transmission Congestion Contracts (TCC)
instead of FTR because it is written to the NYISO Market Structures Working Group. In the
NYISO, an FTR is called a TCC.
21Flowgate rights can also be of Obligation or Option type.
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market. The test of six scenarios concluded that it appears evident from this revenue
inadequacy test that the introduction of Option FTRs does not have a negative effect
on the Congestion Revenue Fund, and in fact had a positive impact.
A Joint Energy and Transmission Rights Auction model proposed in [18] proved
revenue adequacy for both FTR and FGR of both the Obligation and Options types
for a linear DC model. In [110], this condition is expanded to include nonlinear trans-
mission constraints that define a convex feasible region. In [1], Hogan comprehen-
sively extends his previous work proving revenue adequacy for various combinations
of FTR auctions with different power flow approximations (AC, DC, contingencies,
and losses) and different financial rights products: Balanced and unbalanced bids,
FTR Obligation and Options, FGR Obligations and Options.
The steady state characteristics of the electrical system, generator operating con-
straints, load characteristics and generator cost (bid) functions define the feasible
space of a market dispatch optimization problem (or optimal power flow problem,
OPF). The shape of the feasible space is an important criterion to solving an opti-
mization problem. If the feasible space is convex22 and the objective function is either
maximizing a concave function or minimizing a convex function, then the solution is
a global optimum solution.23
22A convex set is a set where a straight line segment connecting any two points within the set will
not contain points on the line that is not in that set.
23If the function is separable in all variables, then a concave function has nonpositive second
derivatives, and a convex function has nonnegative second derivatives. However, if the function is
not separable Hessian conditions are positive semidefinite for convexity and negative semidefinite
for concavity. [116]
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Convexity is important for allocating FTRs because the FTRs should be feasible in
the dispatch problem, or stated differently, the feasible region representing the implied
simultaneous flows from the FTR allocation must be within the feasible region for the
feasible optimal dispatch flows. If not, revenue adequacy can occur. In [117], Philpott
and Pritchard prove for a convex optimization framework (where the transmission
constraints are convex) that the SFT ensures revenue adequacy and presents two
cases that do not satisfy the property, where either the network is affected by outages
or has negative nodal prices. Also, [117] shows via example that in the nonconvex
case you might get revenue inadequacy. On the other hand, Lesieutre and Hiskens,
in [51], prove in general that the feasible power injections that satisfy the AC power
flow equations are nonconvex and further demonstrates via example that the SFT
does not ensure revenue adequacy. Also, in that case, Lesieutre and Hiskens suggest
that policies should be adopted to accommodate revenue inadequacy since it cannot
be theoretically achieved by the SFT.
The revenue adequacy theorem [48] depends on the convexity of the optimization
problem where the convexity of the decision variables and the constraint functions
form the feasible region. Since the power flow equations are nonlinear and nonconvex
in the AC case, the revenue adequacy theorem may not hold under those assumed
conditions. In practice, it suffices because all RTOs presently use a linear DC load
flow with linear transmission constraints for both the day-ahead and FTR allocation
models [118].
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2.5.3 Literature on revenue adequacy solutions
In the previous section, the research shows that revenue adequacy is not theoret-
ically achievable using the SFT due to the nonconvex nature of the power system
equations. Also, that section provides guidance into the limitations of the revenue
adequacy theorem in real markets even in the situation where the system topology in
the FTR allocation and day-ahead market are the same. Therefore, methods to man-
age revenue adequacy or make up the shortfall are necessary and desirable in practice.
Section 2.4 presented the various applied approaches used by RTOs to manage revenue
adequacy and underfunding. The present section covers the literature concerning four
schemes to reduce revenue inadequacy or underfunding. The first involves virtually
expanding a transmission capacity in the FTR allocation by short selling FTRs. The
second introduces a method of directly assigning the revenue inadequacy or surplus
to transmission companies that change their network configuration from what they
provided during the FTR allocation. The last two proposals use similar transmission
switching techniques. One approach addresses revenue adequacy by ensuring the dis-
patch optimization produces a revenue inadequate solution and the other does so by
improving the SFT in the FTR allocation process.
First, in [119], Oren and Hedman propose a virtual line capacity increase that ex-
pands the FTR auction feasible region (creating more capacity to sell FTRs) through
a financial Flowgate Right (FGR) short position. In essence, an entity wishing to
create the virtual line capacity would sell an FGR into the FTR auction so that
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they could receive the auction revenues generated from the additional line capacity
the FGR creates. This would, in fact, create a short position where the entity that
sold the FGR would be liable to cover the FTR payments for the additional FTRs
allocated by the FGR sold. Any entity could sell FGRs; however, Oren and Hed-
man suggest that the transmission owner is the entity ideally suited since it provides
the owner incentive for incremental improvements and maintenance. Financially, the
entity interested in taking a short position is speculating that the payment received
from selling an FGR is greater than the loss if it becomes congested.
Like the prior proposal, the next proposal associates the revenue inadequacy so-
lution to the transmission owners. In [120], Rudkevich et al. propose a mechanism to
directly assign the resulting revenue inadequacy shortfall to the transmission owners
that deviate from the network topology they provided for the FTR allocation. The
premise behind the paper is that the entity responsible for changes in the transmission
system has the financial responsibility for the topology changes they make and the ob-
jective is to preserve the value of FTRs by ensuring they are fully funded. Rudkevich
et al. propose a new financial instrument called the Transmission Reconfiguration
Right (TRR). The TRR creates “transaction batches” using power injections and
withdrawals that replicate the market network as promised capability in the FTR
auction model then it uses the day-ahead market results to determine the economic
value of the TRR. Subsequently, the TRR is then assigned to the transmission owner.
Lastly, Rudkevech et al. amended the revenue adequacy theorem so that revenue ad-
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equacy is achieved by combinations of FTRs and TRRs.
The prior two papers aim to reduce underfunding by reassigning the revenue
inadequacy liability to either an entity speculating to make a profit or one that has
direct control of the transmission grid. The following two proposals use topology
control formulation techniques to reduce revenue inadequacy.
Fisher et al. in [14] proposed an optimal transmission switching dispatch that eco-
nomically dispatches generation using transmission switching. This work is succeeded
and expanded by [121–128]. The impact of the optimal transmission switching upon
revenue adequacy of FTRs is explained in [15,90]. Fundamentally, the optimal trans-
mission switching dispatch may change the operating period topology relative to the
one used in the FTR model and creates a potential revenue inadequacy issue. This is-
sue led to the following proposal to prevent the revenue inadequacy. In [89], Hedman
et al. propose a modified optimal transmission dispatch formulation that constrains
the topology configuration to be revenue adequate or to be a surplus based on pre-
viously allocated FTRs. The main drawback to this method is that it restricts the
potential benefit gained from optimal transmission switching.
Lastly, in [129], Rangarajan and Wang offer an improved SFT formulation that is
capable of analyzing constraints from multiple transmission configurations in the FTR
auction. The formulation uses a transmission switching method to model expected
transmission switching outages (if using optimal transmission switching dispatch),
transmission maintenance outages, and contingencies. Also, the formulation uses a
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Benders’ decomposition technique that is formed into a master and sub-problem. The
master problem is similar to FTR auction formulation that maximizes the economic
value of the FTR bids that is subject to the transmission system constraints. However,
in this formulation, a binary variable controls whether a line is open or close to model
the first set of topology configurations in the SFT. The auction solves in an iterative
fashion that begins by solving the master problem for an initial set of “sanctioned”
bids. The process then passes the sanctioned bids to the sub-problem where they are
further tested to determine if they are feasible in the second set of topologies. The sub-
problem is configured to send a pass/fail indication (another set of binary variables) to
the master problem if the sanctioned set of bids are not feasible. If not feasible, then
feasible cuts are passed to the master problem to begin another iteration until the
Benders’ upper and lower bounds converge, and reaches an optimal solution. Both
the master and sub-problem are capable of modeling outages however the authors
recommend that expected topologies (e.g., based on maintenance outages) be put
into the master problem and less probable topologies (e.g., based on short duration
outages) be put in the sub-problem. The advantage of this improved SFT formulation
is that independent sub-problems can be solved by parallel processing to reduce the
overall computational time.
This thesis adds the literature described in this section by identifying how Braess’s






The goal of this chapter is to build an understanding of locational marginal prices
(LMPs), Braess’s paradox, SINTO, and the dispatch and FTR auction formulations
in order to demonstrate in the next chapter how Braess’s paradox and SINTO in FTR
auctions can cause revenue inadequacy. Section 3.2 begins by explaining LMP using
a simple three-bus system to understand some important characteristics of LMP and
flow in transmission systems. This is followed by an expository on Braess’s paradox
from its discovery in transportation systems to its identification in power systems.
Braess’s paradox was applied to electricity markets by Blumsack [37] and it yields a
perverse outcome. In short, Braess’s paradox indicates that in certain instances, the
addition of transmission capacity in the form of another line can reduce the overall ca-
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pacity of the system. Then two circuits that exhibit Braess’s paradox are introduced.
The first is a well-known circuit called the Wheatstone bridge. The second is a paral-
lel two-circuit system with one circuit having relatively higher admittance and lower
capacity compared to the other (parallel high admittance low capacity or PHALC
circuit). These circuits are combined in Chapter 4 to illustrate how Braess’s paradox
and SINTO in FTR auctions can lead to revenue inadequacy. Section 3.4 explains
how RTO/ISOs use SINTO in FTR auctions and it hypothesizes how the practice
originated. This is followed in Section 3.5 with a description of the optimization
models used in Chapter 4. The first is an optimal power flow (OPF) formulation con-
sidering transmission constraints that calculates generation output levels and LMPs.
The second is a simplified FTR auction formulation.
Lastly, this chapter lays the foundation for Chapter 5, which proposes two gen-
eral models (CHIMPO and NO-SINTO) to correct the potential revenue inadequacy
problem resulting from Braess’s paradox and the use of SINTO, and for Chapters
6 and 7, where the models are applied to determine the extent of the risk in real
systems.
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3.2 Understanding LMP using a three-
bus system
This section presents two cases of a simple three-bus example from [130] to explain
LMPs. Figure 3.1 shows a three-bus system with a generator G1 connected to bus 1,
generator G2 to bus 2, and a load L (demand) of 150 MW at bus 3. Generator G1 is
the lowest-cost producer producing power at $10/MW-h while generator G2 produces
power at $12/MW-h. Both generators have unlimited capacity. Additionally, the
three transmission lines have the same impedances and have no capacity limit. For
simplicity, transmission line losses are ignored.
Figure 3.1: Three-bus circuit configuration
Figure 3.2 shows the least-cost dispatch solution. It is intuitive that the lowest
cost to serve the load would come from generator G1 because its cost is less than
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that of generator G2. In this case, generator G1 produces 150 MW and injects it
into bus 1. Generator G2 – being more expensive – does not dispatch power. From
bus 1, the power has to travel to the load L, which is connected at bus 3. There are
two possible paths that the power can travel through from bus 1 to bus 3: the first
and most direct route goes through line 2 and the second path goes through lines 1
and 3. Twice as much power will travel through line 2 than the second path through
lines 1 and 3 because lines 1 and 3 together have twice the impedance, which in an AC
circuit is analogous to resistance in a DC circuit and impedes power flow. Impedance
together with Kirchhoff’s laws results in the phenomenon of parallel flows [131]: here,
the power flow through path 1 (line 2) is 100 MW while it is 50 MW through path 2
(lines 1 and 3) since Kirchhoff’s laws result in two-thirds of the power running through
line 2.
Figure 3.2: Least-cost dispatch with no constraints
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The LMP is $10/MW at each bus because generator G1 has the lowest cost and
unlimited capacity, and there are no constrained lines in the transmission system.
The cost to the load (customer payments) would be:
$10
MW-h
× 150 MW-h = $1500
Generator G1 would be paid $1500 for producing 150 MW at $10/MW-h, and gen-
erator G2 would not be paid since it did not produce power.
It is important to note that if power were injected at bus 2, it would have two
paths to reach the load at bus 3: the first through line 3 and the second through
lines 1 and 2. Notice that power injected at bus 1 causes flow to travel from bus 1
to 2 whereas power injected at bus 2 causes a flow in the opposite direction. Injection
contributions to line flows can be broken out this way due to the principle of super-
position. After arbitrarily assigning a positive sign to a flow direction of a line, the
flow contributions from each injection point can be algebraically summed to calculate
the net flow. For example, if flow from bus 1 to 2 is positive and if generator G1 is
producing 90 MW, the flow due to generator G1 would be 1/3 times 90 MW or 30
MW. The flow on line 1 due to generation G2 is 60 MW × −1/3 or −20 MW. The
net flow would be 30 MW + (−20 MW) or 10 MW from bus 1 to 2.
Now let us consider case 2, which has a 30 MW limit for line 1. In case 1, 50 MW
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traveled along line 1; however, now this flow is limited due to the 30 MW limit on
line 1. The first 90 MW can be supplied from generator G1 before line 1 becomes
constrained (90 MW × 1/3 = 30 MW). Generator G2 is needed to supply the rest
of the load and prevent line 1 from exceeding its limit. For every megawatt that
generator G2 injects into bus 2, a 1/3 MW counter-flow is created on line 1, reducing
its flow. This allows generator G1 to increase its output and generate more power.
This is desirable since generator G1 is less expensive than generator G2. The optimal
solution is shown in Figure 3.3, with generator G1 producing 120 MW and generator
G2 producing 30 MW.
Figure 3.3: Least-cost dispatch with constraints
The LMP calculation for bus 1 remains the same at $10/MW-h since generator
G1 could supply a load at bus 1 for $10/MW-h as long as the net power injection at
that bus does not exceed 120 MW. The LMP for bus 2 is now $12/MW-h since the
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line 1 constraint does not allow generator G1 to serve an additional load at bus 2.
The LMP at bus 3 is $11/MW-h because each megawatt supplied by generator G2
allows another megawatt from generator G1 to be produced; therefore, the marginal
price of power at bus 3 is supplied by both generators G1 and G2 such that half
is supplied by each. The LMP is calculated as the generator weighted average of
generators G1 and G2 or (.5 × $10/MW-h) + (.5 × $12/MW-h) = $11/MW-h. The
financial settlements are as follows:
• Generator G1 = $10/MW× 120 MW = $1200
• Generator G2 = $12/MW× 30 MW = $360
• Load L = $11/MW× 150 MW = $1650
The total generation cost is $1560, and the total amount that the load pays is
$1650. Finally, the congestion rents can be calculated from the difference between
these two quantities: load payments minus generator receipts = $1650−$1500 = $150.
3.3 Braess’s paradox
A German mathematician named Dietrich Braess discovered Braess’s paradox
when studying traffic networks. Braess’s paper was initially written in German but
translated into English by Anna Nagurney and Tina Wakolbinger of the University
of Massachusetts, Amherst [39]. The paradox states that a transportation system’s
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performance may decline in certain circumstances by adding capacity – in this case
by building another road. He proved this by solving a Nash equilibrium for a traffic
scenario using a Wheatstone bridge system where drivers acted in their own self-
interest (minimizing their travel time).
3.3.1 Braess’s paradox example
Below is a simple transportation example explaining Braess’s paradox. The ex-
ample presented is directly from [132, 133] and is presented here to give a general
understanding of the paradox.
Figure 3.4: Braess’s paradox transportation model example [134]
A Wheatstone bridge transportation system is shown in Figure 3.4. The new road
represented by a dashed line is the Wheatstone bridge. In this example, 4000 drivers
set off from the starting point to the finish. The travel time from the starting point
to node A is dependent on the traffic flow whereas the travel time from the starting
point to node B is dependent on road conditions. The travel times from nodes A and
B are symmetrical but opposite to those from the starting point. The road from node
A to the end point has a fixed time whereas the time to go from node B to the end
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point is a function of traffic flow.
An analysis of the system without the Wheatstone bridge where each driver is
trying to minimize their own travel time yields the following results: 2000 drivers take
the path from the starting point to node A to the end point, and 2000 drivers take
the path from the starting point to node B to the end point. If everyone sets out from
start to finish, then the total travel time for each driver is T/100+45 = 2000/100+45
or 65 minutes, where T is the number of travelers who take that road. The links that
are flow dependent (T/100) are subject to congestion such that an increase in the
number of drivers results in an increase in travel times. Since the road structure
is symmetrical, a balance is reached when 2000 drivers take each path. Once the
equilibrium is reached, no driver can unilaterally decrease their travel time further
(the so-called user equilibrium). A well-known result is that the user equilibrium is
not Pareto optimal (i.e., it is inefficient).
However, if a new road is built from node A to node B that will take no time
(t = 0), the outcome is different. In this case, the shortest time to either node A or B
is from the starting point to node A, that is, the minimum of 4000/100 minutes and
45 minutes. Since there is no time penalty from node A to B, the shortest time to
the end point from node B is also the minimum of 45 minutes and 4000/100 minutes.
Each driver seeking to minimize their own travel time will select the path from the
starting point to node A, from node A to node B, and finally from node B to the
finish point, totaling 4000/100 + 4000/100, or 80 minutes. Thus, the addition of
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the Wheatstone bridge is socially suboptimal because the travel time for all drivers
increased from 65 minutes to 80 minutes under the user equilibrium.
3.3.2 Braess’s paradox in power systems
In his 2006 dissertation, Blumsack applies Braess’s paradox to power systems,
specifically as it pertains to market design policy incentives for transmission invest-
ment [37]. His research examined the characteristics of a Wheatstone bridge network
(Figure 3.5) and how the unintended consequence of a decrease in system capacity
can originate if a new line is constructed. Additionally, previous work in which adding
a transmission line would reduce capacity can be found in [38,135].
Figure 3.5: Wheatstone bridge circuit
Blumsack also studied the necessary and sufficient conditions for Braess’s paradox
to occur in a power system network. He concluded that the case for power systems is
more restricted than in other networks such that the mere presence of a Wheatstone
bridge circuit was neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for Braess’s paradox
to occur. This finding complicates the identification of Braess’s paradox in that,
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circuit configurations alone cannot be used to distinguish circuits that exhibit Braess’s
paradox. Other related research by Emily Fisher, et al. [14,127] exploits the effects of
Braess’s paradox by switching transmission lines in the dispatch optimization. This,
in effect, lowers the cost of operating generators to meet demand. The current practice
is that the transmission topology is not optimized and is configured to a normally
operated state1 regardless of the dispatch. In this case, the underlying advantage
is due to Braess’s paradox where switching transmission takes one or several lines
out of service, thereby removing congestion and increasing the ability of the system
to accommodate cheaper energy sources. The proposed research investigates the
extent that Braess’s paradox impacts FTR auctions and how SINTO compounds
these impacts.
3.3.3 Electrical circuits exhibiting Braess’s
paradox
Electrical circuits exhibit a version of Braess’s paradox. Unlike transport systems
(where the paradox originates in the divergence between user equilibria and social
cost minimization), in power markets, it originates from Kirchhoff’s laws. Kirchhoff’s
laws cause power to flow in all parallel paths; however, the effect is similar: adding an
additional link in the network can lower the capacity of the system. Two circuits are
1The normally operated state of a transmission system is where the system operator normally
configures the transmission system for reliable operation by manipulating breakers.
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introduced in this section; the first is a Wheatstone bridge circuit and the second is
a parallel circuit containing mismatched lines where one has higher admittance and
lower capacity than the other. The second circuit is a parallel high admittance low
capacity (PHALC) circuit. Admittance is a characteristic of a line that is analogous
to conductance in a direct current circuit. The reciprocal of admittance is impedance,
and the reciprocal of conductance is resistance. Impedance reduces the current flow
in an alternating current circuit or device.
It is important to note that these two circuits are not the only electrical circuits
that exhibit Braess’s paradox. They are presented because they will be used in an
example later in the proposal.
3.3.4 Wheatstone bridge circuit
The Wheatstone bridge was invented by Samuel Hunter Christie but was named
after Sir Charles Wheatstone, who publicized it. In its earliest use, the Wheatstone
bridge was used to determine with precision the value of an unknown resistor, Rx. In
the circuit in Figure 3.6, the line with the voltmeter is the Wheatstone bridge. When
the voltmeter on the bridge reads zero, the two circuits are balanced, and the value
on the rheostat (R2) is equal to the value of the unknown resistance (Rx).
The Wheatstone bridge cannot be reduced to simpler series and parallel circuits.
It is a unique circuit that frequently appears in power systems. Figure 3.7 shows two
examples of Wheatstone bridges that appear in an actual system. In this case, the
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Figure 3.6: Wheatstone bridge circuit for determination of an unknown resistance
(Rx) [136]
picture is of the transmission system in Houston, Texas, where the orange lines are
345 kV circuits, the blue lines are 138 kV circuits, and the yellow lines are 69 kV
circuits.
Figure 3.7: Geographic example of bridge circuits in Houston, Texas [137]
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3.3.5 Parallel High Admittance Low Capacity
circuits
A PHALC circuit is a simple example of a circuit that exhibits Braess’s paradox.
The circuit is composed of two parallel lines: one having a relatively higher admittance
and a lower transmission line rating than the other. In short, more of the flow will
take the path of higher admittance (or lower impedance), and because it contains
a lower transmission line rating, it will become congested before the other line. A
simple example is shown in Figure 3.8, where line B has twice the admittance, and
half the line rating as line A. Line A’s rating is 120 MW, and line B’s rating is 60 MW.
The most power that generator G1 can deliver to the load connected at bus 2 when
both lines are in service is 60 MW + 30 MW, for a total of 90 MW. Since line B has
twice the admittance, it will have twice as much flow as line A. The flow limitation is
reached when line B reaches its limit of 60 MW and, at that point, there will be a 30
MW flow on line A. If line B is taken out of service, then the total transfer capability
is 120 MW – line A’s limit. In other words, generator G1 can transfer more power by
taking line B out of service.
It may not seem reasonable that a transmission engineer would build such a cir-
cuit, but they exist because transmission systems are incrementally planned for load
growth, reliability, or to accommodate new or retired generation. Variations of the
PHALC circuit exist; for example, two areas that are connected by multiple tie lines
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Figure 3.8: Parallel high admittance low capacity (PHALC) circuit
where the lowest rated line limits the transfer of power between areas. In another
example, planners may not retire a transmission line even after a larger capacity line
is built because the old line could still provide circuit redundancy for reliability.
3.4 The simultaneous imposition of non-
coincidental transmission
outages in power systems
Transmission owners schedule transmission outages by submitting an outage re-
quest to the RTO/ISO for review and approval. The RTO/ISO studies the outages
to identify any reliability impacts and to coordinate outage requests with neighboring
transmission companies. Transmission outages are not studied for minimizing mar-
ket impacts or for how best to model them in the FTR auction process. Before an
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FTR auction, the FTR modeling group at the RTO/ISO prepares the auction in-
put data, which includes transmission outage assumptions. Figure 3.9 is an example
Gantt chart illustrating five transmission outages scheduled for a typical month. This
example represents the chronological order of the scheduled transmission outages.
Figure 3.9: Example Gantt chart for transmission outages
The common practice when allocating FTRs is to model the outages concurrently
in one transmission system representation as if they occur simultaneously, rather than
chronologically, as shown in Figure 3.9. That is, all lines that have an outage (outages
A through E) in Figure 3.9 are removed from the transmission topology as shown in
Figure 3.10, which forms a set of capacity constraints in the FTR auction formulation.
Figure 3.10: SINTO approximation: Gantt chart for transmission outages
To simplify the problem further, only outages of significant duration are included.
For example, typically for a monthly auction, only outages lasting five days or greater
are included. Table 3.1 lists the rules used by different RTO/ISOs for the inclusion
of a transmission outage in FTR auctions.
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Table 3.1: How RTO/ISOs include transmission outages for FTR auctions [24, 36,
138–141]
Transmission outages are excluded from the FTR auction (line put back in service)
only if they affect either reliability or the feasibility of the auction optimization, for
example, see the Midwest Independent System Operator’s FTR ARR Reports [142].
No consideration is made as to whether the transmission outage exhibits Braess’s
paradox (i.e., increases the amount of FTRs that can be awarded) or if SINTO
multiplies the effects of Braess’s paradox. Typically, the FTR modeling group studies
only whether the set of included outages is feasible, where feasible means that the set
of outages does not create electrical islands. Electrical islands occur when at least
one line does not connect a bus or a group of busses to the rest of the system. Rather
than remove the line from the network, some RTO/ISOs, like the California ISO, may
derate a line instead of modeling the line out of service. The derating will then be
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proportioned based on the number of days it is out of service over the total number
of days in that month.
To illustrate SINTO, Figures 3.11 and 3.12 provide a visual comparison of the
number of non-coincidental planned transmission outages (shown in red) occurring in
a week versus a month in Houston (ERCOT) during May 2013. As can be seen, the
topologies are very different – the latter figure being a graphical example of what is
modeled for a monthly FTR auction. The different colors of the transmission lines
indicate different voltage levels, with orange being 345 kV, blue 138 kV, and yellow
69 kV.
Figure 3.11: Map of ERCOT transmission outages for one week from May 22 to May
29, 2013 [137]
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Figure 3.12: Map of ERCOT transmission outages for one month from May 1 to May
31, 2013 [137]
3.4.1 Genesis of SINTO
No literature exists on the SINTO methodology. Instead, a hypothesis is offered as
to why SINTO was adopted. Before explaining the hypothesis, a very brief high-level
exposition on fundamental power flow theory is presented to provide the necessary
background for the hypothesis.
AC power flow routines solve a set of non-linear simultaneous equations where the
unknowns include voltage angle, voltage magnitude, and real and reactive power flows
over all lines and from all generators, given a set of real and reactive power demands.
Kirchhoff’s voltage and current laws are used to develop the set of equations, which
involve complex numbers. Iterative numerical methods are used to solve the problem,
such as the Gauss–Seidel, Newton–Raphson, and fast-decoupled algorithms [131].
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The power flow problem can be solved more quickly if simplifying assumptions
are made. In particular, for a linear DC load flow, the following three simplifying
assumptions are made: the voltage magnitude is the same for each bus on the system
by fixing the bus voltage magnitudes at a nominal voltage (flat voltage profile), voltage
angles are very small, and the line resistance is negligible [131]. These assumptions
make the load flow problem a linear problem that is much easier to solve. In all
RTO/ISO markets, DC load flow methods are used for market applications, including
dispatch and auctioning FTRs.
Even when using the simplifying DC load flow model, power flow calculations are
computationally challenging and require a large computer memory capacity due to
the actual size of transmission systems.2 Shortcuts are needed to reduce the com-
putational burden. Instead of performing several sequential load flows, one for each
configuration of the network, a smaller and easier to solve model results from consid-
ering all the outages at once in a single load flow.
Regardless, of its origin, SINTO is practiced broadly in FTR auctions in the power
industry. All RTO/ISOs in the United States use it in their FTR auction process.
This type of industry adoption is considered good utility practice. FERC Order
No. 888 defined “Good Utility Practice” in Section 1.14 of the pro forma OATT as
follows:
“Any of the practices, methods and acts engaged in or approved by a
significant portion of the electric utility industry during the relevant time
period, or any of the practices, methods and acts which, in the exercise of
2Also, considering the number of contingencies to analyze.
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reasonable judgment in light of the facts known at the time the decision
was made, could have been expected to accomplish the desired result at a
reasonable cost consistent with good business practices, reliability, safety
and expedition. Good Utility Practice is not intended to be limited to
the optimum practice, method, or act to the exclusion of all others, but
rather to be acceptable practices, methods, or acts generally accepted in
the region” [143].
Note the definition does not require proof that the practice achieves the desired result
or that it is optimal. Since no documentation exists on the practice, SINTO may never
have been appropriately vetted to determine its effectiveness. It is also undetermined
if it leads to other undesirable issues, like distorting the load flow results.
3.5 Model formulations
The first two formulations used in Chapter 4 to prove that SINTO can lead to
revenue inadequacy (by overselling FTRs in FTR auctions) are presented and ex-
plained below. The first is a DC OPF used to simulate power market prices, gener-
ator dispatch levels, transmission constraints, and congestion cost. The second is a
simplified FTR auction formulation (SINTO) used to calculate FTR awards, trans-
mission constraints, and clearing prices. Further, a second FTR formulation is used
that represents transmission constraints as they are operated to demonstrate that
revenue adequacy is maintained. This formulation, called the CHIMPO FTR auction
formulation, is presented in Formulation 5.1 (Chapter 5).
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3.5.1 Generation dispatch formulation: DC
optimal power flow
The dispatch formulation used in the circuit analysis that follows is a DC OPF
formulation and is shown in Formulation 3.1. The formulation derived from [38]
employs the susceptance matrix (B) and bus phase angles (θ) to calculate transmission
line flows. The susceptance is the complex part of the admittance, and it plays a role
like that of conductance in a DC circuit. The LMP is calculated as the dual of the
Kirchhoff’s current law (nodal energy balance) in constraint 3.1e.
Sets:
IConni : All adjacent busses connect to bus i via lines
Indexes:
i, j: Bus index
Parameters:
CCosti : Costs (usually, a generator’s offer to sell energy ($/MW-h))
Gmini : Minimum generation output (MW)
Gmaxi : Maximum generation output (MW)
Qminij : Line flow minimum limit (MW)
Qmaxij : Line flow maximum limit (MW)
Bij: Line susceptance (mhos)
Li: Load (MW)
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Decision Variables:
gi: Generator output (MW)
qBusi : Net bus power injection or withdrawal (MW)
qLineij : Line flow (MW)
θij: Bus phase angle (radians)
The general dispatch model can be written as follows. Note that the following
conditions apply to all equations where appropriate: ∀i ∈ I,∀j ∈ I.
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Gmini ≤ gi ≤ Gmaxi (3.1b)
Transmission Line Limits:




i = Li (3.1d)









i = 0, (3.1e)
Line Flow Phase Angle:
Bij (θi − θj) = qLineij , ∀j ∈ IConni , j > i (3.1f)
3.5.2 SINTO FTR auction formulation
The FTR auction formulation in Formulation 3.2 is inspired by the above dispatch
formulation [12]. The FTR auction objective function is to maximize FTR as-bid bids
that are simultaneously feasible. An FTR can be thought of as a vector containing
four components: bid (CBids ), bid quantity (F
max
s ), and a path with a source bus
(i) and sink bus (j). fs is a decision variable and Mis converts the bids into power
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injections and withdrawals to determine line flows and simultaneous feasibility.
Additional notation is as follows:
Index:
s: FTR Bid Index
Parameters:
CBids : FTR Bids ($/MW-h)
Fmaxs : FTR quantity maximum limit (MW)
Mis: FTR mapping matrix converting FTR bid s into bus i, j injections and with-
drawals
S: Total Number of Bids (MW)
Decision Variables:
fs: FTR Bid Vector including source (i), sink (j), and quantity (MW)
The SINTO model can be written as follows. Note that the following conditions
apply to all equations where appropriate: ∀i ∈ I,∀j ∈ I.
90
CHAPTER 3. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND













FTR Bid Quantity Limits:
0 ≤ fs ≤ Fmaxs (3.2c)
Transmission Line Limits:










i = 0, (3.2e)
Line Flow Phase Angle:
Bij (θi − θj) = qLineij , j ∈ IConni , j > i (3.2f)
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Revenue Inadequacy Caused by
Braess’s Paradox and SINTO
In this chapter, a simple case study will be used to demonstrate that Braess’s
paradox and SINTO in FTR auctions can lead to revenue inadequacy. The example
that follows shows how SINTO can in some cases exaggerate transmission capacity
relative to actual system capacity. This is accomplished comparing two cases: the first
using SINTO in the FTR auction and the second using a multi-topology (CHIMPO)
approach to develop transmission constraints that more accurately reflect operational
topologies.
The Wheatstone bridge and the PHALC circuits demonstrate that it is possible
to increase transmission system capacity by taking a line out of service. The circuit
in Figure 4.1 places a PHALC circuit and a Wheatstone bridge circuit in series to
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establish that SINTO can, in fact, increase transmission system capacity, which re-
sults in revenue inadequacy. Selling too many FTRs, which clear the auction at a
lower price, causes this revenue inadequacy. This section examines two cases. The
first case represents the current practice of SINTO in FTR auctions. In the second
case, the proposed multi-topology FTR auction formulation, called the chronological
imposition of planned outages (CHIMPO), is employed. This formulation represents
the system topology better at various times during the total period. In the example,
there are four periods, and each can be considered a dispatch period and a settlement
period. For simplicity in this example, each period is an hour, and a calendar strip
consists of four periods or four hours. FTRs are auctioned off by a calendar strip that
includes all four periods. This is like an actual market where power is settled every
hour and FTRs are sold by monthly calendar strips.
4.1 Circuit description
Figure 4.1 shows the circuit that will be used in this example and Table 4.1
contains the circuit’s parameters. There are two generators such that generator G1
is the lowest-cost producer with a cost of $15/MW-h and generator G5 has a cost of
$20/MW-h. For simplicity, each generator is assumed to have no maximum generation
capacity limit. There is only one load, and it is connected at bus 5 where the higher
cost generator G5 is located. The load in all four hours is equal to 120 MW. The most
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economic power flow is from generator 1, connected at bus 1, to the load connected at
bus 5. Also, note that generator G5 can deliver to the load at bus 5 without causing
power flow in the system.
Figure 4.1: Hybrid PHALC and Wheatstone bridge circuit
Table 4.1: Hybrid PHALC and Wheatstone bridge
circuit parameters
Line R (per unit) X (per unit) Limit (MW)
Line1,2a 0 0.00286 140
Line1,2b 0 0.00143 60
Line 2,3 0 0.00143 70
Line 2,4 0 0.00286 70
Line 3,4 0 0.00001 200
Line 3,5 0 0.00286 70
Line 4,5 0 0.00143 70
4.2 System dispatch LMP calculation
The total auction period (calendar strip) contains four one-hour periods and in
each period transmission lines can be scheduled out of service. Table 4.2 displays
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the scheduled transmission outages. Periods 1 and 2 have no transmission outages
scheduled. Line 1,2b is scheduled out of service for period 3 and line 3,4 for period 4.
Table 4.2: Planned transmission outage schedule
Period 1 2 3 4
Line 1,2b – – X –
Line 3,4 – – – X
Table 4.3 contains the LMP results for each period using the dispatch formulation
in Formulation 3.1.
Table 4.3: Dispatch pricing and congestion spreads from bus 5 to bus 1
Bus Locational Marginal Prices
Period 1 2 3 4
Bus 1 $15.00 $15.00 $15.00 $15.00
Bus 2 $20.00 $20.00 $15.00 $20.00
Bus 3 $20.00 $20.00 $20.00 $20.00
Bus 4 $20.00 $20.00 $20.00 $20.00
Bus 5 $20.00 $20.00 $20.00 $20.00
Congestion Spreads Ave Spreads
Bus 5 to Bus 1 $5.00 $5.00 $5.00 $5.00 $5.00
If there were no congestion, the bus LMPs for each period would be the same;
however, note that this is not the situation. Congestion appears in each period, even
with all the lines placed in service (periods 1 and 2). Of particular interest is the
price difference from bus 1 to bus 5, since generator G1 is the lowest-cost generator
and is fully exposed to the congestion. The bus 1 to bus 5 price difference for each
period is shown at the bottom of Table 4.3. In each period, the price difference is
$5/MW-h, so the average congestion for the total period is $5/MW-h.
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Table 4.4 displays the generation dispatched during each period. Notice that
generator G1, the least expensive generator, does not supply all of the power, even
though generator G1 has enough capacity to supply the load. This indicates that the
transmission system could not deliver any more power from generator G1 and was
constrained in every period.
Table 4.4: Generator dispatch levels
Generator Dispatch (MW)
Period 1 2 3 4
G1 90 90 105 90
G5 30 30 15 30
4.3 Case 1: FTR auction results with
SINTO
Two FTR auction bidders needed to be developed for this example. The first
is a hedger who owns generator G1 and is simply attempting to hedge1 generator
G1. The second bidder is a speculator who has no physical position (generation or
load) in the power market and is attempting to capitalize on arbitrage opportunities.
The hedger’s strategy is risk management to protect their physical position – the
cost of selling power from bus 1 to the load at bus 5 from uncertain transmission
1As explained in Chapter 1, FTRs hedge the FTR holder from exposure to price differences
between two nodes by providing an additional payment stream equal to the amount of congestion
rents charged between the two nodes.
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system events. The speculator’s strategy is to get a return on investment such that
the FTR payments received (from congestion rents) are greater than the price paid
for the FTR. Assuming that both participants have a perfect LMP forecast, as listed
in Table 4.3, the hedger, would be willing to bid at least $5/MW-h. This is because
the hedger is not opportunistic and requires no return on investment other than the
payment stream to hedge their position. Unlike the hedger, the speculator needs to
bid less than the forecast spread to gain a return; otherwise, the return would be
zero. In this example, the speculator is looking to gain a $1 return on investment, so
they would bid $4/MW-h for an FTR that sources at bus 1 and sinks at bus 5.
Table 4.5 illustrates how the transmission outages are modeled in the FTR auc-
tion single-period topology. On the left is the transmission outage schedule and on
the right is a single period containing both scheduled outages, which are modeled
simultaneously. That is, the SINTO FTR model imposes the outages of both lines
1,2b and 3,4 at the same time, even though in reality the maintenance outages occur
in different periods. The SINTO approach is the same as modeling both transmission
outages for the duration of all four hours.
Table 4.5: Comparison of planned outage schedule and how transmission outages are
modeled in the FTR auction model (SINTO)
Transmission Outage Schedule FTR Model – SINTO
Period 1 2 3 4 T1
Line 1,2b – – X – ⇒ X
Line 3,4 – – – X X
The FTR auction formulation (Formulation 3.2) is used to model the non-coincidental
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transmission outages simultaneously. The FTR auction is cleared as follows: both
the hedger’s and speculator’s bids clear at a price of $4/MW-h. Therefore, the specu-
lator’s bid sets the price. The hedger is awarded 120 MW and the speculator 20 MW
for a calendar strip that includes all four periods. Table 4.6 displays the awarded
FTR auction settlements for each FTR holder. The amount owed to the RTO/ISO
is the total number of FTRs awarded per period × 4 periods × the FTR auction
clearing price. For the hedger, the amount owed would be 120 FTR/h × 4 h × $4 =
$1920; whereas the FTR auction cost for the speculator is 20 FTR/h × 4 h × $4 =
$320.
Table 4.6: Case 1: FTR auction awards and total cost to purchase FTRs
Bidder FTR Awards (MW)
Period 1 2 3 4
Hedger 120 120 120 120
Speculator 20 20 20 20
FTR Clearing Price $4.00 $4.00 $4.00 $4.00 –
Bidder FTR Cost FTR Total Cost
Period 1 2 3 4
Hedger $480.00 $480.00 $480.00 $480.00 $1920.00
Speculator $80.00 $80.00 $80.00 $80.00 $320.00
$2240.00
Using the LMP values forecast in Table 4.3 as actual LMPs, the FTR payouts
to the FTR holders are shown in Table 4.7 with the hedger receiving $2400 and the
speculator receiving $400. The table also shows the profit received by subtracting the
FTR cost from the FTR auction payout. Both the hedger and the speculator make
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a profit.
Table 4.7: Case 1: FTR holder payouts and profits (FTR Payout – FTR Cost)
Bidder FTR Payout Total FTR Payout
Period 1 2 3 4
Hedger $600.00 $600.00 $600.00 $600.00 $2400.00
Speculator $100.00 $100.00 $100.00 $100.00 $400.00
$2800.00
Bidder Difference (Profit) Total Profit
Period 1 2 3 4
Hedger $120.00 $120.00 $120.00 $120.00 $480.00
Speculator $20.00 $20.00 $20.00 $20.00 $80.00
$560.00
4.3.1 Case 1: Revenue adequacy
RTO/ISOs are non-profit organizations that take no financial positions – meaning
that they are revenue neutral. Ratepayers pay their net expenses through a regulated
tariff, and for any losses or gains due to congestion and FTRs. Table 4.8 shows the
amount of money that the ISO collects from the load and the amount it pays to the
generators. These charges and payments are calculated by multiplying the amount
of power either supplied or consumed (quantity) by the respective LMP. This result
is now revenue inadequate as indicated by the $925.00 deficit if the FTR holders are
fully paid. Thus, SINTO has given away too many transmission rights because of
Braess’s paradox.
Interestingly enough, both the speculator and the hedger made a profit from
the auction although the FTRs are revenue inadequate. Better yet, this revenue
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Table 4.8: Case 1: Revenue adequacy calculation
Entity RTO/ISO Settlements
Period 1 2 3 4 Totals
Load $2400.00 $2400.00 $2400.00 $2400.00 $9600.00 Collected
G1 $1350.00 $1350.00 $1575.00 $1350.00 $5625.00 Paid




inadequacy is observed, despite the seemingly conservative approach of employing
SINTO to reduce system capacity and prevent FTR over-awarding. In fact, imposing
all the outages at once has increased system capacity, not conservatively decreased it.
4.4 Case 2: FTR auction results using the
proposed multi-topology
CHIMPO formulation
Now consider case 2, which uses the proposed multi-topology formulation (Formu-
lation 5.1 in Chapter 5) to form constraints that better represent system operations.
In this case, the transmission outages are modeled by forming three sets of topological
constraints as shown on the right side of Table 4.9. Essentially, the multi-topology
topological constraints limit FTR awards to the most limiting circuit capacity during
any of the periods.
The FTR awards and clearing price for a path from bus 1 to bus 5 are displayed
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Table 4.9: Comparison of planned outage schedule and how transmission outages are
modeled in the FTR auction model (CHIMPO)
Transmission Outage Schedule FTR Model – CHIMPO
Period 1 2 3 4 T1 T2 T3
Line 1,2b X ⇒ X
Line 3,4 X X
in Table 4.10. In this case, the FTR awards are 90 MW for the hedger and 0 MW
for the speculator. These are down from SINTO’s awards of 120 MW for the hedger
and 20 MW for the speculator. Also, note that now the hedger sets the clearing price
and that the hedger has to pay more for an FTR, which has increased from $4 (case
1) to $5.
Table 4.10: Case 2: FTR auction awards
Bidder FTR Awards (MW)
Period 1 2 3 4
Hedger 90 90 90 90
Speculator 0 0 0 0
FTR Clearing Price $5.00 $5.00 $5.00 $5.00
Table 4.11 displays the FTR auction settlements. For the hedger, this would be
90 FTR/h × 4 h × $5 = $1800; whereas the FTR auction cost for the speculator is
$0 since they were not awarded any FTRs.
Table 4.11: Case 2: Total cost of purchasing FTRs
Bidder FTR Cost FTR Total Cost
Period 1 2 3 4
Hedger $450.00 $450.00 $450.00 $450.00 $1800.00
Speculator $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
$1800.00
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Using the LMP values forecast in Table 4.4 as actual LMPs, the FTR payouts
to the FTR holders are shown in Table 4.12. The hedger receives $1800 and the
speculator receives $0. The table also shows the profit received by subtracting the
FTR cost from the FTR auction payout. The hedger recovers enough money from
the FTR payments to exactly hedge the congestion cost incurred from bus 1 to bus 5,
because their bid exactly equaled the expected price difference.
Table 4.12: Case 2: FTR holder payouts and profits (FTR Payout – FTR Cost)
Bidder FTR Payout Total FTR Payout
Period 1 2 3 4
Hedger $450.00 $450.00 $450.00 $450.00 $1800.00
Speculator $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
$1800.00
Bidder Difference (Profit) Total Profit
Period 1 2 3 4
Hedger $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Speculator $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
$0
4.4.1 Case 2: Revenue adequacy
Table 4.13 provides the power market settlements for generators G1 and G5 and
the load for the total period. The differences that the RTO/ISO paid to the generators
and collected for the load is now enough to fund the FTRs fully and stay revenue
adequate. The ISO receives $75 more in congestion revenues than it pays out to FTR
holders.
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Table 4.13: Case 2: Revenue adequacy calculation
Entity RTO/ISO Settlements
Period 1 2 3 4 Totals
Load $2400.00 $2400.00 $2400.00 $2400.00 $9600.00 Collected
G1 $1350.00 $1350.00 $1575.00 $1350.00 $5625.00 Paid





Case 1 in this example revealed how SINTO could lead to revenue inadequacy
when outages in circuits that exhibit Braess’s paradox impact each other. Case 2
employed a multi-topology formulation that better represented the multiple topologies
during the total period. The multi-topology model added transmission constraints
that conservatively limited FTR over-awarding. This example presents only the case
where the transmission outages exhibited Braess’s paradox. However, many if not
most cases of transmission outages will lead to reduced rather than increased capacity.
The proposed multi-topology formulation would still be able to capture these capacity
reductions appropriately to limit FTR awards. Lastly, a contributing factor to revenue
inadequacy, in addition to the Braess’s paradox–SINTO interaction, is the market rule
that requires FTRs to be auctioned in calendar strips. An FTR calendar-strip award
that is limited by the most limiting transmission constraint during the period is an
overly restrictive practice that reduces the FTR capacity during periods when FTRs
are feasible. However, the economic benefits of relaxing this restriction and awarding
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FTR for periods smaller than a month is left for future research.
4.6 Braess’s paradox circuit formation
possibilities
The combined series PHALC circuit and Wheatstone bridge circuit modeled in
this example is one of many possible circuit formations. A circuit can contain any
combination of these circuits including the basic formations (series, parallel, or com-
bination series-parallel circuits), which may interact with each other. Further, these
circuits may exist within other Wheatstone bridges or other types of mesh circuit
that cannot be neatly decomposed into series and parallel circuits. Moreover, the
difficulty of identifying Braess’s paradox increases when taking into account that ac-
tual power systems have network flows from multiple generators to multiple loads.
In Chapter 5, two formulations that implicitly reduce the meshed/nested Braess’s




This portion of the thesis offers two formulations, which are both pragmatic so-
lutions that address issues derived from Braess’s paradox in SINTO-based FTR auc-
tions. They are considered practical because present commercial software packages
can be reconfigured to the new formulation and thus, RTOs may readily implement
them in today’s FTR markets. To this end, the two formulations are tested and
analyzed in the case study that follows (Chapters 6 and 7).
Then, Formulation 3.2 is modified to include the ability to consider multiple
topologies in the FTR auctions, by adding an index for topologies t. Let the sets
T SINTO, T CHIMPO, and T NO−SINTO denote the sets of topologies considered in the
SINTO, CHIMPO and NO-SINTO formulations (described in the subsequent sec-
tions) for the auction period, respectively. Briefly, the SINTO formulation1 considers
1The SINTO model in Formulation 3.2 is a special case of the presented Formulation 5.1, where
t is a single topology SINTO.
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a single topology, i.e., T SINTO = {SINTO}. The NO-SINTO formulation considers
two topologies: The SINTO and normal operation (i.e., no scheduled outages) topolo-
gies, respectively. Therefore, T NO−SINTO = {NO, SINTO}, where the topology NO
indicates the normal operations topology. Finally, the CHIMPO formulation consid-
ers each unique topology that occurs during the FTR auction planning period, which
may or may not include the NO and SINTO topologies.
Note that the following conditions apply to all equations where appropriate: ∀i ∈
I,∀j ∈ I. In addition, the following conditions are included for the SINTO, CHIMPO
and NO-SINTO models, respectively, depending on the model that is solved: ∀t ∈
T SINTO, ∀t ∈ T CHIMPO, and ∀t ∈ T NO−SINTO. The details of the CHIMPO and
NO-SINTO models are described in the subsequent subsections.
This section is organized as follows: Section 5.1 describes the multi-topology
CHIMPO FTR auction formulation. In Section 5.2, a simple but novel modification
based on Braess’s paradox is made to the CHIMPO formulation to give a practical
implementation called the NO-SINTO formulation.
5.1 Chronological Imposition of Planned
Outages (CHIMPO) formulation
Multi-period FTR auction models are in use today, but only to accommodate
multiple trading periods (e.g., peak-weekday, peak-weekend, off-peak and 24-hour,
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FTR Bid Quantity Limits:
0 ≤ fs ≤ Fmaxs (5.1c)
Transmission Line Limits:










i = 0, (5.1e)
Line Flow Phase Angle:
Bijt (θit − θjt) = qLineijt , j ∈ IConni , j > i (5.1f)
or around-the-clock periods) [144]. The model in this section is the first proposed
practical solution to specifically address the effects of Braess’s paradox and SINTO
by modifying the FTR auction formulation to include transmission constraints that
account for all periods where the transmission topology changes. This formulation
creates transmission system constraints for all changes in topology during the auction
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period that is modeled by grouping similar hourly configurations.2 The possibility
that Braess’s paradox causes an over-allocation of FTRs is mitigated because all
system configurations are accurately represented in the transmission constraints, in-
cluding the system without transmission outages (if there are none in any hour).
In Formulation 5.1, note the addition of the t index (compared to formulation
3.2), which represents a new set of constraints for every period where the trans-
mission topology changes. The formulation is called the chronological imposition of
planned outages (CHIMPO) since it simulates the chronological order of the planned
transmission outages.
5.2 NO-SINTO formulation
One potential shortcoming of the CHIMPO model is that the problem size is
proportional to the number of transmission topologies modeled. This is due to the
additional sets of transmission constraints from each topology change. For realistic
systems, the additional constraints and variables may make practical implementation
impossible due to issues such as increased computational time. Table 5.1 provides
ERCOT CRR auction bid statistics for the period from May 2013 through to May
2014. This data provides a sense of the actual size of the objective function, as the
2A multi-topology FTR auction formulation utilizing transmission switching to model trans-
mission outages in its SFT is presented in [129]. However it is not proposed as a direct solution
to the impacts of Braess’s paradox and SINTO, but rather, to better model outages that reduce
transmission capacity.
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table displays the number of CRR buy offers and sell bids that make up the number of
decision variables. During this period, the average number of FTR decision variables
for Formulation 5.1 would be 144,289. The total number of decision variables is
larger because there are flow and angle variables for each month as well. While
it is understood that this is not the largest optimization problem, it is substantial
considering the tight market deadlines for computing, analyzing, and validating the
results.
Table 5.1: Statistics of actual CRR auction bids
Table 5.2 displays the attributes that make up the transmission constraints. An
estimate is provided in Table 5.3 of both the number of bid constraints and trans-
mission system constraints for the SINTO, CHIMPO, and NO-SINTO formulations
based on the data in Table 5.2. For the SINTO formulation, the calculation in Ta-
ble 5.3 (line #8) shows that the estimated total number of constraints in the May
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Table 5.2: May 2013 CRR auction data statistics
2013 CRR auction was 77,715,243.
If there are nine non-coincident outage periods (plus the no-outage case), the
number of constraints increases by ten times to 775,844,199; see Table 5.3 (line #12).
To reduce the number of constraints, a NO-SINTO FTR auction is introduced to
remedy the Braess’s paradox and SINTO situation. In general, Braess’s paradox and
SINTO can create capacity that over-awards FTRs; therefore, an alternate solution
is proposed to limit the overcapacity created by modeling only two configurations:
one with normal operations considering no transmission outages (normal operations
or NO) and the other with SINTO. The number of constraints in the practical NO-
SINTO formulation reduces to 155,285,127, which may be doable considering auction
deadlines; see Table 5.3 (line # 17).
The example from Chapter 4 that uses both a PHALC circuit in series with a
Wheatstone bridge circuit is used to explain the rationale for this formulation. In
that example, the FTR auction optimization tries to award as many FTRs that
the transmission constraints allow at the highest price. Since the objective function
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Table 5.3: Comparison of estimated number of constraints for the SINTO, CHIMPO,
and NO-SINTO CRR auction formulations
maximizes the auction value (the set of simultaneously feasible FTRs generating the
largest sum of as-bid bids), the most restrictive topology would limit the problem,
which in this particular case would be the system configuration that has no trans-
mission outages instead of the one with the simultaneous imposition of transmission
outages. This is because SINTO may exhibit the effect of Braess’s paradox and create
capacity that is not normally available under normal operating conditions. However,
for other networks, the most restrictive case might have outages; in general, it will not
be known ahead of time which is the most restrictive. Thus, a model is proposed that
checks only two topologies, and uses the most restrictive one: the SINTO topology,
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and the NO topology (i.e., letting t = {NO, SINTO} in the Formulation 5.1).
This formulation approximately doubles the number of transmission system con-
straints compared to the SINTO model, yet it may be practical enough to be imple-
mented. To reiterate the concept behind the NO-SINTO formulation is that if the
normal operation of the system is more restrictive than the one that includes transmis-
sion outages (SINTO), then the awarded FTRs might be reduced to the value of the
lesser of the two sets of transmission period constraints. This, however, may be more
restrictive than SINTO but still not as restrictive as the multi-topology CHIMPO for-
mulation because all the transmission system configurations are not modeled. Thus,
the NO-SINTO formulation may be considered more of a heuristic than a complete




ERCOT Case Study: Models and
Data
6.1 Objectives and scope of chapter
The case study described in Chapters 6 and 7 has two major objectives: investi-
gate whether Braess’s paradox and the SINTO model affect the FTR auction results
of an actual power market, and verifying if the proposed NO-SINTO model outper-
forms the standard SINTO model. At present, the academic literature elucidates,
for example, the nature of Braess’s paradox and how, in theory, it impacts trans-
mission investment [37] or how Braess’s paradox can optimize the dispatch through
transmission switching [14] utilizing small test circuits to prove their hypothesis. The
present chapter investigates the practical effects and frequency of the paradox in real
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markets. This case study focuses ERCOT’s 2014 CRR1 monthly auction data to find
empirical evidence for Braess’s paradox. The auction software used in ERCOT CRR
auctions, iHedge® FTR Market Simulator, is also used for this case study.
Thus, the first objective is to find empirical evidence of the paradox by com-
paring the CHIMPO and SINTO models from Chapters 3 and 5. The CHIMPO
model is the reference case because it captures the actual chronological sequence of
constraints from different transmission configurations derived from scheduled trans-
mission outages. The standard SINTO approach approximates the CHIMPO SFT.
By comparing the two models, one can see when non-coincident transmission outages
can cause Braess’s paradox. As explained in Chapter 4, modeling SINTO in conges-
tion auctions can theoretically exacerbate the effects of Braess’s paradox. Chapter 7
provides practical evidence that modeling SINTO does impact FTR auction results
when Braess’s paradox is active.
The second objective is to benchmark the performance of NO-SINTO and CHIMPO
against the SINTO model using actual FTR auction data. The two performance cri-
teria evaluated include the following: the ability to approximate the ideal but compu-
tationally expensive CHIMPO model, and computational performance for practical
implementation in U.S. power markets. In Chapter 7, it is concluded that CHIMPO
would be impractical for ERCOT due to prohibitive computational costs due to the
number of topologies considered, but the NO-SINTO model can better reduce rev-
1A CRR (congestion revenue right) is a term that ERCOT uses for FTRs and is exactly the same
financial instrument.
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enue inadequacy due to Braess’s paradox than the SINTO model at a reasonable
computational expense.
The models developed in Chapters 3 and 5 are simplified representations of real
power the market implementation of CRR auctions but can provide useful and rele-
vant insight on market behavior and auction trends. The following sections focus on
bridging the divide between theoretical models and practical implementation within
ERCOT’s CRR auction by discussing data, assumptions, processes and methodolo-
gies, with results presented in Chapter 7. In Section 6.2, the rationale for selecting
ERCOT for the case study is explained. Section 6.3 explains CRR bidding details
that require new auction functionality but adds additional complexity to ERCOT’s
actual CRR auction implementation. Section 6.4 describes ERCOT’s auction pro-
cess. Section 6.6 describes iHedge® FTR Market Simulator, which is used both by
ERCOT and this case study. Section 6.7 describes the study case preparations for
the SINTO, NO, NO-SINTO, CHIMPO formulations. This is followed in Section 6.8
by the case study assumptions, methodology, and procedure. The results of the case
study are then analyzed in Chapter 7.
6.2 Market selection
In this section, the rationale is provided for selecting ERCOT as the power mar-
ket to model for the case study. Figure 2.1 in Chapter 2 displays a map of the seven
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centralized power markets (Regional Transmission Organization/Independent System
Operator) in the United States. As discussed in Chapter 2, all other non-centralized
markets (shaded white) in the United States use bilateral markets and access to the
transmission system is allocated via physical transmission rights. In contrast, each of
the centralized market employs locational marginal prices and allocates FTRs. The
decision of which market to choose for the case study was based on three criteria: auc-
tion data transparency, minimization of the impact of parallel flows from neighboring
transmission systems, and market size. The ERCOT market was chosen primarily
because of the availability and completeness of the Congestion Revenue Rights (CRR)
auction data.
ERCOT provides all the necessary data to recreate the CRR auctions [145]. The
data includes masked CRR auction bid and offer data, previously cleared FTR awards
(called “Fixed bids”), the transmission grid model, a list of transmission contingen-
cies, line ratings, interface definitions, aggregate and commercial nodes, a transmis-
sion line outages list, and mapping files. The description of this data is provided
in Section 6.4. ERCOT masks the bid and offer data to keep the data confidential:
preventing the determination of which market participant submitted the data. For
the case study, market participant identification is not necessary since the analysis
compares CRR auction result statistics for different formulations.
The second reason that the ERCOT market was selected is that it is a relatively
isolated transmission system (see Figure 6.1). It is separated from the Eastern In-
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terconnection by two direct current (DC) ties and from Mexico by three DC ties; as
a result, parallel flows from adjoining transmission systems do not impact ERCOT
transmission system flows. As explained in Section 2.3.2, inaccurate estimations of
parallel flows in FTR auction model can also lead to revenue inadequacy by either
underestimating the amount of parallel flow on lines in the prevailing flow direction
or overestimating the amount of parallel flow on a line in the counter-flow direction.
The third reason is that ERCOT is a relatively large transmission system with
many circuit configurations and is sufficiently extensive to serve as a proxy for trans-
mission systems in other power markets.
Figure 6.1: Map of U.S. interconnections [146]
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6.3 ERCOT CRR auction complexities
This section discusses the usage of auction software for modeling multiple topolo-
gies. Further, this section provides necessary information to understand the case
study data, terminology, model preparation, analysis, and results.
Nexant’s precise formulation of their iHedge® CRR auction software package is
not publicly available for proprietary reasons; however, for comprehension, this sec-
tion summarizes the addition functionality Nexant includes but that is not depicted
in the CHIMPO and NO-SINTO model formulations in Chapter 5. Moreover, a gen-
eral CRR auction formulation is derived that includes the additional functionality to
provide insight into how the additional functionality may be incorporated into those
formulations. Although auction software and power systems operations are complex,
the emergent behavior from the CHIMPO and NO-SINTO models show that bet-
ter representation of network topology will reduce revenue inadequacy resulting from
Braess’s paradox, SINTO, and calendar-strip term sales, as described in Chapter 5.
The actual CRR auction software, iHedge® FTR Market Simulator, can be con-
figured to model multiple transmission configurations in its simultaneous feasibility
test.2 Despite this, as of end of 2014, all U.S. RTOs, including ERCOT, use SINTO
models.
2Based on Nexant’s staff, Joe Bright during iHedge training on April 2, 2014 at 111 Market Place,
Baltimore Maryland 21202
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Table 6.1: Sample (abridged) auction participants’ auction bid data
Bid Index Bid (Y +s ) (Y
−





CRR ID Type Source Sink Type Hedge TimeOfUse MW BidPrice (US $) AccountHolder
Type
20811677 CRR Bid LPCCS CT11 OLIN OLING 1 BUY OBL 24-Hours 10 0.02 XNRGP2
20811678 CRR Bid HB SOUTH LZ SOUTH BUY OBL 24-Hours 17 1.41 XNOBLE
20811679 CRR Bid HB NORTH LZ NORTH BUY OBL 24-Hours 1 0.26 XSESSW
20811680 CRR Bid LZ HOUSTON HB HOUSTON BUY OBL 24-Hours 5 -0.25 XNOBLE
20811681 CRR Bid WHCCS CT1 ST HB NORTH BUY OPT 24-Hours 2.5 0.07 XMETT3
20811682 CRR Bid BYU BYU 12 SL PUN1 BUY OPT 24-Hours 80 0.01 XSESSW
20811683 CRR Bid CBY4 ALL LZ HOUSTON BUY OPT Off-peak 10 0.01 XVITO2
20811684 CRR Bid STP STP G2 DOWGEN PUN1 BUY OBL Off-peak 1.5 0.13 XLQA2
20811685 CRR Bid LZ WEST BULLCRK 1 2 SELL OBL Off-peak 2.6 3 XBJEN3
20811686 CRR Bid INKS INKS G1 SD5SES 5 SELL OBL Off-peak 1 -0.5 XDARBY
20811687 CRR Bid MIL MILG1 2 PSA PSA G3 SELL OBL Off-peak 1.4 1.04 XBJEN3
20811688 CRR Bid JCKCNTY2 CT3 LZ WEST SELL OPT Off-peak 0.5 1.32 XMETV2
20811689 CRR Bid WFCOGEN 13 LZ NORTH SELL OPT PeakWD 9 0.71 XVITO2
20811690 CRR Bid HB SOUTH LZ SOUTH BUY OBL PeakWE 0.4 6.5 XMETT3
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
|S| CRR Bid HAYSEN3 4 LZ LCRA BUY OBL PeakWE 2.2 -0.24 XMETV2
20806733 Fixed Bid WOO WOODWRD1 WOO WOODWRD2 OBL PeakWE 0.2 XNRGP2
20800067 Fixed Bid KEO KEO SM1 WOO WOODWRD2 OPT Off-peak 14.9 XVITO2
20805814 Fixed Bid KEO KEO SM1 WOO WOODWRD2 OPT PeakWE 10 XSESSW
20803681 Fixed Bid KEO KEO SM1 WOO WOODWRD2 OPT PeakWE 9 XNOBLE
20811325 Fixed Bid FLCNS UNIT1 WOO WOODWRD2 OPT PeakWD 18 XMETT3
17548149 Fixed Bid WOO WOODWRD1 WOO WOODWRD2 OPT PeakWD 6.8 XSESSW
17549534 Fixed Bid OECCS 1 WOO WOODWRD2 OPT PeakWD 2 XDARBY
17559095 Fixed Bid OECCS 1 WOO WOODWRD2 OPT Off-peak 19.9 XLQA2
17564831 Fixed Bid KING KINGNE WOO WOODWRD2 OPT Off-peak 1 XBJEN3
17555771 Fixed Bid KEO KEO SM1 WOO WOODWRD2 OPT PeakWE 9 XNOBLE
17564829 Fixed Bid KEO KEO SM1 WOO WOODWRD2 OPT Off-peak 1 XBJEN3
17547583 Fixed Bid IN INDNENR 2 WOO WOODWRD2 OPT PeakWD 6.5 XMETV2
17547181 Fixed Bid FLTCK SSI WOO WOODWRD2 OPT PeakWD 1.5 XMETV2
17547744 Fixed Bid CALLAHA WND1 WOO WOODWRD2 OPT PeakWD 9.3 XMETT3
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
|S| Fixed Bid KEO KEO SM1 WOO WOODWRD2 OPT Off-peak 3 XVITO2
6.3.1 Bid data structure
Typically, a list of auction participants n ∈ N submit their bids to the RTO.
The RTO receives bid data as shown in Table 6.1 [145]. Each bid s ∈ S can have
several characteristics: Bid or offer type (Hs), hedge type (Os), time-of-use (Ps),
fixed bid quantity (Fmaxs ), and an associated auction participant n. The variables
will be described on an as-needed basis in subsequent sections. We define subsets
of S with superscripts to describe the relevant characteristics. For example, SBuy
denotes the set of all Buy bids. In this particular case, given a set of bid or offer type
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Hs ∈ {Buy, Sell}, ∀s ∈ S, the set SBuy ⊆ S can be defined as SBuy = {s|Hs = Buy}.
6.3.2 Settlement points
In ERCOT, electricity trade is accomplished between Settlement Price Points
(SPPs3), rather than electric buses. It is possible to transact each SPP as a source
or a sink for each bid s.
Let Y denote the set of SPPs, where each SPP may include one or more buses. To
track SPPs to buses, we designate a set ISPPy that maps all the buses i that belong
in SPP y ∈ Y . For example, if the SPP OECCS 1 included buses 1, 2, and 3, then
ISPPOECCS 1 = {1, 2, 3}.
The advantages of aggregating multiple buses into SPPs are as follows:
• More descriptive bus names: for example, in ERCOT, LZ precedes a load zone
SPP,4 RN precedes a resource SPP, HB precedes a Hub SPP, etc.
• It allows the definition of aggregated points: Hubs and Zones
• It limits the number of bid points - not every bus is a bid point - and therefore
defines more precisely where participants can bid. In ERCOT, the sources and
sinks include generator points, Hubs, and Zones.
3In other RTOs, SPPs are called Commercial Pricing Nodes (CPNodes) that can be either Pricing
Nodes (PNodes) or Aggregate Pricing Nodes (APNodes).
4A load zone is a collection of buses representing consumers. In ERCOT, the load zones are his-
torical zones established using cluster analysis to define a set of commercially significant constraints
in their zonal (not LMP) market. In other power markets, the load zones represent historical utility
service areas.
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• Naming consistency: bus names are designated by transmission owner and
transmission owners have their own abbreviations for bus names.
Settlement point definitions
An SPP can either have a one-to-one correspondence with an electrical bus or is
an aggregate that includes a group of buses that uses a simple average or weighted
average to distribute a power injection or withdrawal as determined by the ERCOT’s
stakeholders. These weighting factors also are used to aggregate the LMPs for price
determination.
When an FTR bid s is awarded, the delivered power is estimated to begin at a
source and end at a sink, which may be distributed over several buses. Each bid s
designates a source SPP Y +s ∈ Y and a sink SPP Y −s ∈ Y . Referring back to Table
6.1, the bid s=17549534 injects at SPP Y +s = OECCS 1 and withdraws from SPP
Y −s = WOO WOODWRD2. Let ISPPy designate the set of buses associated with
SPP y ∈ Y . Then, the power injected into a source Y +s and may be distributed
over a set of of buses ISPPy for y = Y +s . Similarly, the power withdrawn from a
sink Y −s due to bid s may be distributed over the set of buses ISPPy for y = Y +s .
For example, if the SPP OECCS 1 were associated to buses 1 and 2, and the SPP
WOO WOODWRD2 were associated to buses 3, 4, and 5, then ISPPOECCS 1 = {1, 2}
and ISPPWOO WOODWRD2 = {3, 4, 5}. Thus, it is possible to map each bid to the affected
by a power injection or withdrawal.
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In order to track the sensitivity of an SPP injection or withdrawal on the power
flows into each bus, we define a matrix M that describes the per-unit power flow
distribution due to each bid s. A positive value designates an injection at bus i, and
a negative value designates power withdrawal at bus i. Each column s of M , denoted
as Ms, has the following properties: its sum is zero and its `1-norm ≤ 2. Thus,
the power injected into bus i can be calculated as Mf . The injection matrix M is
further described in [12].
The values of M depends on the type of SPP (i.e., resource, hub or zone) at the
source and at the sink, but can be calculated as the sum of the effects from injections
M+ and withdrawals M−. Thus, M = M+ −M−, where, the values M+is and M−is
are calculated ∀i ∈ ISPPy , y = Y +s and ∀i ∈ ISPPy , y = Y −s , respectively, below.
• Resource: If the bid s is sourced from a single generator at bus i and sinked
at a bus j, then M+is = 1 and M
−
js = 1. For example, if Ms = (1,−1, 0, . . . , 0),
then all power injected into the grid due to bid s begins at bus 1 (source) and
ends at bus 2 (sink).
• Hub: For an aggregate bid such as a hub, a bid injection at the source is
accomplished by distributing the bid proportionally across the buses that define
that hub. If the bid s is sourced from or delivered to the hub containing bus






. Using the example earlier in this section, when a bid s
injects at SPP OECCS 1 and withdraws from WOO WOODWRD2, thenMs =
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, power is injected evenly from a hub containing
buses 1 and 2, and withdrawn evenly from a hub containing buses 3, 4, and 5.
• Zone: A withdrawal at a load zone sink is accomplished through a propor-
tional distribution based on the weights of the load Li at each bus. If the
bid s is sourced from or delivered to a zone containing bus i, then Mis =
Li∑
j∈ISPPy
. For example, power were injected from bus 3, and withdrawn from





, 1, 0, . . . , 0
)
.
By following the above rules, it is possible to generate the M matrix in order to
estimate the resultant power flows from each accepted bid.
6.3.3 Multi-period auctions
One of the complexities in the ERCOT’s CRR auction implementation is that the
auction is designed to clear multiple time-of-use block CRR products to accommodate
how power is traded in the bilateral market.5 The term-based products are the fol-
lowing: 24-hour (i.e., around-the-clock), peak-weekday, off-peak and, peak-weekend.
Figure 6.2 displays the hours included in each product. For example, the peak-
weekday calendar-strip includes the sixteen hours from 0700 to 2200, from Monday
5“The utilities operate in wholesale markets governed by contracts between and among the partic-
ipants in those markets – contracts that are regulated by FERC. Because of this characteristic, these
wholesale markets have become known as ‘bilateral markets’ even though it is a bit of a misnomer,
as bilateral contracts also are a significant part of centralized markets.” Source: [147]
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Figure 6.2: ERCOT TOU diagram [148]
through Friday, for the entire month. For a non-leap year February (28 days), this
would amount to a total of Ws = 320 hours, where Ws is a parameter that weighs
bids to account for the number of hours in an FTR product.6 24-hour bids are not
displayed in the chart but intuitively includes all hours in a CRR auction period –
in this case all the hours in a month. In ERCOT, the auction software, iHedge®, is
configured to accommodate multi-period products.7
In order to accommodate multi-period bids, we create a set of periods P =
{PeakWD,PeakWE,Offpeak}, which denotes peak weekday, peak weekend, and off-
peak periods, respectively. We modify the SINTO FTR model (Formulation 3.2) as
follows. Note that the following conditions apply to all equations where appropriate:
∀i ∈ I,∀j ∈ I,∀p ∈ P ,∀s ∈ S,∀s′ ∈ S.
6Note that while the weight is proportional to the number of hours, that Ws is a unitless variable.
7This multi-period functionality is also used in ERCOT’s semi-annual CRR auction where a
calendar-strip can include any combination of one-month increments up to six-month and time-of-
use period bids.
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0 ≤ fs ≤ Fmaxs (6.1c)
fs′ = fs s > s
′ ∧ s′ ∈ S24hrs (6.1d)









ip = 0 (6.1f)
Bij (θip − θjp) = qLineijp ∀j ∈ IConni , j > i (6.1g)
where, in (6.1a), the objective function includes Ws, which weighs each bid by the
number of hours corresponding to each bid s. In (6.1b), the M matrix is modified
to include TOU periods p ∈ P , such that each bid s corresponds to buses i and a
single period p. Similarly, q has also gained a dimension p in (6.1e)-(6.1g) to account
for flows in different time periods. Equation (6.1d) accounts for 24-hour bids (bids
that apply to all time periods) by forcing the bid quantities fs to be equal for each
time period p. This is achieved by using a set S24hrs that maps all corresponding
24-hour bids to s. For example, if bids 1, 4, and 7 correspond to the peak-weekday,
peak-weekend, and off-peak components of a single 24-bid, then S24hr1 = {4, 7}. Thus,
each 24-hour bid requires three decision variables, all with the same value.
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6.3.4 Expanded model to include fixed bids and
CRR offers
In this section, we combine and adapt the multi-period CRR auction and multi-
topology models from formulations (5.1) and (6.1) to account for pre-existing CRR
awards and for offers to sell FTRs. The former is achieved by constraining pre-existing
awards or allocations to fixed values Fmaxs , where the set of pre-existing awards belong
to the set SFixed ⊆ S. It is important to account for pre-existing awards because they
impact transmission system capacity.
The model also allows the sales of FTRs, achieved by defining a set of buy bids
SBuy ⊆ S and sell bids SSell ⊆ S. Each s can either a bid to buy FTRs, or an offer
to sell FTRs. The sets SBuy and SSell represent buy and sell bids, respectively, and
are partitions8 of S. These sets can be defined as follows: SBuy = {s|Hs = Buy} and
SSell = {s|Hs = Sell}.
When CRRs are acquired in previous auctions (Fixed Bids), they may be offered
for sale in the monthly CRR auction. The offer price may be positive or negative.
A negative price denotes that the CRR holder who is offering their CRR into the
auction is willing to pay a buyer in order to discard the risk associated with the
CRR. In a CRR Obligation, if the direction of congestion is opposite to the direction
of the CRR, the CRR holder pays the RTO the difference between the (higher) LMP
at the source location and the (lower) LMP at the sink location multiplied by the
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quantity of CRRs on that path. In this case, the holder perceives that they are
financially exposed because of the downside risk of negative cash flows. Conversely,
if the congestion is predicted to be in the same direction as the CRR, the CRR has
a positive value (or cash flow). Thus, the holder will want to be compensated for
selling the CRR.
The expanded model is as follows. Note that the following conditions apply to
all equations where appropriate: ∀i ∈ I,∀j ∈ I,∀p ∈ P , ∀s ∈ S and ∀s′ ∈ S.
In addition, we also consider all topologies t relevant to the evaluated model (e.g.,
∀t ∈ T CHIMPO for the CHIMPO model).
Formulation 6.2: CRR auction formulation with TOU, multi-period, Offers,
























s ∀s ∈ SFixed (6.2c)
0 ≤ fs ≤ Fmaxs ∀s 6∈ SFixed (6.2d)
fs′ = fs s > s
′ ∧ s′ ∈ S24hrs (6.2e)









ip = 0 (6.2g)
Bijpt (θipt − θjpt) = qLineijpt j ∈ IConni , j > i (6.2h)
where (6.2c) and (6.2d) set the feasible space for fixed and flexible bid, respectively.
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Equation (6.2g) has been modified to separate injections into and withdrawals from
the grid at bus i during period p for topology t.
6.3.5 CRR Options
A auction participant may bid for FTR Options or Obligations, depending on
how they want to hedge their bid. Thus, from Table 6.1, based on the hedge type
Os ∈ {Obl,Opt}, we define the sets of FTR Obligations (Obl) bids and Options (Opt)
bids as SObl = {s|Os = Obl} and SOpt = {s|Os = Opt}, respectively, where these are
partitions of S.
Another important functionality beyond those already discussed is that ERCOT
provides two hedging alternatives by providing two types of CRRs – Obligations and
Options. All CRR are directional where the bidder must designate a path from a
source node and a sink node which is modeled as a point of power injection and
withdrawal respectively in the auction’s transmission model. CRR Obligations pay
the holder if the direction of CRR is in the direction of congestion. However, if the
direction of congestion is in the opposite direction of the CRR, the CRR holder is
charged the LMP difference. Similar to a CRR Obligations, CRR Options pay the
holder if the direction of the CRR Option is in the same direction as the congestion,
but unlike CRR Obligations, CRR Options do not charge the holder if the congestion
direction is in the opposite direction.
Figure 6.3 provides a diagram depicting CRR Obligation and CRR Option pay-
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outs. On the x-axis, LMP2−LMP1 is the difference between LMP2 the LMP at the
sink and LMP1 the LMP at the source. The y-axis depicts the payoff. Payoffs above
the x-axis are positive and negative when it is below. A negative payoff indicates
a situation where a payment is made from the FTR owner to the RTO. The blue
dashed line illustrates the FTR Option, and the red dotted line illustrates the FTR
Obligation. The value at the intersection for both axes is equal to zero. The main
difference between the two instruments is that when the LMP difference is negative
the payoff value for the FTR Obligation is negative whereas for the FTR Option it
is zero.
Figure 6.3: Payoff curves for FTRs as Options or Obligations [149]
From an auction modeling perspective, CRR Obligations allow the flow from other
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CRR Obligations in the opposite direction to offset each other such that the flow on
the line is equal to the difference of the flows (net flow). An unlimited quantity of
CRR Obligations can be sold as long as the net flow is equal to or below the line limit.
Revenue adequacy is maintained although an unlimited amount of CRR Obligations
may be sold because the CRR holders of offsetting CRR Obligations are obliged to
pay when the direction of the congestion is in the opposite direction of their CRR.
Theoretically, the total CRR Obligation charges and the congestion rents are enough
to pay the CRR Obligation holders.
In contrast, since CRR Options do not charge the holders when congestion is in
the opposite direction as the CRR, there are no additional funds collected from these
instruments to cover any additional payments to CRR in the forward direction thus
CRR Options are modeled differently. CRR Options are modeled such that they
do not count offsetting flows (counter-flows) like CRR Obligations that enable more
CRRs in the opposite direction to be awarded. While the flow calculations differ
between Obligations and Options, Braess’s paradox impact Options as well.
In [37,150–157] and in the Braess’s paradox example presented in Chapter 4 of this
thesis, a single flow is used to demonstrate the impact of Braess’s paradox that is not
predicated on counter-flows therefore Braess’s paradox does not require counter-flow
as a necessary condition for it to occur and impact CRR Options.
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6.3.6 Credit and budget constraints
The credit and budget constraints are similarly formulated but serve two different
purposes. The credit constraint is imposed by ERCOT (RTO/ISO) based on the
credit exposure ERCOT calculates for the auction participant n ∈ N , where N
denotes the set of auction participants [148, 158, 159]. The budget constraint is a
self-imposed constraint that enables bidder (auction participant) to cap the total
amount that they pay for all the bids and offers s if they clear the auction. The
set SBidn maps all the bids and offers associated to bidder n. For example, in Table
6.1, bids 17547583 and 17547181 were submitted by participant n=XMETV2, thus
SBidXMETV2 = {17547583, 17547181}. SBidn ,∀n ∈ N are partitions of S.
In the following constraint, the sum of costs must remain below the budget/credit
Zn for each auction participant n ∈ N :
∑
s∈SOpt








(φ|CBids |+ η)fs ≤ Zn, ∀s ∈ SBidn
where, on the left-hand side, the first term represents the financial exposure for CRR
Options buy awards. Since selling CRR Options to ERCOT creates zero financial
exposure it does not need to be reflected in the constraint. The second term de-
scribes CRR Obligation offers exposure where the CRR Obligation offers clear the
auction with a negative price such that money is owed to ERCOT. The last term de-
scribes CRR Obligations buys in either direction and guarantees that a bidder cannot
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systematically profit from holding CRR Obligations in both directions. φ and η are
parameters defined and published by the CRR market operator every month to calcu-
late the variable and constant component of the exposure of Obligations, respectively,
due to bid prices CBids [158]. Note that η > 0.
The value of Zn is the lesser value between the available credit (tracked and
calculated by ERCOT for each market participant n), and the participant’s self-
imposed budgetary constraint [148,159].9
6.3.7 Generic constraints
ERCOT defines a generic constraint as a “transmission constraint made up of
one or more grouped transmission elements that is used to constrain flow between
geographic areas of ERCOT for the purpose of managing stability, voltage, and other
constraints that cannot otherwise be modeled directly in ERCOTs power flow and
contingency analysis applications” [161].
Each geographic area, called an interface v, has a maximum quantity of power
than can be transferred, known as the interface limit QIntv . Let v ∈ V denote the set
of interfaces. Further, let LIntv be a set of lines, denoted by tuples (i,j), contained in
the interface v. Note that a generic constraint can be (and often is) directional, where
the interface limit QIntv may be different in either direction or may not be defined in
9ERCOT has two levels of credit constraints: one for the auction participant or the counterparty,
and the other for the account holder since an account holder can participate in multiple markets
and may have broader credit constraints [160].
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one of the directions.
The notation is read as follows: APTDFijst , is the per-unit power transfer distribution
factor on the line from bus (or buses) i to bus (or buses) j from a power transfer due
to bid s for topology t.










≤ QIntv , ∀p ∈ P , ∀t ∈ T ,∀v ∈ V
where, as described earlier, Ps is the time-of-use period associated with bid s.
Formulation 6.3, as follows, includes all the functionality discussed thus far: CRR
offers, Fixed Bids, TOU, settlement points and budget constraints, generic constraints
and CRR Options is modified using FTR Options formulation [162] [96]. Note that the
following conditions apply to all equations where appropriate: ∀i ∈ I,∀j ∈ I,∀p ∈
P , ∀s ∈ S,∀s′ ∈ S,∀v ∈ V ,∀n ∈ N . In addition, we also consider all topologies t
relevant to the evaluated model (e.g., ∀t ∈ T CHIMPO for the CHIMPO model)
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Formulation 6.3: CRR auction formulation with TOU, multi-period, buys

























s ∀s ∈ SFixed (6.3c)
0 ≤ fs ≤ Fmaxs ∀s 6∈ SFixed (6.3d)
fs′ = fs s > s









ip = 0 (6.3f)
Bijpt (θipt − θjpt) = qLineijpt j ∈ IConni , j > i (6.3g)∑
s∈SOpt































Contingency analysis is a reliability criterion determined by North American Elec-
tric Reliability Organization (NERC) for system security. System security is defined
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by NERC as the ability of the bulk power system to withstand sudden and expected
disturbances.10 Contingency analysis accomplishes this function. NERC defines a
contingency as “the unexpected failure or outage of a system component, such as
a generator, transmission line, circuit breaker, switch or other electrical element.”
Power systems in the United States are operated to meet NERC’s reliability stan-
dards and to do so perform contingency analysis.11 A convention used in discussing
contingencies is the n− x notation, for example, n− 0 is the system without contin-
gencies and n−1 means that single contingencies are considered. A single contingency
may include multiple elements (equipment) that “are physically or electrically linked
and fail together as one.” Most transmission lines have two limits called the normal
and emergency short-term ratings. The normal rating is a 24-hour continuous rat-
ing whereas emergency ratings have a duration of less than 24-hours that requires
the system operator to re-dispatch the system to bring the line flows back under the
normal rating within a period required by the NERC’s operating standards. These
ratings are determined by the transmission owners in compliance with NERC’s Stan-
dard FAC-008-3 Facility Ratings. Under normal operating conditions (n − 0) the
normal ratings determine the line flow limits while under contingencies (n − 1) the
emergency short-term limits are used.
10NERC’s complete definition: system security as the ability of the Bulk-Power System to with-
stand sudden, unexpected disturbances, such as short circuits or unanticipated loss of system ele-
ments due to natural causes or caused by manmade physical or cyber attacks.
11NERC Standard TOP-004-2 Transmission Operations: Purpose: To ensure that the transmis-
sion system is operated so that instability, uncontrolled separation, or cascading outages will not
occur as a result of the most severe single Contingency and specified multiple Contingencies.
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Contingency analysis calculates the flows on the transmission system for every
defined contingency to determine if any equipment is overloaded under any contin-
gency. This analysis is a computationally intense iterative process that determines the
power system’s state after each contingency. Operating the power system to maintain
reliability under contingencies reduces overall power system capacity because trans-
mission equipment flows must be reduced to absorb the potential redistributed flows
from elements that go on outage in a contingency. RTOs use a Security Constrained
Economic Dispatch (SCED) that minimizes system cost and constrains the generation
dispatch to keep flows on the transmission system equal to or below the transmission
system equipment limits both without (n− 0) and with contingencies (n− 1). If con-
tingencies are disregarded in CRR auctions, then too many may be sold, resulting in
a risk of revenue inadequacy. This critical functionality adds complexity to ERCOT’s
commercial CRR auction implementation not shown in the formulations presented
earlier in this thesis and not typically shown in many academic models. Formulation
6.4 shows how the above formulations are modified to include contingency analysis in
the simultaneous feasibility test and includes all the additional functionality covered
above in Sections from 6.3.2 to 6.3.5. For simplification, the formulation is presented
fully utilizing linear approximation sensitivity factors (PTDFs and OTDFs) instead
of the B-θ formulation defined above that calculates flows based on phase angle dif-
ferences between adjacent buses. Outage Transfer Distribution Factors (OTDF) are
similar to PTDFs as described in Section 6.3.5 except that is calculated after a con-
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tingency. In other words, it is the PTDF after a contingency. The notation is read
as follows: AOTDFijstc , is the outage transfer distribution factor on the line from bus (or
buses) i to bus (or buses) j from a power transfer due to bid s for contingency c of
topology t.
The expanded model that includes PTDF and budget limits is as follows. Note
that the following conditions apply to all equations where appropriate: ∀i ∈ I,∀j ∈
I,∀p ∈ P ,∀s ∈ S,∀s′ ∈ S,∀v ∈ V ,∀n ∈ N ,∀c ∈ C. In addition, all topologies t
relevant to the evaluated model (e.g., ∀t ∈ T CHIMPO for the CHIMPO model) are
considered.
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s ∀s ∈ SFixed (6.4b)
0 ≤ fs ≤ Fmaxs ∀s 6∈ SFixed (6.4c)
fs′ = fs s > s
′ ∧ s′ ∈ S24hrs (6.4d)∑
s∈SOpt





















































6.4 ERCOT CRR auction process
ERCOT market participants acquire CRRs through a series of auctions conducted
monthly and semi-annually. The monthly auction provides bidders the opportunity
to purchase or sell CRRs for the subsequent month. The semi-annual CRR auction
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is a long-term auction that consists of four separate but successive auctions – each
covering a six-month period. The transmission capacity available for the auction
is adjusted downward by scaling the equipment limits to lessen the risk of revenue
inadequacy. Table 6.2 displays the successive semi-annual auctions and each auction’s
scaling factor. The scaling factor used for the monthly auctions is 90%. The remaining
10% transmission capacity is a global derate factor that is not made available to the
auction participants. The global derate factor acts as insurance against uncertain
events (e.g., forced transmission line outage) that can lead to revenue inadequacy.
Table 6.2: Long-term auction sequence
Sequence Period Scaling Factor
1 0 – 6 months 60%
2 6 month – 1 year 45%
3 1 year – 1 year and 6 months 30%
4 1 year and 6 months – 2 years 15%
Bidders in each six-month auctions may submit bids for the time-of-use periods
described in Section 6.3.3 except for 24-hour bids. Also, bids do not have to be for the
entire six-month period – bidders may bid on a month or calendar-strip of consecutive
months.
Once the long-term auction is cleared, its CRR awards are called “fixed bids” in
subsequent monthly and semiannual auctions except for the last sequence (Sequence
4 in Figure 6.4) where the 15% capacity purchased in the long-term auction is the
first opportunity for bidders to purchase CRRs. Fixed CRRs may be offered to be
11A partition of a set is a grouping of the set’s elements into non-empty subsets, in such that every
element is included in exactly one of the subsets.
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sold in other later monthly or long-term auctions.
Figure 6.4: Example ERCOT CRR auction schedule to purchase CRRs for December
Year 2
6.5 ERCOT’s CRR auction outage impo-
sition
According to ERCOT’s market rules (Protocols, Operating Guides), the process
for including planned outages of transmission into the CRR action model is a modified
version of SINTO. Instead of including all outages, ERCOT models a subset of them
as described in the following:
Congestion Revenue Right (CRR) Network Model Outage determination
uses network topology of the CRR Network Model identified by ERCOT.
This must include Outages of Transmission Elements with a status of ap-
proved or accepted by ERCOT at the time the CRR Network Model is
being built and that demonstrate significant impact to the transfer capa-
bility during the effective period. ERCOT will consider including Outages
in the CRR Network Model that are scheduled to occur in the relevant
time period and meet one or more of the following criteria: (i) Consecu-
tive or continuous approved or accepted Outages greater than or equal to
five days; (ii) Approved or accepted Outages which include Transmission
Elements included in the definition of a Hub; (iii) Approved or accepted
Outages which include Transmission Elements in a 345 kV Transmission
Facility; (iv) Approved or accepted Outages that require the use of a
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Block Load Transfer (BLT); and (v) Any other approved or accepted
Outage that has been determined by ERCOT to carry a substantial risk
of causing significant congestion. [163]
The outages not modeled are assumed to have an insignificant effect on congestion.
Thus the procedures in this operating guide section support the hypothesis provided in
Section 3.4.1 that suggest a broader mindset to reduce CRR awards by only focusing
on including outages that may increase congestion, without considering whether the
included outages might result in CRR over-awards due to Braess’s paradox.
ERCOT publishes a document called: “Whitepaper for Congestion Revenue Rights
Model Build Processes [140].” This document describes in detail the methodology
used by ERCOT’s engineers to build the transmission model (“base case”) used in
the CRR auction simultaneous feasibility test.12 The methodology groups transmis-
sion outages using a GANTT chart to visually determine days in the modeled month
that have the most coincidental transmission outages in order for the CRR auction
engineers to select the single “day” where the aggregate grouping of outages “create
the most congestion on the system and apply those outages to the model for that
month [140].”
Figure 6.5, shows an example from an ERCOT presentation [164] of a GANTT
chart of scheduled transmission outages for the month. The rows in the GANTT chart
contains the list of outages. Columns A through M contain descriptive information
about the outages (only A - D is shown), for example, column A list the “from” station
12The process described in this white paper was confirmed in a meeting with ERCOT’s CRR team
on October 5, 2015, 2:30p central time managed by David Maggio who was in attendance.
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names, column B list the “from” station abbreviation, column C list the “to” station
name and column D list the “to” station abbreviation. The set of columns starting
at column N contain the outage schedules by day where an “X” in the cell indicate
that the outage is scheduled for that day. The two columns highlighted yellow are
candidate days that may contain the single “day” where the aggregate grouping of
outages ERCOT determines creates the most congestion on the system and applies
those outages to the CRR auction model for that month. The selected “day” that
the CRR auction engineers deem most significant to congestion represents the set of
outages that is included in the CRR auction.
Two noteworthy observations can be made from the GANTT chart. The first is
obvious, in that, many transmission outages are not modeled in the CRR auction
using this method. This one of the trade-offs ERCOT and other RTOs make for
practical implementation of the CRR auction given the auction’s deadlines. The
exclusion of outages that do not occur on the selected date may have an impact on
revenue adequacy as discussed in Section 2.2. However, the contribution of this thesis
and its case study is about the impact of Braess’s paradox and SINTO on the CRR
auction. As previously presented the CHIMPO model approach would remedy this
issue because it includes all the transmission outages as they are scheduled to occur.
The second observation from the GANTT chart is that the date selected with the
most simultaneous outages may not be simultaneous for the entire period because the
outages may have different durations thus SINTO still applies.
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Figure 6.5: ERCOT transmission outage GANTT chart [164]
6.6 Modeling system
Nexant offers two FTR auction software solutions. The first is the iHedge FTR
Market System used by RTOs to conduct FTR auctions and allocations. The second
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is the iHedge FTR Market Simulator for use by market participants to simulate the
FTR auction in order to develop FTR bidding strategies. Both solutions are described
below.
ERCOT uses Nexant’s iHedge® FTR Market System. The iHedge FTR Market
System is a comprehensive web-based software platform that administers and man-
ages transmission rights and runs the FTR allocation and auction process for the ISO.
ERCOT selected Nexant iHedge Solution because it is a web-based, integrated tool
driven by calculation subsystem built on database subsystem and data interface sub-
system that interacts with users through a market user interface (MUI) [165]. Figure
6.6, displays ERCOT’s iHedge FTR Market System integrated with ERCOT’s inter-
nal system for conducting ERCOT CRR auctions. The Network Model Management
System (NMMS) shown on the right lower side of the diagram is used to prepare
transmission models for the CRR system as well as other ERCOT systems.13 The
transmission model is then sent to the iHedge FTR Market System shown for inclu-
sion into the CRR auction. The iHedge FTR Market System shown inside the large
green shaded rectangle of Figure 6.6 includes the Data Interface Subsystem, Database
Subsystem, Market Participant’s User Interface, Market Operator Interface, and the
CRR Calculation Subsystem. The CRR Calculation Subsystem is the same engine
used in iHedge FTR Market Simulator.
The Nexant iHedge FTR Market Simulator is a standalone command line appli-
13ERCOT operational and planning systems include: Energy Management System (EMS), Market
Management System (MMS), Outage Scheduler (OS), Congestion Revenue Rights System (CRR),
Operations Training Simulator (OTS), Settlements & Billings and ERCOT Planning.
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Figure 6.6: Nexant CRR system, its components & interfaces with other ERCOT
systems [165]
cation that can run in a Unix or WINDOWS environment. The iHedge FTR Market
Simulator is the FTR calculation system of the iHedge FTR Market System and does
not include the other data management systems found in the iHedge FTR Market
System, e.g., the iHedge FTR Market Simulator does not include the Market Partici-
pant’s User Interface where bidders submit their bids. A simple block diagram of the
simulator is shown in Figure 6.7. The iHedge FTR Market Simulator works with two
supporting utilities that converts ERCOT’s CRR auction output files to input files
for the iHedge FTR Market Simulator.
The simulation input files were prepared in a WINDOWS environment and then
transferred to the Unix server for processing. Below are the steps necessary to perform
145
CHAPTER 6. ERCOT CASE STUDY MODEL PREPARATION
Figure 6.7: ERCOT Nexant CRR iHedge Market Simulator
a CRR auction simulation:
1. Solve the base case: This process calculates the power flows on each line using
the Fixed bids from prior auctions as described in Section 6.3.4.
2. Run contingency analysis: This is performed for all periods and topologies to
determine whether the Fixed bids are feasible in the upcoming CRR auction.
Contingency analysis is discussed in Section 6.3.8.
3. Expand limits to ensure feasibility: Once CRRs are awarded in prior CRR auc-
tions, the ERCOT protocols [160] specify that the line limits will be readjusted
(expanded) to accommodate the flows attributed to these awards. The Fixed
CRR awards may no longer be feasible in the subsequent auction as determined
from the contingency analysis. From a computational perspective, the expand-
ing limits process may be necessary to solve the auction because the new CRR
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bids may not have enough controls to make the Fixed CRR awards feasible thus
the auction would not be able to find a solution.
4. Run auction: Solves the multistage optimization problem.
5. Create output reports: Produces text and comma-separated values (csv) files
for results, analysis, and diagnostics. The reports include the following: Branch
Outage Report, Expanded Limits Report, Objective Function Value Report,
Binding Constraints Report, Binding Constraints Sensitivity Report, and CRR
Awards Report.
Software selection rationale
Nexant iHedge® FTR Market Simulator14 is the software used to conduct the
modeling for the case study. iHedge® was chosen for the following reasons:
• Access to Nexant’s knowledgeable staff who are the leading experts of FTR
auctions process and auction software.
• Nexant iHedge® is the commercial application used by most RTO/ISOs to
conduct their FTR auctions.15
• It has the capability to be set up as a multi-period model and can be configured
to model formulations proposed in Sections 5.1 and 5.2.
14http://www.nexant.com/software/ihedge
15iHedge® is directly used by NYISO, MISO, CAISO, ERCOT, and SPP; has been used by PJM
and NEISO to verify their primary auction software
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• It has the capability to model Point-To-Point Obligation and Options FTRs
• It is capable of modeling transmission contingencies.
• It can model aggregate bids and offers: hubs, zones, commercial pricing nodes
(CPNodes).
• It can replicate exactly FTR auction results.16
6.7 Case study data and model
preparation
The process for data and CRR auction model preparation for the CHIMPO, NO-
SINTO, SINTO and NO simulations is described below.
The case study modeling process is illustrated in flow diagram Figure 6.8. All data
used in the model is attained from ERCOT’s Market Information System (MIS) [145].
The CRR data download uses both pre- and post- CRR auction data. The pre-auction
data packet includes the following data:
• Fixed Bids file: File containing CRR awards that were awarded in previously
held CRR auctions as explained in Section 6.3.4.
16The objective in this case study is not to compare the modeling results to historical market
auction results. Nevertheless, this analysis was performed, and the results are almost identical to
the CRR auction results with the main difference attributed to budget and credit constraint data
not being publicly available for the bidders.
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Figure 6.8: Case study CRR auction modeling process
• Base cases files: Three base cases - one for each period - are provided with
the data package. However, all three base cases are the same, and all SINTO
transmission outages are reflected in the base cases that the CRR team included
in the model.
• Contingency file: The contingency includes the contingency elements to be eval-
uated by the simultaneous feasibility test. Contingency analysis are explained
in Section 6.3.8.
• Monitored elements files: File contains a list of the devices/equipment with
their associated base case and emergency ratings.
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• Source and Sink definitions file: This file provides the Settlement Pricing Point
(SPP) node-to-bus mappings and associated weighting factors for both single
and aggregate nodes. SPPs are explained in Section 6.3.2.
• Dynamic ratings’ file: Static table with the temperature assumptions for each
weather zone used to determine the dynamic line limits.
• Non-thermal constraints file: File includes a list of generic constraints. Generic
constraints are interface constraints (a group of transmission lines) that are
given a limit (typically for stability, voltage or other constraint that cannot be
modeled in a power flow application) to limit geographic area power transfers.
Generic constraints are explained in Section 6.3.7.
• Mapping file: File provides a mapping between the operations equipment names
and the CRR base case.
• GIS bus file: Google Earth .kml file containing the GIS coordinates for ER-
COT’s transmission system buses and lines.
• Transmission outage text file: File contains a snapshot of all the transmission
outages considered for the CRR auction. Only a subset of the outages is selected
to be included in the auction as explained in Section 6.5.
• Flowgate file: ERCOT CRRs are Point-to-Point FTRs and the stakeholders
have not adopted the use of Financial Flowgate Rights (FGR) thus the file is
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empty.
The post-auction data packet includes the following files:
• Cleared CRR awards file: File contains the unmasked cleared bids and offers
awarded for the monthly CRR auction including the bid description, clearing
price and quantities.
• Submitted Bids and Offers file: File contains all masked bid and offer data for
the auction.
• CRR auction binding constraints: File contains monthly auction binding con-
straints and shadow prices.
• Source and sink shadow prices: File contains the prices for the commercial
pricing nodes.
6.7.1 CHIMPO CRR auction simulation process
The base case and outage data are prepared for the CHIMPO simulations by first
creating a GANTT chart to manually create sets of coincidental transmission outages
(topologies) that occur during that month. ERCOT adopted this outage inclusion
process because removing all of the non-coincidental outages scheduled for a month
may not be operationally feasible.17 Figure 6.9 shows the GANTT chart prepared for
17An ancillary benefit of the CHIMPO formulation is that all transmission outages can be included
in the model.
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the May 2014 CHIMPO auction simulation. In the GANTT chart, each row indicates
the transmission line or transformer planned for an outage and a red colored cell with
a “1” in it indicates an outage scheduled for that day. Conversely, green cells with a
“0” indicate that the equipment does not have an outage on that day. As explained
in Section 6.5, the outages modeled in the CRR monthly auction are only a subset
of the total number of outages scheduled during the month – where the ERCOT
CRR engineers select the day where the group of outages is determined to have the
greatest impact on congestion (the day with the most limited transmission capacity
in the month). It is obvious that on the day selected the outages are simultaneous;
however, because the outages may have different durations (e.g., one outage has a 5
day duration, and another outage has a l5 day duration and may only be coincidental
on the day selected) the outages may not all be coincidental for every period during
the month. As seen in the GANTT chart shown in Figure 6.9, ERCOT selected
May 2nd as the day with the most limited transmission capacity. Also, note that the
transmission configurations due to the planned outages are different when comparing
May 2nd to May 31st thus the May 2nd outages are not coincidental for the entire
period. Another example, showing that the day with the most limiting coincidental
grouping of planned outages are not coincidental for the entire period can be seen in
the GANTT chart prepared by ERCOT shown in Figure 6.5.
In addition to the scheduled outages shown for example in Figure 6.9, ERCOT
includes outages when creating the base case that can not be manipulated in the base
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Figure 6.9: May 2014 transmission outage GANTT chart
case and thus the outages cannot be controlled for the case study. These outages
are listed in the transmission outage file mentioned in Section 6.7 that is provided to
the market participants before the auction. The reason that some equipment outages
cannot be adjusted in the base cases provided by ERCOT (and all other RTOs) is
because the power industry uses two types of topology models – one for the operation
and the other one for the planning of the power system.
The transmission outage file includes electrical equipment outages such as breakers
and disconnect switches that cannot be modeled in a planning-type Bus-Branch model
(base case) ERCOT uses in the CRR auction. The two types of topology models are
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the Node-Breaker network model used by system operations and the Bus-Branch
network model used by transmission planners [166,167]. Node-Breaker network mod-
els represent substation18 equipment in much greater detail than the Bus-Breaker
network model and so it is more capable of modeling actual transmission system
configurations. Conversely, the Bus-Branch network models contain no breakers or
disconnect switches and are more limited in the transmission configuration that can
be represented. For example, in Figure 6.10a the network Node-Breaker model is il-
lustrated where the red squares are breakers, and the black rectangles are buses, and
the planning Bus-Branch model corresponding to the network model is shown below
in Figure 6.10b. Notice that all three substations in the Node-Breaker model are each
modeled with a single bus in the Bus-Branch model. The CRR base case originates
as a network operations model (Node-Breaker) where equipment like breakers and
disconnects can be taken out-of-service. Once the outages are modeled, the CRR
engineers create a Bus-Branch base case from the Node-Breaker network model using
a program called a topology processor [168].19 After the Bus-Branch base case is
created, equipment like breakers and disconnect switches can no longer be modified.
Thus, in the case study, the GANTT chart created from the transmission outage
18A substation is a power system facility that encompasses the following physical equipment:
transformer, breakers, disconnect switches, electrical buses, metering and relaying devices, and con-
trol and communication systems. A substation serves several functions including a connection point
for transmission lines, an interconnection point for generators or loads (or to distribution systems),
voltage conversion, facilitate maintenance, power system measurements, power system protection,
and remote control equipment.
19The topology processor conversion depends on the operational state of the breakers and discon-
nects.
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Figure 6.10: Substation model representation (a) Node-Breaker (b) Bus-Branch [169]
After creating the GANTT chart, the next step is to build base cases that incorpo-
rate the coincidental outage topologies. Since ERCOT already included the outages
into the auction base cases provided in the pre-auction data package, the task was to
determine which lines to place back-in-service instead of which to take out-of-service.
In addition to the transmission outages, the base case also includes open transmission
lines that are either where the operating state is normally open or are future lines
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that are not in-service yet. This means that closing all the lines in the base case
and then imposing the transmission outages was not an option in preparing the base
cases.
After the base cases are prepared, the next step is to assemble the data into
a set of iHedge FTR Market Simulator input files. Two programs are used: the
Data Aggregator and DATMAN. The Data Aggregator is a utility that reads the
ERCOT CRR data files as provided by ERCOT and converts the data into Partial
PCA20 data files and DATMAN macro files. The initial DATMAN macro files and
partial PCA files are configured to create files for a SINTO CRR simulation and are
subsequently modified to a CHIMPO configuration. Following that the second utility
called DATMAN reads the modified DATMAN macro files assembles the PCA input
files for iHedge FTR Market Simulator.
Table 6.3 displays the number of topologies modeled for the CHIMPO CRR auc-
tion simulations which are a product of the number of outage configurations consid-
ered and the number of TOU periods.
The last column in Table 6.3 displays the total number of combined TOU period
and topology PCA files created per simulated month. One additional PCA file is
created called the Multiperiod PCA file. Lastly, an iHedge macro file is created
with commands that perform the necessary steps to run the simulation and generate
and name the output results files. The output reports produced for analysis include
20PCA stands for “Power Computer Applications” after the name of the company before Nexant
Inc. acquired it in 2000
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Table 6.3: Modeled CHIMPO topologies
the following: Branch Outage Report, Expanded Limits Report, Objective Function
Value Report, Binding Constraints Report, Binding Constraints Sensitivity Report,
and CRR Awards Report. The iHedge macro file and PCA files are then moved to
the iHedge FTR Market Simulator Unix application server directory. This directory
also houses the auction simulation results files. A Unix script file initiates the twelve
CHIMPO simulation and iterates through each monthly auction run.
After the CHIMPO CRR auction simulations are completed, then the output
and diagnostic reports are moved back to the WINDOWS results directory and are
analyzed. The output reports are either text or csv files, and Access databases are
created to query the results.
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6.7.2 NO SINTO, NO and SINTO CRR auction
simulation process
The process for the NO-SINTO CRR auction simulations is the same as CHIMPO
except only two topologies are prepared. The first is the SINTO base case provided as-
is by ERCOT and another “Normal Operations” base case prepared by placing the
scheduled transmission outaged lines back in-service. As in the preparation of the
CHIMPO topologies, transmission lines and transformers that are either normally
opened or not in service are not altered. The NO CRR simulations are prepared
using the base case created for the NO-SINTO CRR simulation; however, only one
topology is used in the simultaneous feasibility test. Lastly, the SINTO CRR auction
simulation uses ERCOT’s CRR auction data without modification.
6.8 Study general approach and
methodology
6.8.1 Specific questions to be addressed by the
methodology
As explained in Section 5.1, the CHIMPO formulation is the ideal SFT approxi-
mation because constraints for all the unique transmission system configurations due
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to the planned transmission outage schedule for the month are precisely represented.
Although the CHIMPO formulation is the ideal solution, its main drawback is the
additional computational time required to consider multiple configurations within a
month may not meet the market deadlines to run the auction, analyze results, rerun
if necessary and finally notify the auction participants of their results. For the case
study, CHIMPO simulations are used to accomplish two purposes. The first is to
detect the presence of Braess’s paradox and SINTO by comparing the SINTO results
to the CHIMPO. The CHIMPO CRR simulation is the benchmark for the case study.
The second purpose is to assess if the NO-SINTO approach is a better approximation
to the full CHIMPO model than the SINTO approach. Lastly, the case study ap-
proach considers computational performance by comparing computational times for
each of the formulations.
This case study procedure is developed to answer the following questions. In turn,
these questions are separately addressed in the sections from Section 7.2 to Section
7.6.
1. Did Braess’s paradox impact the CRR auction results?
2. How were the auction results affected?
3. Did the proposed formulations reduce the effects of Braess’s paradox and the
simultaneous imposition of non-coincidental transmission outages?
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4. Which formulation (SINTO or NO-SINTO) had better results when comparing
their allocations to CHIMPO allocations, and why were those results better?
5. Can the proposed formulations be practically implemented? If not, why?
6.8.2 Test methodology and procedure
Below is a description of the procedure and methods for the case study:
1. Prepare CRR auction simulation data for the NO, SINTO, NO-SINTO, and
CHIMPO CRR auction formulations as described in Section 6.7.
2. Simulate ERCOT’s CRR auction results by running the SINTO formulation
3. Run CRR auctions with the two proposed modified formulations: CHIMPO
and NO-SINTO
4. Run the CRR auctions without planned transmission outages: Normal Opera-
tion (NO)
5. Collect model run performance statistics, e.g., computation time, model run
failures, size of results data
6. Aggregate iHedge model output data: large model output data in text and
comma separated values (.csv) files imported into an Access Database and
queries developed to aggregate the data to be analyzed
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7. Compare simulation results
• Transmission limit expansion report analysis. This comparison examines
whether previously awarded CRR, Fixed CRRs, remain feasible in the
monthly auction. Comparison metrics include: correlation, RMSE (Roots
Mean Square Error), and comparing totals.
• Use metrics to investigate and explain differences among the various model
runs using the CHIMPO simulations as the benchmark.
8. Summarize and document findings




ERCOT Case Study Results and
Analysis
7.1 Introduction
The primary objective of this chapter is to answer the five research questions posed
in Section 6.8.1 using the case study CRR auction simulation results. Each of these
five questions is addressed in a separate section below. In Section 7.2, the first inquiry
is to determine if the case study found evidence of the Braess’s paradox affects in the
SINTO CRR auction results. In Section 7.3, the second question is to analyze how
the auction results were affected by Braess’s paradox. The third question presented
in Section 7.4 assesses whether the proposed NO-SINTO and CHIMPO formulations
reduce the impact of Braess’s paradox and SINTO. Then in Section 7.5, the fourth
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question appraises which formulation, SINTO or NO-SINTO, provides a CRR result
closest to the ideal CHIMPO result. Lastly, in Section 7.6, the fifth question examines
whether the proposed formulations can be practically implemented. As previously
discussed in Section 6.8.1, the CHIMPO simulation results are used as the benchmark
for the case study because it uses the various transmission configurations derived
from the planned transmission outage schedules which most accurately represent the
planned day-ahead market transmission configurations.
In all, forty-eight CRR auction simulations (twelve - 2014 monthly CRR auctions
for each of four formulations: CHIMPO, NO-SINTO, SINTO, and NO) were per-
formed and output data aggregated to produce data sets of results used to answer
the five case study research questions. A standard non-parametric hypothesis test is
used to determine a quantitative index of the strength of the differences between the
models.1
In addition to analyses of the above five questions, a modification to the NO-
SINTO model is proposed and tested that improves its performance. In particular, in
Section 7.7, a subsequent modification is made to the NO-SINTO formulation based
on a hypothesis that adding outages lasting the full month to the NO constraints
of the NO-SINTO model would improve its approximation to the CHIMPO model
results. The modified model, called the Adjusted NO-SINTO model, is then run for
the twelve month test period and the Objective Function Values (OFV) compared to
1In this case, the results of the hypothesis test are not to be interpreted as actual probabilistic
statements of statistical significance.
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the OFV results of the other approaches to determine if the approximation improved.
In Section 7.8, the case study result findings are summarized.
7.2 Question 1: Did Braess’s paradox im-
pact the case study results?
7.2.1 Detecting the paradox with the objective func-
tion values
In its most basic form, a circuit exhibiting Braess’s paradox is simple to assess;
for example, as in the specifically designed Wheatstone bridge circuit used in this
thesis (Chapter 4) and other academic work [153, 170] that considers only one flow
from a start node (source) to a destination or end node (sink). However in a large
transmission system with many circuit configurations and many superimposed power
flows, affirming whether the paradox occurs is a challenging task.
Blumsack in [37] proposed a network decomposition through a graph theory ap-
proach to identify embedded Wheatstone sub-networks in a transmission system.
However, he also proved that the explicit identification of the circuit in itself does
not mean a Braess’s paradox situation exists. In [153], Blumsack also showed that,
unlike in transportation systems, the presence of a Wheatstone bridge configuration
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in power systems is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for Braess’s paradox
to occur. Even if it met the necessary and sufficient condition, it would be a very
complex task to identify the transmission outages that cause Braess’s paradox in an
actual system. This is because contingency analyses change circuit configurations and
due to CRR option constraints that only model flows in one direction (where flow
induced by the option is equal to the max(0, positive flow)), Sections 6.3.8 and 6.3.5
respectively.
The approach taken to answer whether Braess’s paradox affected the CRR auction
results in this case study is diagnosed by comparing the objective function values for
the alternative formulations and other results data. In Figure 7.1, the objective value
is represented by the area under the bid curve that clears the auction (area left of
the vertical transmission capacity supply line). If an outage causes Braess’s paradox,
then the objective function value could increase since the outage might enable more
of the higher value bids to clear the auction. Observing an increase would clearly
indicate that the outage has caused Braess’s paradox. On the other hand, if an outage
decreases the objective function, then there is no evidence of Braess’s paradox. (It is
possible that an outage increases network capacity for some combinations of injections
and withdrawals, but decreases it for others; so an observation that the objective has
worsened does not mean that an increase would not be observed under some other
set of bids. Thus, observing a decrease does not necessarily rule out the occurrence
of Braess’s paradox.)
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Figure 7.1: Using OFV to detect Braess’s paradox
Now, consider the NO-SINTO approximation (Section 5.2) where the mere ad-
dition of a set of counter-intuitive constraints is added to the SINTO SFT to limit
the flows – not a set with more outages but instead a set with no outages what-
soever. If transmission outages always reduce capacity, then the additional set of
constraints with no outages should not bind in the CRR auction optimization, and
the NO-SINTO objective value would be no worse than the SINTO objective value.
However, if the outages cause a Braess’s paradox effect, then the constraints based
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on the no planned outages (Normally Operated) case could limit the flow if a trans-
mission outage increases transmission capacity, resulting in a NO-SINTO objective
value that is worse than the SINTO objective value.
This same concept is also apparent in the CHIMPO formulation including outages
lasting less than a month because its set of transmission constraints would include
every transmission configuration that can occur in the month, and the most limiting
condition would limit the flows.2 The approach is similar to the transmission switch-
ing dispatch optimization [14] where the optimization does not explicitly determine
transmission outages in circuits that exhibit Braess’s paradox but instead implicitly
considers Braess’s paradox when the optimization reduces congestion by removing
lines from their normally operated position.
Thus, the first set of analyses undertaken to determine if Braess’s paradox im-
pacted the CRR auction results is to compare the SINTO formulation objective func-
tion values to the NO-SINTO and CHIMPO values. If the SINTO would naively be
expected to be the most conservative CRR auction approximation (as it imposes all
outages at once in one network configuration), SINTO’s flows induced by the awarded
bids (and offers) (for a given set of outages and set of bids and offers) would also be
expected to be feasible in both the NO-SINTO transmission configuration constraints
and in the various CHIMPO transmission configuration constraints sets. Thus the
2CHIMPO is, in theory, less restrictive than SINTO if none of a month’s sub-periods would
experience all of SINTO’s outages at the same time. However, if SINTO has a better objective value
than CHIMPO, this would also be evidence of Braess’s paradox, in that simultaneous imposition of
all outages has increased capacity.
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(naive) expectation for the conservative SINTO CRR auction objective function value
would be that it is less or at least no more than the NO-SINTO and CHIMPO OFVs
(i.e., SINTO should not yield a better OFV). On the other hand, if Braess’s paradox
occurs, then SINTO might actually result in a better objective function value than
NO-SINTO and CHIMPO. Indeed, the result below shows this.
7.2.2 Objective function values
Whether that occurred is considered in the ensuing analysis. Table 7.1 list the 48
objective function values from the CRR auction simulations applying the four CRR
auction formulations to each of 12 months. The cells in the table use a green, yellow,
and red color gradient across the rows. The gradient is established, so that greener
shades represent smaller values, yellow represents medium values and red shades the
higher values. Based on this color scheme, a general first observation is that the
Normally Operated (NO) CRR auction that does not include planned transmission
outages is mostly red indicating that the objective function values are higher than the
other three auction formulations. If one disregards the possibility of Braess’s paradox,
this would be expected since more of the higher valued CRRs would likely clear the
auction because it is less constrained than the other formulations that include planned
transmission outages.
If Braess’s paradox is not significant, then it would be expected that the objective
functions would worsen (proceed from red to green) as the models add more con-
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straints. That is, it should proceed from the NO CRR auction model (no outages) to
CHIMPO CRR auction model (which does not impose all transmission outage con-
straints at once, but rather calculates flows separately for each), and finally to SINTO
model (which imposes all outages simultaneously) and NO-SINTO model (which adds
a no outages network to the SINTO case and so should not be more restrictive).
The second observation (and more surprising) is that the SINTO CRR auction ob-
jective function values are mostly colored yellow and in the medium range compared
to the other CRR auction approximations. This indicates that the SINTO objective
function value is higher and thus it is less constraining than the NO-SINTO and
CHIMPO formulations.3 As previously discussed, the only set of constraints added
to the NO-SINTO was from a normally operated system configuration that does not
include outages. This indicates that any additional transmission capacity resulting
from an outage creating Braess’s paradox is now limited by the normally operated
transmission system constraints. This proves that Braess’s paradox impacted the
SINTO CRR auction allocation. Finally, like the NO-SINTO model, the CHIMPO
objective function values tend to be shaded green. This shows there is some con-
sistency between the NO-SINTO model and the CHIMPO model meaning that the
CHIMPO model too acts to limit Braess’s paradox.
The final row in Table 7.1 displays the twelve-month simple average of the OFVs.
3This result signifies that the SINTO bids would not be simultaneously feasible on the sets
of network constraints from the different outage configurations in the NO-SINTO and CHIMPO
formulations. This thus provides evidence that Braess’s paradox impacts the SINTO CRR auction
results.
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A comparison of these averages and respective cell shading shows for the twelve-month
period, the average of the CHIMPO and NO-SINTO OFVs were very close with a
difference (NO-SINTO OFV - CHIMPO OFV) equal to $1,647. This difference which
is lower than the difference between the CHIMPO and SINTO averages that has a
difference (SINTO OFV - CHIMPO OFV) equal to $287,911.
Table 7.1: Objective function value comparison
7.2.3 Hypothesis testing using the Sign Test
To verify that the sets of observations in Table 7.1 are statistically distinct, a
nonparametric binomial hypothesis Sign Test [171] was performed for the paired dif-
ferences of the monthly objective function values. Of course, use of this test assumes
that the months are independent samples, which is not the case. Thus, the use in this
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chapter of a statistical test should be viewed as merely a quantitative indication of the
extent of the differences between the solutions, and not as literally a demonstration
that the results could not have happened by chance.
Hypothesis tests were performed for the following OFV combinations: NO versus
SINTO, SINTO versus NO-SINTO, and SINTO versus CHIMPO. The Sign Test
was chosen instead of a t-test to avoid the assumption that the distribution of the
objective function values is a normal distribution. For each Sign Test a significance
level of 0.05 is used. Table 7.2, list the p-values for both one-tailed and two-tailed test
with the number of trials equal to twelve (n=12) because subsequent comparisons are
made among the models (SINTO, NO-SINTO, CHIMPO and NO) for the twelve 2014
monthly auction simulations. The simulation results for the different auction models
are paired since the monthly data results for one model is related to the corresponding
monthly data of the other models.
The formulas used to calculate the binomial probability values for the 1-tailed
test listed in Table 7.2 are given below. In the formulas used to calculate these
probabilities, n is the total number of trials which, in this case, and for all subsequent
hypothesis Sign Test, is equal to 12 (the total number of monthly simulations for a
year). k is the total number of positive (+) sign differences for the trails. p is the
probability of having a positive (+) sign difference in a single trial – e.g., in this case,
the sign is the difference between the two formulation result values being statistically
tested. In the Sign Test, when the difference between the two values being tested is
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equal to zero, the value is disregarded and accordingly, the sample size reduced. Since
only positive and negative signs are considered and equally likely, the probability for
a trial is equal to 0.5. As a result, the probability of getting a negative (−) sign
difference also has a probability of 0.5 (1 − p) and is designated by the letter q.
The value of the 2-tailed test shown in Table 7.2, is the probability of either tail.
For example, the 2-tailed value for P (X ≥ 11) is actually the probability of either
P (X ≥ 11 or X ≤ 1), and so is twice the probability of P (X ≥ 11).






















7.2.3.1 Are SINTO OFVs greater than the NO-SINTO OFVs?
In the absence of Braess’s paradox, SINTO and NO-SINTO’s objective function
values should not differ. But if Braess’s paradox is present, SINTO could perform
better, indicating that networks with outages are sometimes less restrictive than a
network with no outages. The hypothesis test follows. Let d be defined as the
difference between the SINTO OFV and NO-SINTO OFV.
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Table 7.2: p-values from n=12 Binomial Distribution
d = SINTO OFV− NOSINTO OFV
The null hypothesis is that the difference d is equal to zero, or stated differently, that
the SINTO OFV is equal to the NO-SINTO OFV.
H0 : d = 0
The alternative hypothesis (presence of Braess’s paradox) is that the difference d is
greater than zero or that the SINTO OFV is greater than the NO-SINTO OFV.
Ha : d > 0
The calculated d value is shown in the column labeled “Diff. (SINTO - NOS-
INTO)” of Table 7.3 and the sign of the difference is displayed in the column labeled
“Sign.”
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Table 7.3: Hypothesis Sign Test: SINTO and NO-SINTO OFV
The number of positive signs is equal to 12 and number of negative signs is equal
to 0. The corresponding p-value from Table 7.2 for a 2-tail test with 12 positive
signs is equal to 0.00049. The result is significant since the p-value is less than the
alpha value of 0.05 thus the null hypothesis is rejected, and the alternative hypothesis
is accepted. This signifies that the SINTO OFVs are greater than the NO-SINTO
OFVs, meaning that Braess’s paradox outages were constrained by the additional NO
topology constraints added to the NO-SINTO model that does not include planned
outages.
In the next section, a similar hypothesis test is performed between the SINTO
OFVs and the ideal CHIMPO OFVs as another indication of whether or not Braess’s
paradox outages impacted the SINTO simulation results.
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7.2.3.2 Are SINTO OFVs greater than the CHIMPO OFVs?
Like in the preceding section but this time with the CHIMPO model, the con-
ventional intuition is that the SINTO model is more conservative than CHIMPO
model thus SINTO’s OFVs should be lower or at least equal to the CHIMPO’s OFVs
since all the outages are modeled simultaneously in the SINTO approximation. If the
CHIMPO OFVs are greater than SINTO’s OFVs, the CHIMPO model would be more
constrained by topologies where the outages are not scheduled to be out-of-service
(for planned outages with durations less than a month). The hypothesis test follows.
Let d be defined as the difference between the SINTO OFV and CHIMPO OFV.
d = SINTO OFV− CHIMPO OFV
The null hypothesis is that the difference d is equal to zero or stated differently that
the SINTO OFV is equal to the CHIMPO OFV.
H0 : d = 0
The alternative hypothesis is that the difference d is greater than zero or that the
SINTO OFV is greater than the CHIMPO.
Ha : d > 0
The calculated d value is shown in the column labeled “Diff. (SINTO - CHIMPO)”
of Table 7.4 and the sign of the difference is displayed in the column labeled “Sign.”
The number of positive signs is equal to 12 and number of negative signs is equal
to 0. The corresponding p-value from Table 7.2 for a 2-tail test with 12 positive signs
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Table 7.4: Hypothesis Sign Test: SINTO and CHIMPO OFV
is equal to 0.00049. The result is significant since the p-value is less than the alpha
value of 0.05 thus the null hypothesis is rejected, and the alternative hypothesis is
accepted. This signifies that the SINTO OFVs are statistically significantly greater
than the CHIMPO OFVs meaning that Braess’s paradox outages were constrained
by the additional constraints when outages with a duration less than a month are
placed back in-service in the CHIMPO topology constraints.
In the next section, another similar hypothesis test is performed, however, in this
case, it is between the SINTO OFVs and the NO OFVs. The normally operated
(NO) topology does not include planned transmission outages so the naive intuition
is that the SINTO OFVs should be less than the NO OFVs. The following hypothesis
test determines if the difference between the larger NO OFVs and the lesser SINTO
OFVs is statistically significant.
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7.2.3.3 Are NO OFVs greater than SINTO OFVs?
The purpose of this hypothesis test is to verify whether the NO model that does
not include planned transmission outages is less constrained than the SINTO model.
Therefore the added NO topology constraints in the NO-SINTO model should not
cause the NO-SINTO model to be more limiting than the SINTO model. The con-
ventional intuition is that the outages would reduce transmission capacity; thus the
NO OFVs should be larger than the SINTO OFVs. The hypothesis test follows. Let
d be defined as the difference between the NO OFV and SINTO OFV.
d = NO OFV− SINTO OFV
The null hypothesis is that the difference d is equal to zero or stated differently that
the NO OFV is equal to the SINTO OFV.
H0 : d = 0
The alternative hypothesis is that the difference d is greater than zero or that the NO
OFV is greater than the SINTO OFV.
Ha : d > 0
The calculated d value is shown in the column labeled “Diff. (NO - SINTO)” of
Table 7.5 and the sign of the difference is displayed in the column labeled “Sign.”
The null hypothesis is that the difference d is equal to zero or stated differently
that the NO OFV is equal to the SINTO OFV. The number of positive signs is
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Table 7.5: Hypothesis Sign Test: NO and SINTO OFV
equal to 11 and number of negative signs is equal to 1. The corresponding p-value
from Table 7.2 for a 2-tail test with 11 positive signs is equal to 0.00634. The result
is significant since the p-value is less than the alpha value of 0.05 thus the null
hypothesis is rejected, and the alternative hypothesis is accepted. This signifies that
the NO OFVs are statistically significantly greater than the SINTO OFVs. This
confirms the conventional intuition that the aggregate impact of the outages included
in the SINTO model has the aggregate effect of reducing transmission capacity. This,
however, is not always the case, for example, it can be observed from Table 7.5 that
in June the aggregate effect of including the outages in the SINTO model made the
OFV greater than the NO model OFV.
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7.2.3.4 Discussion
The Sign Tests’ results validate the observations based on the color gradient in
Table 7.1 in which the NO CRR OFVs are greater than the SINTO OFVs, and
the SINTO CRR auction OFVs are in turn greater than both the NO-SINTO and
CHIMPO OFVs.
As expected, the NO CRR auction OFVs usually have the highest values because
it is less constrained than the other CRR auction formulations which include the
planned transmission outages. Only if Braess’s paradox had a very strong effect would
the reverse be the case. One interesting observation is that this may not always be
the case. For example, the OFV for the SINTO CRR auction was greater in June
than the NO CRR auction OFV, implying that the aggregate set of outages in the
SINTO exhibited the Braess’s paradox effect to the extent that it was less constrained
than the normally operated state of the transmission system with no outages.
The hypothesis test also confirms a second more important observation from Table
7.1 in that the OFVs for both the NO-SINTO and the CHIMPO are less than the
SINTO, indicating that they are more constrained than the conservative SINTO CRR
auction approximation.
The impact of Braess’s paradox is evident since each formulation modeled the
same number of outages but the SINTO OFV was, in fact, less constrained (higher
OFV) than both the NO-SINTO and CHIMPO auction simulations. In the case of
the NO-SINTO formulation, the only set of constraints added that makes it different
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than the SINTO constraints are from a second topology that does not include outages.
One can deduce that the additional constraints that lowered the NO-SINTO OFV
were caused by the second topology with no planned outages, meaning that the
SINTO topology was less constrained because some of the outages modeled increased
transmission capacity compared to the no planned outage case (Normally Operated)
instead of reducing it. This analysis answers the first case study research question
(Section 6.8.1) and provides evidence that Braess’s paradox impacted the SINTO
CRR auction allocation.
7.2.4 Additional evidence of Braess’s paradox in
the fixed dids SFT
Next an analysis of the overloads from previously allocated CRRs (called Fixed
bids) is provided to show more evidence that the SINTO CRR auction formulation
simultaneous feasibility test (SFT) is less constrained due to the impact of Braess’s
paradox arising from the modeled planned outages. As part of the ERCOT’s CRR
auction process, a simultaneous feasibility test is conducted on the Fixed bids before
the CRR auction to determine if they cause overloads due to the transmission outages
scheduled for the monthly auction [160, 172]. As explained in Section 6.4, the prior
CRR auctions allocate up to 60% of the transmission system capacity by reducing the
transmission lines ratings. ERCOT allocates up to 90% of the transmission system
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capacity for the monthly auctions. However, the transmission outages modeled in the
monthly CRR auction may make some of the previously awarded Fixed bids infeasible
when ERCOT performs a pre-auction SFT due to the redistribution of flows caused
by the outages. The SFT is an application that can be run independently from
the auction optimization to identify overloads from Fixed bids. After the SFT is
completed, the limits of any overloaded constraints are increased to the flows on the
lines. This is performed in order to honor the previously awarded Fixed CRR bids and
avoid starting with a known infeasibility issue that may not be resolved by the auction
optimization. This is applied to each of the models to determine whether the Fixed
CRRs alone are feasible. If Braess’s paradox is not present, then the expectation
is that the SINTO model would show at least as many violations as the CHIMPO
model, and the same number as the NO-SINTO model because the outages would
similarly reduce transmission capacity in all three models. But if Braess’s paradox is
operating, SINTO might have fewer violations.
A summary of the overloads cause by the Fixed CRRs alone from the simultaneous
feasibility test is shown in Table 7.6. The column named Total Number Overloads
list the total number of unique overloads resulting from the SINTO, NO-SINTO, and
SINTO SFT. For instance, if there was an overload created in the SINTO SFT on line
A-B and two overloads in the NO-SINTO on lines A-B and C-D and three overloads
from the CHIMPO SFT on lines A-B, E-F, and G-H the total number of unique
overloads would be equal to 4 (A-B, C-D, E-F, and G-H). The next column named
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“No. Dissimilar Overloads” list the number of overloads that were not identified in all
three SFT methods. The columns named CHIMPO, NOSINTO and SINTO identify
which SFT method has the dissimilar overload. For example, in February there
were 40 unique overloads among the three SFT methods. There was one dissimilar
overload that did not appear in all three SFT method results. The dissimilar overload
in February appeared in both the CHIMPO and the NOSINTO as indicated with the
X in their column and in the February row.4
Table 7.6: Fixed CRRs overloads
In analyzing the table one, important and obvious observation is that the SINTO
column contains no Xs. Resulting in no Xs indicates that the SINTO SFT was not as
constrained as the NO-SINTO and CHIMPO SFT methods, although as previously
mentioned they all model the same transmission outages but in different ways. If
there was no Braess’s paradox, then SINTO should have been more restrictive and
4Note: Expanding the limits may be different for each formulation therefore each auction might
start the optimization at a different starting point (or condition).
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should show all the violations that occur in the other models. This did not occur.
This implies that some of the outages modeled exhibited the Braess’s paradox effect
and increased the transmission capacity such that the overload did not appear.
The second observation is that both the NO-SINTO and CHIMPO SFT infea-
sibilities results were the same in eight of the twelve months indicating that both
approaches demonstrate similarities in identifying overloads caused by Braess’s para-
dox not captured by the SINTO method.
7.3 Question 2: How were the auction re-
sults affected by Braess’s paradox?
7.3.1 Effects on accepted quantities of bids
The primary objective of analyzing the auction results is to determine how the
auction results based on different SFT approximations compare to each other using
the ideal CHIMPO allocation as the benchmark for comparison. Revenue adequacy is
attained by ensuring the CRR allocation is feasible during the market period, which
in this case is the day-ahead market. Thus the focus of the analysis is on the bid
(and offer) volumes awarded and not on the clearing prices for CRRs. Nevertheless,
a price comparison for the bids that were accepted in one auction but not another
is provided to determine which SFT approximation came closer to the CHIMPO
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formulation results, which most accurately reflects that actual distribution of outage
conditions.
The simulation results data used to answer the question on how the auction results
were affected by Braess’s paradox are based on the cleared (awarded) bids and offers;
these quantities are likely to be different among the four formulations. If any cleared
bid or offer has a different megawatt quantity than the other three, it is included in the
study data for the subsequent analysis. For example, if the awarded quantity for one
particular right using the SINTO approximation is 5 MW and the other three methods
(CHIMPO, NO-SINTO and NO) have a quantity of 0 MW for the same bid, then that
right is included in the data set. Thus, any rights with unequal awards are included in
the data set. Table 7.7 lists the bid and offer data quantities for each month. The first
column starting at the left side of the table lists the simulated month. The second
column with the heading, “Count,” lists the total number of dissimilar bids (and
offers). The cells in that column use conditional formatting where green indicates
a lower value, yellow an intermediate value, and red color indicating a high value.
The month with the smallest number of dissimilar bids is August, and the largest is
April. The next column, which is entitled, “Total No. Bids,” lists the total number
of bids (and offers) submitted by auction participants for that auction. The fourth
column named, “Total Fixed Bids” gives the number of previously allocated bids from
earlier semi-annual auctions where the quantity of the awards has to be modeled in
the monthly auction. Fixed bids were explained in Section 6.3.4. The fifth column
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with the heading entitled, “Total All Bids” is the sum of the “Total No. Bids” and
“Total Fixed Bids.” The last column entitled, “% of Bids Affected,” is the percentage
of dissimilar bids in the “Count” column to the total number of submitted bids in
the “Total No. Bids” column. The column uses the same conditional formatting used
in the Count column.
Table 7.7: Dissimilar awarded quantities among all four CRR auction models
As previously explained, the CHIMPO formulation results are the benchmark for
comparison of the auction results. The first item analyzed to determine how the
auction results are affected is the total megawatt quantities of the cleared dissimilar
bids which are listed in Table 7.8. Here the total includes the sum (positive) values of
cleared bids and offers. Conditional formatting is applied to each row where the color
gradient is green for lower values and red for higher values. This same color scheme
is used in all the subsequent tables below. Intuitively the first observation is that the
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Normally Operated (NO) formulation results have a larger cleared megawatt volume
than the other three formulation approaches. This is expected since the NO simula-
tion does not include planned transmission outages and should have more available
transmission capacity unless Braess’s paradox has a very strong effect. Also notice
that in August the volume was less for the NO than both the CHIMPO and SINTO
suggesting the presence that Braess’s paradox impacted the results (i.e., transmis-
sion outages made more capacity available), which is consistent with the objective
function value results of Section 7.2.3.4, above. A second observation is the SINTO
results have more yellow coloring than both the CHIMPO and NO-SINTO results
indicating that SINTO did not provide the most conservative volume. On the other
hand, the CHIMPO and NO-SINTO are shaded mostly green indicating that they
were closer in megawatt volume to each other than the SINTO volume. The fact
that NO-SINTO and SINTO did not have the same volumes is evidence of Braess’s
paradox, in that, if the “no outages” network is indeed a looser set of constraints than
networks with outages, adding the “no outages” network to SINTO should not have
reduced the MW awarded. But in fact, it did, indicating that some networks with
outages are actually less constraining than the no outages network, a manifestation
of Braess’s paradox.
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7.3.2 Hypothesis test
In this section, the qualitative observation of the previous subsection is confirmed
by undertaking hypothesis tests using the dissimilar cleared bid volume data set
described in the previous subsection. In particular, a hypothesis test is conducted
between the CHIMPO and NO-SINTO to determine if the difference is statistically
significant. And likewise, the hypothesis test is used to determine if the difference
between CHIMPO and SINTO values are also statistically significant.
Table 7.8: Comparison total quantity (MWs) awarded
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7.3.2.1 Are the CHIMPO Total Awarded Bid Quantities equal
to NO-SINTO Total Awarded Bid Quantities?
In this comparison, the awarded amounts for the NO-SINTO and CHIMPO auc-
tion simulations are compared to each other to determine whether they are statisti-
cally the same. The results of this hypothesis test is one of the considerations as to
whether the simpler NO-SINTO model is sufficiently similar to the CHIMPO model
so that NO-SINTO can be used to run the CRR auctions rather than the compu-
tationally more challenging CHIMPO model. This is one of several considerations
analyzed in this chapter to determine whether the NO-SINTO can be utilized instead
of the CHIMPO model. The hypothesis test follows. Let d be defined as the differ-
ence between the CHIMPO awarded bid quantities and the NO-SINTO awarded bid
quantities.
d = CHIMPO Awarded Quantities− NO-SINTO Awarded Quantities
The null hypothesis is that the difference d is equal to zero or stated differently that
the CHIMPO Awarded Quantities is equal to the NO-SINTO Awarded Quantities.
H0 : d = 0
The alternative hypothesis is that the difference d is not equal to zero or that the
CHIMPO Awarded Quantities are not equal to CHIMPO Awarded Quantities.
Ha : d 6= 0
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The calculated d value is shown in the column labeled “Diff. (CHIMPO - NOS-
INTO)” of Table 7.9 and the sign of the difference is displayed in the column labeled
“Sign.”
Table 7.9: Hypothesis Sign Test: CHIMPO – NO-SINTO Awarded Quantities
The number of positive signs is equal to 7 and number of negative signs is equal
to 5. The corresponding p-value from Table 7.2 for a 2-tail test with 7 positive signs
is equal to 0.77441.
The result is not statistically significant since the p-value is more than the al-
pha value of 0.05 thus the test fails to reject the null hypothesis and the alternative
hypothesis is rejected. This signifies that the CHIMPO awarded bid quantities are
statistically indistinguishable from the NO-SINTO awarded bid quantities. This re-
sult indicates that the first condition is met in determining if the NO-SINTO model
is a better approximation for the ideal CHIMPO model than the SINTO.
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In the next section, a similar hypothesis test is used to determine whether the
CHIMPO total awarded bid quantities are statistically equal to the SINTO total
awarded bid quantities.
7.3.2.2 Is the CHIMPO Total Awarded Bid Quantities equal
to SINTO Total Awarded Bid Quantities?
From the preceding section, the CHIMPO awarded bid quantities are statistically
indistinguishable from the NO-SINTO, so the next test determines whether the same
is true between the CHIMPO awarded bid quantities and the SINTO awarded bid
quantities. The goal is to continue to analyze how are the auction results from
the different models affected by Braess’s paradox and to determine which model
(NO-SINTO and SINTO) is a better approximation for the CHIMPO model. The
hypothesis test follows. Let d be defined as the difference between the CHIMPO
awarded bid quantities and the SINTO awarded bid quantities.
d = CHIMPO Awarded Quantities− SINTO Awarded Quantities
The null hypothesis is that the difference is equal to zero or stated differently that
the CHIMPO Awarded Quantities is equal to the SINTO Awarded Quantities.
H0 : d = 0
The alternative hypothesis is that the difference d is less than zero or that the
CHIMPO Awarded Quantities are less than to SINTO Awarded Quantities which
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would be consistent with Braess’s paradox affecting the results.
Ha : d < 0
The calculated d value is shown in the column labeled “Diff. (CHIMPO - SINTO)”
of Table 7.10 and the sign of the difference is displayed in the column labeled “Sign.”
Table 7.10: Hypothesis Sign Test: CHIMPO – SINTO Awarded Quantities
The number of positive signs is equal to 1 and number of negative signs is equal
to 11. The corresponding p-value from Table 7.2 for a 2-tail test with 1 positive sign
is equal to 0.00635.
The result is statistically significant since the p-value is less than the alpha value of
0.05; thus the test failed to accept the null hypothesis, and the alternative hypothesis
is accepted. This signifies that the CHIMPO awarded bid quantities are statistically
less than the SINTO awarded bid quantities. This implies that the CHIMPO model is
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more constraining than the SINTO model and that the difference in the total awarded
quantities is statistically significant.
The hypothesis for the awarded quantities support the observations from the con-
ditionally formatted Table 7.8 in that the CHIMPO auction cleared quantities are less
that the SINTO but are statistically equal to the NO-SINTO cleared bid quantities.
7.3.3 Test of correlations
Now that the cleared bid quantity totals are compared, an analysis is performed of
the tendency of the bids to vary together. In particular, the Pearson (product-moment
correlation) coefficient correlations are used to compare the NO-SINTO, SINTO and
NO formulation cleared bid megawatt results to the CHIMPO’s results (e.g., the
CHIMPO versus NO-SINTO, CHIMPO versus SINTO, and CHIMPO versus NO
correlations).
If the NO-SINTO results are more highly correlated to CHIMPO than are the
other approximate models (SINTO and NO), then this is additional evidence that NO-
SINTO is the better approximation. Table 7.11 lists the monthly correlation results.
The correlation table uses the same row conditional formatting as described for the
Table 7.8. In this case, a red color indicates the closest (highest) correlation. By
observing the coloring, the cleared bid megawatt quantities that most closely matched
the CHIMPO awarded megawatt quantities are the NO-SINTO bid quantities because
it has the largest correlation values in nine out of the twelve months. As expected,
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the NO formulation results have the smallest correlation to the CHIMPO awarded
bid quantities. A hypothesis test is performed to determine if the differences among
these correlations are statistically significant.
Table 7.11: Correlations of approximate auction awarded quantities in three approx-
imate models to awarded quantities in CHIMPO model
7.3.3.1 Are NO-SINTO or SINTO results more closely cor-
related to CHIMPO results?
Let d be defined as the difference between the NO-SINTO correlation values and
the SINTO correlation values.
d = CHIMPO/NO-SINTO correlation values− CHIMPO/SINTO correlation values
The null hypothesis is that the difference d is less than equal or to zero or that the
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CHIMPO/NO-SINTO correlation values are less than or equal to CHIMPO/SINTO
correlation values.
H0 : d ≤ 0
The alternative hypothesis is that the difference d is greater than zero or stated
differently that the CHIMPO/NO-SINTO correlation values are greater than the
CHIMPO/SINTO correlation values.
Ha : d > 0
The calculated d value is shown in the column labeled “Diff. (NOSINTO -
SINTO)” of Table 7.12 and the sign of the difference is displayed in the column
labeled “Sign.”
Table 7.12: Hypothesis Sign Test: CHIMPO/NO-SINTO – CHIMPO/SINTO Corre-
lation Values
The number of positive signs is equal to 9 and number of negative signs is equal
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to 3. The corresponding p-value from Table 7.2 for a 1-tail test with 9 positive signs
is equal to 0.07300.
The result is significant since the p-value is greater than the alpha value of 0.05
thus the null hypothesis is accepted, and the alternative hypothesis is rejected. This
signifies that the NO-SINTO results are significantly closer to the correlation values
to CHIMPO’s awarded bid quantities compared to the difference between SINTO and
CHIMPO results values. This indicates that the NO-SINTO awarded bid quantities
vary together more closely than the SINTO awarded bid quantities, and so NO-SINTO
is a better approximation of CHIMPO results than SINTO.
7.3.4 Test of RMSE
The last item examined to assess how the auction results were affected is to analyze
the Root-Mean-Square-Error (RMSE) between each of the three approximate formu-
lation’s awarded megawatt bid quantities (NO-SINTO, SINTO, and NO) compared
to the CHIMPO awarded bid megawatt quantities. Table 7.13 shows the RMSE val-
ues for the awarded megawatt bid quantities. In this case, a lower RMSE is desirable
because it indicates less error between the awarded bid quantities. The conditional
formatting is across each row and is the same as previously described.
The first observation is as expected that the NO formulation awarded bid quan-
tities has the largest RMSE values relative to the CHIMPO awarded bid quantities.
As before, this expectation arises because NO imposes no transmission outages in the
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SFT. The next observation is that nine of twelve of the CHIMPO/SINTO RMSE val-
ues are larger than the CHIMPO/NO-SINTO values. Like Section 7.13, this supports
the hypothesis that CHIMPO cleared bid megawatt volumes are closer to NO-SINTO
values than to the SINTO cleared bid megawatt volumes.
Table 7.13: RMSE of approximate auction awarded quantities in three approximate
models to awarded quantities in CHIMPO model
As an index of the strength of that conclusion, a hypothesis test can be performed
to confirm whether the CHIMPO/NO-SINTO RMSE values are significantly smaller
than the CHIMPO/SINTO values.
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7.3.4.1 Are the CHIMPO/NO-SINTO RMSE values less than
the CHIMPO/SINTO RMSE values for the awarded
bids?
Let d be defined as the difference between the CHIMPO/NO-SINTO quantities
RMSE values and the CHIMPO/SINTO RMSE values.
d = CHIMPO/NO-SINTO RMSE values− CHIMPO/SINTO RMSE values
The null hypothesis is that the difference d is less than or equal to zero or that
the CHIMPO/NO-SINTO RMSE values are less than or equal to CHIMPO/SINTO
RMSE values.
H0 : d ≤ 0
The alternative hypothesis is that the difference d is greater than zero or stated differ-
ently that the CHIMPO/NO-SINTO RMSE values are greater than the CHIMPO/SINTO
RMSE values.
Ha : d > 0
The calculated d value is shown in the column labeled “Diff. (NOSINTO -
SINTO)” of Table 7.14 and the sign of the difference is displayed in the column
labeled “Sign.”
The number of positive signs is equal to 3 and number of negative signs is equal
to 9. The corresponding p-value from Table 7.2 for a 1-tail test with 3 positive signs
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Table 7.14: Hypothesis Sign Test: CHIMPO/NO-SINTO – CHIMPO/SINTO RMSE
Values
is equal to 0.07300.
The result is not significant since the p-value is greater than the alpha value of
0.05 so the test fails to reject the null hypothesis and the alternative hypothesis is
rejected. This signifies that the CHIMPO/NO-SINTO RMSE values are statistically
less than the CHIMPO/SINTO RMSE values.
7.3.5 Comparison of CRR prices of NO, SINTO,
NO-SINTO with CHIMPO
Thus far, the cleared bid quantities have been analyzed to examine how the bid
results were affected. Below the prices of the dissimilar bid quantities are analyzed
because the prices may be different for cleared bids of the same volumes. The change
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in price is an indication of how the SINTO approach impacts all the other bidders not
just in bid volume differences but also more broadly the prices auction participants
pay for the bids. A second objective is to see which formulation had prices that
most closely resembled the CHIMPO cleared prices for dissimilar bids – in particular,
whether the NO-SINTO model is a good approximation.
The first bid price item examined is the price correlation of the dissimilar bids for
each of the three formulations (NO-SINTO, SINTO and NO) relative to the CHIMPO
cleared dissimilar bid prices. Table 7.15 list the price correlations of the NO-SINTO,
SINTO and NO price results to the CHIMPO price results. The conditional format-
ting is as previously described where the green coloring represents the lowest value,
and the highest is colored red.
Using this color gradient, the first observation to note is that the CHIMPO/NO
price correlations are always smaller than the CHIMPO/NO-SINTO price correlation
values and mostly smaller than the CHIMPO/SINTO values. The second observation
is that the CHIMPO/NO-SINTO price correlation values are mostly greater than
the CHIMPO/SINTO correlations. This indicates that the NO-SINTO prices of the
awarded bids tend to vary more similarly to the CHIMPO prices than do the SINTO
and NO prices.
The RMSE associated with the cleared bid prices is the last item analyzed to
answer: how were the auction results affected. Table 7.16 list the RMSE values for
the auction simulations. The conditional formatting is the same as the one throughout
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Table 7.15: Correlations of clearing prices in three approximate models to awarded
quantities in CHIMPO model
the chapter. The main observations are that the price error values compared to the
CHIMPO prices are mostly smaller for the NO-SINTO than the SINTO prices errors
and the NO price errors are greater than both the SINTO and NO-SINTO prices.
7.3.6 Summary of comparison of auction results
The preceding results shows that there is agreement among the comparative anal-
yses (total quantities awarded, correlations and RMSE) which indicates the following:
• The NO auction allocation results are indeed less constrained so that more
bids/offers are accepted, and the results are more different from CHIMPO that
are the NO-SINTO and SINTO results. This is an intuitive result since the NO
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Table 7.16: RMSE of clearing prices in three approximate models to awarded quan-
tities in CHIMPO model
can be perceived to be less constrained because it does not include outages.
• The SINTO auction allocation results cleared with greater volumes than both
the CHIMPO and NO-SINTO models. This shows that the SINTO SFT allo-
cation is not as conservative as the CHIMPO and NO-SINTO allocations. This
also indicates that the SINTO allocation would not be simultaneously feasible
in the transmission configurations modeled in CHIMPO. It also suggests some
outages exhibited Braess’s paradox such that the NO-SINTO and CHIMPO
SFTs are more constrained than the simultaneous imposition of all outages,
which in the absence of Braess’s paradox would be more constraining.
• The NO-SINTO allocation total awarded bid quantity, the pattern of awarded
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quantities, and prices were closer to the ideal CHIMPO than to the SINTO
model results. These results show that the NO-SINTO is a better approximation
to CHIMPO than the SINTO approximation.
7.4 Question 3: Did the proposed formu-
lations reduce the effects of Braess’s
paradox and SINTO?
As explained in Section 7.2, the explicit identification of outages that cause
Braess’s paradox is challenging in a large network with many flows. This is because
the identification of a Wheatstone bridge circuit is not enough to guarantee Braess’s
paradox will occur; furthermore, there are thousands of contingencies that are also
analyzed to solve the optimization problem. Therefore, the case study in this thesis
instead relies on more indirect evidence that Braess’s paradox affected the allocation
results. One main indication used in this case study is to determine if the objective
function value of the SINTO approach has a lower value than both the CHIMPO and
NO-SINTO values given the same outages modeled in all three formulations (NO-
SINTO, CHIMPO, and SINTO). If so, then the SINTO approach would suppress
higher value bids, be more conservative, and would yield a set of awarded bids that
would be feasible in both the CHIMPO and NO-SINTO topologies. However, the
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results indicate that the SINTO objective function values were not lower than both
the other formulations indicating that a set of higher value bids were not awarded
and were constrained.
Take for example, that in the NO-SINTO the only circuit added compared to the
SINTO was the normally operated (NO) system transmission configuration without
outages. If the SINTO approach is considered the most conservative, then it would
not be expected that adding constraints from a less constrained topology would im-
pact the results. It was found that the SINTO allocation based on the concept of
the simultaneous feasibility test would not be feasible in the normally operated trans-
mission topology with no scheduled outages, which is evidence of Braess’s paradox.
When the outages were modeled according to their actual transmission outage sched-
ules (CHIMPO), the associated topologies modeled in the simultaneous feasibility
test also would be feasible with the SINTO allocation otherwise the CHIMPO objec-
tive function values would not be lower than the SINTO objective function values.
A second indication is to analyze the bids to see which set of bids were closer to
the CHIMPO results. Once again the SINTO results did not compare as well as the
NO-SINTO SFT. Thus, by the evidence, both the CHIMPO and NO-SINTO reduced
the effects of Braess’s paradox for transmission outages that start or end or do both
within the time-frame of the period modeled.
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7.5 Question 4: Which formulation better
approximates CHIMPO, and why?
The main advantage of the CHIMPO formulation is that it most accurately re-
flects the time sequence of the actual unique transmission configurations resulting
from the scheduled planned transmission outages. Revenue inadequacy occurs due to
differences in the transmission system topology used in the SFT for the CRR (FTR)
allocation process and the transmission system topology used to calculate the LMPs
in the day-ahead energy market. For this reason,5 the CHIMPO formulation is used
as the ideal allocation model. However, the CHIMPO model is much larger and thus
likely to be harder to solve, as discussed in Section 5.2. This being the case, the objec-
tive of this question is to see which of the more compact formulation approximations
(NO-SINTO or SINTO) comes closest to the ideal CHIMPO allocation.
This can be assessed by considering the objective function values, MW CRR
awards, and prices of those awards. In this section, the relevant comparisons made
in Section 7.2 and 7.3 are used to draw conclusions about this question. To begin,
the OFVs in Table 7.1 are again analyzed. From observing the color gradient, the
NO-SINTO OFVs are mostly shaded green like the CHIMPO OFVs visually implying
that they both are similar and of lower value than the SINTO OFVs which are mostly
shaded yellow with June being red and July being brown which are both indicating
5This is under the assumption that the outages occur as scheduled and no new outages happen.
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higher values than the yellow colored cells. A sign nonparametric hypothesis test
follows to confirm the visual observation and to determine if the values are statistically
significant.
7.5.1 OFV hypothesis testing 2
7.5.1.1 Is SINTO’s OFV equal to CHIMPO’s OFV?
A two-tailed Sign Test was previously performed in Section 7.2.3.2 to determine
whether the SINTO OFVs were greater than the CHIMPO OFV. The Sign Test
resulted in rejecting the null hypothesis that the difference between SINTO and
CHIMPO OFVs was equal to zero and accepted the alternative hypothesis that the
difference was a positive value. This result provided statistical evidence that the
difference between the SINTO OFV and CHIMPO OFV happened not by chance.
7.5.1.2 Is NO-SINTO’s OFV equal to CHIMPO’s OFV?
Let d be defined as the difference between the NO-SINTO OFV and CHIMPO
OFV.
d = NO-SINTO OFV− CHIMPO OFV
The null hypothesis is that the difference d is equal to zero or stated differently that
the NO-SINTO OFV is equal to the CHIMPO OFV.
H0 : d = 0
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The alternative hypothesis is that the difference d is greater than zero or that the
SINTO OFV is greater than the CHIMPO.
Ha : d > 0
The calculated d value is shown in the column labeled “Diff. (NO SINTO -
CHIMPO)” of Table 7.17 and the sign of the difference is displayed in the column
labeled “Sign.”
Table 7.17: Hypothesis Sign Test: NO-SINTO and CHIMPO OFV
The number of positive signs is equal to 7 and number of negative signs is equal
to 5. The corresponding p-value from Table 7.2 for a 2-tail test with 7 positive signs
is equal to 0.77441.
The result is not significant since the p-value is greater than the alpha value of
0.05 thus the test fails to reject the null hypothesis and the alternative hypothesis is
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rejected. This signifies that the NO-SINTO OFVs are statistically indistinguishable
from the CHIMPO OFVs.
Based on the OFV hypothesis Sign Test results, the SINTO OFVs were statisti-
cally greater than the CHIMPO OFVs and the NO-SINTO OFVs were statistically
equal to the CHIMPO providing evidence that the NO-SINTO OFVs values are a
closer approximation to the CHIMPO OFV than the SINTO OFV.
7.6 Question 5: Can the proposed formu-
lations be practically implemented?
Computational performance is a key consideration in the successful implementa-
tion of optimization software. ERCOT CRR auctions (like FTR auctions in other
RTOs) are conducted in accordance with a specified schedule set by the ERCOT pro-
tocols [160]. The schedule dedicates time and deadlines for all activities to occur. For
example, it establishes market participant CRR bid submission deadlines by speci-
fying when the CRR bidding window opens and when it closes. To that end, there
is limited time for the ERCOT’s CRR engineers to perform the necessary tasks to
conduct the auction which must also take into account the time to sufficiently ana-
lyze and validate the CRR results. Besides, the time span must allow sufficient time
for ERCOT’s CRR engineers to rerun the auction in the event problems occur; for
instance if the auction model run fails due to technical issues. Thus, computational
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performance is an important consideration because any increases in computational
time reduce the provisions made for managing unforeseen CRR auction issues.
Table 7.18 displays the relative run-time for the case study simulations expressed
as a percentage of SINTO’s run-time since SINTO CRR auction methodology is
the current practice.6 As expected due to the additional sets of constraints from
various topologies modeled, the CHIMPO model runs has the largest run-time with
a minimum run-time percentage increase of 231% and a maximum of 1309% realized
in July and December, respectively, compared to SINTO.
Table 7.18: Model relative percent run-time comparison
The second observation is that CHIMPO’s run-time relative to SINTO varies
greatly due to the number of topologies modeled. The NO-SINTO method run-times
are much lower and more consistent (vary less) than the CHIMPO run-times, relative
6The actual run-times are not presented for proprietary reasons.
208
CHAPTER 7. ERCOT CASE STUDY RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
to SINTO run-times. The NO-SINTO run-times ranged from a minimum of 124%
in October to 156% in both May and November. To confirm this observation, the
coefficient of variation (CV) is compared for each model approach and shown in Table
7.19. The coefficient of variation is calculated by dividing the standard deviation of





where s equals the standard deviation and x̄ is the mean.
Also shown in Table 7.19, is the relative percent coefficient of variation. The
relative percent CV for NO-SINTO is only 29% larger than SINTO whereas the
relative percent CV for the CHIMPO is larger than 20 times larger than the SINTO.




Table 7.19: Model run-times coefficient of variation comparison
Another important aspect to consider in implementing either the NO-SINTO
or CHIMPO CRR auction solutions is the incremental data preparation work and
model set-up work. The CHIMPO approach would require an additional topology
pre-processing application to create a set of power flow base cases for each unique
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transmission configurations derived from the transmission outage schedules that the
auction software converts into a corresponding set of constraints. Further, the auction
software would have to reconfigured to enable it to assemble and process the addi-
tional data input sets required. This increases the complexity of preparing the auction
model and the size of the model input data required. At a minimum, it is another step
in the overall process whose potential to fail adds an incremental risk. Conversely,
the NO-SINTO approach is much easier to implement than the CHIMPO because the
only additional data set is one power flow base case that omits the planned outages.
It also has minimal model configuration changes to accommodate the additional set
of constraints.
Implementing the CHIMPO methodology for the ERCOT CRR auction would
be challenging and unlikely to be successful due to much longer run-times that vary
considerably with the fluctuating sets of topology constraints. For example, if an
issue occurred that required a single re-run for the simulated December auction, it
might require twenty-six times the amount of time to do a single SINTO run.7 In
addition, the additional data preparation required and model configuration necessary
creates another obstacle to practical implementation. On the contrary, the NO-
SINTO approach is more implementable due to its relatively modest increase in run-
time that on average increases the SINTO run-time by 39% and minimal increase in
data preparation and model configuration work.
7If the RTO adopted a minimum of one transmission configuration a day then the maximum
set of modeled topologies to create the transmission constraints can increase to 31. The number of
topologies to create the December simulation was 18, see Table 6.3.
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One advantage that the CHIMPO CRR formulation has that is not observed from
the case study findings is that CHIMPO formulation, unlike the SINTO and NO-
SINTO formulations, can model all the transmission outages. As previously explained
in Section 6.5, ERCOT CRR auction engineers select a subset of the transmission
outages based on a day in that month that has the most coincidental transmission
outages.8 The case study used the transmission outages that ERCOT included in its
actual CRR auction, so this potential advantage is not reflected in case study.
7.7 Improving NO-SINTO
In analyzing the NO-SINTO objective function values in Table 7.1, there are
three months (March, August, September) where the NO-SINTO performance was
worse than the SINTO OFVs in comparison to CHIMPO’s OFVs. After analyzing
the outage duration data in Table 7.20, it was observed that in March, 80% of the
outages were month-long outages and August and September the percentage was 61%
and 71%, respectively.
A hypothesis was formed whether the month-long outages exhibited Braess’s para-
dox such that if the outage lasted a total month, then the normally operated in-service
state of the outage would never occur in the CHIMPO constraints, whereas it is rep-
resented in the NO-SINTO normally operated topology constraints. Therefore if the
8One reason for adopting this practice is to prevent problems that create infeasible solution during
contingency analysis in the SFT that could create electrical islands. Not modeling all the outages
that reduce capacity in the CRR auction may also cause revenue inadequacy.
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Table 7.20: Imposed transmission outage duration
“no outages” case in NO-SINTO were modified to include outages that last the entire
period, then the NO-SINTO model would perform better in terms of matching the
CHIMPO results. A means of testing this hypothesis was developed in which the NO-
SINTO is re-run by including all the month-long outages into the normally operated
system topology constraints (which is the additional topology added to SINTO). This
is so that the Braess’s paradox effect arising from the difference between the normally
operated no outage case and one with all month-long outages would not impact the
solution. Previously, none of the month-long outages were included in the NO net-
work constraints in the NO-SINTO model. The objective function results from the
NO-SINTO are shown in the center column of Table 7.21 entitled “Adj NO-SINTO”
together with the other formulation OFV results taken from Table 7.1. The con-
212
CHAPTER 7. ERCOT CASE STUDY RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
ditional formatting is applied to the rows and is the same as used throughout this
chapter. Based on the row coloring, it is observed that the adjustment results in
closer NO-SINTO/CHIMPO OFVs for March, August, and September.
Table 7.21: OFV table with Adj NO-SINTO values
To support this observation and determine if the Adjusted NO-SINTO solution
improved the performance based on the concept that outages that exhibited Braess’s
paradox were being constrained in the NO-SINTO and not the CHIMPO, mean ab-
solute error are calculated for the four formulations compared to CHIMPO’s OFVs.
Table 7.22 list the absolute errors for monthly auction simulations for each formula-
tion approach OFVs compared to the CHIMPO OFVs. As can be seen from the table
by comparing the NO-SINTO to the Adjusted NO-SINTO results, the absolute er-
rors decreased for March from $128,443 to $2,805, August from $141,899 to $306, and
September from $13,802 to $1,241. The average error (MAE) is listed at the bottom
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of the table and which shows that the Adjusted NO-SINTO has the lowest average
error of $24,748 in comparison with the other auction formulations simultaneously
feasibility tests (NO-SINTO, SINTO, and NO).
This result supports the hypothesis that if Braess’s paradox is present for outages
that last the entire period, then including a Normally Operated (no planned outage)
case (which never actually occurs) would result in NO-SINTO over-constraining the
auction, and could result in SINTO being closer than NO-SINTO to CHIMPO. An
outage exhibiting Braess’s paradox lasting the entire period will not be constrained
in either the SINTO or CHIMPO models thus during those situations (where the
month-long outages exhibit Braess’s paradox) the SINTO model may result in a closer
approximation to CHIMPO model than the NO-SINTO model. However, by simply
including the month-long outages in the NO network constraints of the NO-SINTO
model (Adjusted NO-SINTO), the NO-SINTO becomes a better approximation than
before, and now more obviously better than SINTO. This is confirmed by the statis-
tical analysis below.
The improvement in the NO-SINTO formulation and logic behind its hypothesis
is based on the notion of Braess’s paradox and while not a defined mathematical
proof the practical application of the concept provides an indication that it works. In
particular, the adjusted NO-SINTO formulation is better than the SINTO formulation
in all twelve months, which is statistically significant, whereas the original NO-SINTO
was better in only 9 of 12 months, which is not statistically significant. Comparing the
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Table 7.22: Absolute Error OFV compared to CHIMPO including Adjusted NO-
SINTO
two NO-SINTO models, the average absolute error is reduced by almost two-thirds
by adjusting the model.
7.8 Summary of case study findings
The case study provides evidence that Braess’s paradox effect impacts the allo-
cation of CRRs. As intended and expected, the SINTO SFT indeed constrained the
allocation when comparing its allocation to the NO SFT (a model with no outages)
simulation allocation; however, did not prevent the increased capacity from outages
that exhibit Braess’s paradox from posing a revenue inadequacy risk. The presence of
Braess’s paradox is shown by the NO-SINTO SFT being more constraining than the
SINTO SFT even though the only additional constraints added to the NO-SINTO
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formulation are for a topology that does not include outages. The better objective
function for SINTO than for the more accurate CHIMPO model, which better rep-
resents the sequence of outages, indicates that Braess’s paradox can over allocate
financial transmission rights in that there will be a risk of revenue inadequacy in
some hours. This difference in objective functions indicates that the SINTO alloca-
tion of rights is not feasible for some transmission configurations (with fewer outages)
that occur during the month and are considered by CHIMPO. This provides implicit
evidence that some of the outages exhibited Braess’s paradox.
In this case study, the NO-SINTO auction results are closer to the ideal CHIMPO
results than the SINTO. Thus the NO-SINTO approximation is closer to the allo-
cation if the sequence of actual transmission configurations is modeled (CHIMPO)
which may lead to less of a risk of revenue inadequacy than SINTO. If the “no
outages” network that is added to SINTO in order to create NO-SINTO includes
outages that occur for the entire month (and thus are always present in CHIMPO
as well), then NO-SINTO results are even closer to CHIMPO’s results. The inac-
curacies of the NO-SINTO formulation appears small enough that its computational
performance and decreased data needs strongly favors an NO-SINTO implementation
over the full CHIMPO implementation. The CHIMPO computational time substan-
tially increased with the number of topologies used to create the SFT transmission
constraints. Indeed, due to this performance issue, CHIMPO is unlikely to be imple-
mented in today’s RTOs. Since the computational effort required for the SINTO and
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the NO-SINTO are similar but the latter is the much more accurate representation of
the CHIMPO auction, the NO-SINTO formulation is recommended to be used rather
than the current practice of using SINTO to allocate transmission rights.
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Summary and Future Research
8.1 Summary
The first objective of this thesis is to demonstrate that Braess’s paradox in FTR
auctions using the SINTO simultaneous feasibility test in combination with the term
RTO’s provide FTRs (calendar-strip) can in theory lead to revenue inadequacy. This
is accomplished through a simple example presented in Chapter 4. The second objec-
tive is accomplished using this same example to demonstrate that the simultaneous
imposition of non-coincidental outages in FTR auctions can create situations where
combinations of outages exhibiting Braess’s paradox may lead to a less constrained
SFT that causes the overallocation of FTRs. The ERCOT case study in Chapters
6 and 7 also confirm that Braess’s paradox is potentially significant in real CRR
markets.
218
CHAPTER 8. SUMMARY AND FUTURE RESEARCH
The third objective of this research is to develop two practical FTR auction for-
mulations that can reduce or mitigate the Braess’s paradox effect. In Chapter 5,
two practical formulations that can be immediately implemented by RTOs are pre-
sented to remedy the issue. The CHIMPO approach reduces the impact of Braess’s
paradox and SINTO by creating constraints that accurately model the sequence of
transmission configurations derived from the planned transmission outages and how
they affect the feasibility of calendar strip-type FTRs. For this reason, the CHIMPO
formulation is deemed the ideal solution and is used as the benchmark to compare
two approximate models: the SINTO formulation (widely used by RTOs today) and
the NO-SINTO formulation. The second of these formulations which is proposed for
the first time in this thesis (the NO-SINTO FTR auction) simply adds one additional
set of constraints to SINTO based on a transmission system configuration that does
not include planned transmission outages or only includes those outages that last the
entire duration of the transmission rights (e.g., one month).1 The NO-SINTO for-
mulation takes advantage of the concept of Braess’s paradox by adding a seemingly
counter intuitive set of constraints to the SFT that prevents FTRs allocations from
using the increased capacity caused by Braess’s paradox.
The fourth objective is achieved through the ERCOT CRR auction case study
in Chapters 6 and 7. Its goal is to determine which SFT method (SINTO or NO-
SINTO) leads to an allocation that is closer to the ideal CHIMPO formulation. In this
1Adjusted NO-SINTO
219
CHAPTER 8. SUMMARY AND FUTURE RESEARCH
comparison it is deduced through implicit means (e.g., comparing objective function
values and allocations) that some planned outages exhibit the Braess’s paradox effect
in the 2014 ERCOT monthly CRR auction outages that were not mitigated by the
SINTO SFT. The objective function values (OFV) of both the CHIMPO OFVs and
the NO-SINTO OFVs were lower than the SINTO OFVs, thus the SINTO approach
does not achieve the conservative results desired. More importantly it means that the
SINTO allocation is not feasible for at least some of the transmission configurations
scheduled to occur during operations, thus SINTO does risk not accomplishing its
intent of maintaining revenue adequacy.
Lastly, in Section 7.6, the fifth and final objective is to determine through test-
ing the performance of the CHIMPO and NO-SINTO CRR auction approaches on
realistically sized power networks to provide run-time comparisons for practical im-
plementation by RTOs. The run-time performance of the NO-SINTO averaged over
the twelve simulated months is approximately 39% greater than the SINTO average.
The CHIMPO times varied greatly among the monthly simulations due to the number
of topologies modeled, and the average percentage is 700% greater than SINTO’s av-
erage. The recommendation based on this assessment for RTO implementation based
on the computational run-times, CRR market deadlines and additional preparation
work required suggest that NO-SINTO may be implemented to more accurately rep-
resent the feasibility of CRR allocations but the CHIMPO approach is unlikely to be
practical in the near term.
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8.2 Future research
The simultaneous feasibility test is crucial for managing revenue adequacy. The
ideal simultaneous feasibility test applied to the FTR auction would constrain the
FTR release to the capacity of the transmission system based on the resulting network
configurations due to the scheduled outages. In this thesis, it is called the CHIMPO
formulation. However, the CHIMPO formulation is, unfortunately, improbable to im-
plement due to its long and varying run-times but, unlike the SINTO and NO-SINTO
approximations, possesses the capacity of imposing all the operationally feasible out-
ages. Both the SINTO and NO-SINTO approximations use a single topology to model
the outages and therefore are limited in the number of outages they can model.
The first suggestion for future research is to develop a method to minimize the
number of topologies needed to represent a set of scheduled outages without losing
fidelity. For example, two outages occurring in different periods and that are elec-
trically distant from each other (having no mutual impacts) can be combined into
one topology without losing fidelity in the simultaneous feasibility capacity of the
two topologies. Combining outages into a compressed set of topologies reduces the
number of constraints modeled and improve the run-times of the CHIMPO approach.
One approach to reducing the number of topologies while preserving the fidelity
of the model is to identify outages that are electrically independent of each other
and grouping them into the same topology to reduce the set of topologies that rep-
resent the scheduled transmission outages. This problem is similar to the problem of
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quickening contingency analysis by identifying and reducing the number of monitored
elements for each contingency. Methods analogous to concentric relaxation [102,173]
and bounding [102, 174] can be developed to determine the extent that a transmis-
sion outage affects the transmission system. Once this is known the outages whose,
affected systems do not intersect can be combined to the same topology.
The second suggestion for future research is to perform additional testing of the
Adjusted NO-SINTO approximation. The Adjusted NO-SINTO was developed in
Section 7.7 to answer why, in a few months, the SINTO FTR approximation is
closer to CHIMPO than to NO-SINTO. The intention of the additional Adjusted
NO-SINTO simulations is to confirm the hypothesis that the month-long outages
that exhibit Braesss paradox caused the Normal Operation topology constraints of
the NO-SINTO approximation to deviate from the CHIMPO results. This conclusion
is based solely on the objective function values.
Lastly, a final suggestion for future research is to study the impact of calendar
strip FTR products. As shown in this thesis, FTRs awarded by calendar strips
(validity period) using the SINTO FTR auction approximation may cause revenue
inadequacy under certain conditions. In some cases, the calendar strip product is
overly conservative and even if the CHIMPO formulation is used the quantity of
FTRs released is determined by the topology with the least capacity. Reducing the
validity period has advantages for the market participants in that it allows customized
bidding (shaping) for renewable resources, hedge generators that plan to be on outage
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part of the month, make available more FTRs during less constrained periods which
may increase auction revenues and hedging.
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